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felln Robison, Department Head
department of Philosophy
The analytical power should not be confounded with simple ingenuity;
for while the analyst is necessarily ingenious, the ingenious man is
often remarkably incapable of analysis. ...Between ingenuity and the
analytic ability there exists a difference far greater, indeed, than that
between the fancy and the imagination, but of a character very strictly
analogous. It will be found, in fact, that the ingenious are always
fanciful, and the truly imaginative never otherwise than analytic.
Edgar Allan Poe
"The Murders in the Rue Morgue'’
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An anti-skeptical transcendental argument can be loosely defined as an argument that
purports to show that some experience or knowledge of an external world is a
necessary condition of our possession of some knowledge, concept, or cognitive
ability that we know we have. In this dissertation I examine transcendental arguments
by focusing on one such argument given by Immanuel Kant in his Critique ofPure
Reason
,
along with some attempts to interpret that argument by contemporary
commentators.
I proceed by dividing anti-skeptical transcendental arguments into three types:
epistemological, verificationist, and psychological. I examine arguments of the first
two types (themselves often described as ‘Kantian’) and show why they cannot
succeed against the skeptic. I then argue that Kant's Refutation of Idealism is of a
different type: it is psychological in that it concerns the necessary conditions of our
forming beliefs of certain kinds. Many contemporary Kant scholars have claimed that
his anti-skeptical strategy relies on phenomenalism or verificationism; I argue.
vi
however, that Kant in the Refutation employs a clever and hitherto unappreciated
strategy which involves an empiricist principle concerning the origin of simple ideas,
and which does not require either phenomenalism or verificationism. I conclude with
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SKEPTICISM AND TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS
An anti-skeptical transcendental argument can be loosely defined as an argument
that purports to show that some experience or knowledge of an external world is a
necessary condition of our possession of some knowledge, concept, or cognitive ability
that we know we have. In this essay I shall examine transcendental arguments by
focusing on one such argument given by Immanuel Kant in his Critique ofPure Reason ,
along with some attempts to interpret that argument by some modem commentators.
In my first chapter I introduce Kant's approach to epistemological skepticism in
his Critique. I explain the two main founts of skepticism and sketch Kant’s response to
them. I argue in this chapter that Kant has two answers to skepticism. One such answer
involves a widely criticized sort of idealism, in which he appears to answer skepticism by
embracing phenomenalism. However, Kant also presents in the Critique an anti-skeptical
argument called the ‘Refutation of Idealism' which, while very difficult to interpret,
appears to be based on a different sort of reasoning. I conclude Chapter One by sketching
this argument as it is presented and noting the difficulties in interpreting it.
In Chapters Two through Four I examine three approaches to interpreting Kant’s
argument and the correlative three basic approaches to the anti-skeptical transcendental
argument. In Chapter Two I examine what I call the “epistemological” approach to
transcendental arguments and to Kant’s argument in particular. This approach focuses on
the necessary conditions of making justified judgments of certain kinds. Paul Guyer has
argued that Kant’s Refutation of Idealism is an argument that claims that experience of
external-world objects is a necessary condition of making justified judgments about the
temporal order of one’s subjective experiences. I argue, however, that this interpretation,
in addition to being unsubstantiated by the text, cannot yield a successful anti-skeptical
argument.
In Chapter Three I examine the dominant view of transcendental arguments. On
this view, anti-skeptical transcendental arguments like Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
concern the necessary conditions of making meaningful or ‘legitimate’ judgments of
certain kinds. I call this approach the “verificationist” or “Wittgenstinian" approach. This
approach is influenced by logical positivism and by Wittgenstein's views on language. I
begin by discussing logical positivism and examining a hypothetical anti-skeptical
transcendental argument based on its doctrine of verificationism. I argue that
verificationism cannot be the basis for a successful argument of that kind because the
skepticism in question can always be relocated to the level of the meaningfulness of one's
utterances. I then move to a slightly different class of argument given by Putnam and
Burge in which they claim that experience of an external world is a necessary condition
of the ability to refer to external-world objects. For reasons similar to my rejection of
verficiationism as the basis for a transcendental argument against the skeptic, I claim,
again, that this kind of argument cannot succeed. I then address a related sort of anti-
skeptical argument based on Wittgenstein's views on private languages.
In the last two sections of Chapter Three I examine P.F. Strawson’s and Jonathan
Bennett's interpretations of Kant’s anti-skeptical strategy. These interpretations explicitly
claim that Kant in the Refutation of Idealism attempts to show that the experience of an
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external world is a necessary condition of making "meaningful” or “legitimate”
judgments about one's subjective order of experiences. This has become the received
view about the strategy behind anti-skeptical transcendental arguments generally, and
represents the kind of argument that has been subject to devastating criticism by
commentators such as Barry Stroud and Anthony Brueckner. I demonstrate in these
sections why such arguments cannot succeed against the skeptic, for reasons similar to
those that defeated the other verificationism-based arguments dealt with previously.
I believe not only that the quasi-Kantian arguments presented by Strawson and
Bennett fail, but also that they do not represent Kant's reasoning. I argue in Chapter Four
that there is a hitherto unappreciated alternative interpretation of the Refutation of
Idealism which furthermore represents the best anti-skeptical strategy of all those I
consider. This I call the "psychological" interpretation of the Refutation. The
psychological interpretation is that Kant intended to claim that the experience of an
external world is a necessary condition of our making any judgments at all about the
order of our own subjective states. I introduce this interpretation by discussing another
transcendental argument presented by Morris Lipson; it is useful to look at Lipson's
argument because it resembles the argument of the Refutation of Idealism when that
argument is understood correctly. I go on to defend my interpretation and to explain the
hidden premises in Kant’s reasoning. I also claim that Kant's real argument is rather
more interesting and more difficult to defeat than those considered in Chapters Two and
Three. I conclude with a discussion of certain issues about temporal experience that may
cause problems for Kant’s argument.
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CHAPTER I
EPISTEMOLOGICAL SKEPTICISM AND KANT’S REPLIES
1. Cartesian and Humean Skepticism
One of Immanuel Kant's goals in his Critique ofPure Reason was to refute both
Cartesian and Humean skepticism about our knowledge of the external world. Cartesian
skepticism arises as follows. We have, proponents believe, no immediate contact with the
material world and its constituents; we are in direct contact only with our internal mental
states. Our belief in the existence of material objects is the result, therefore, of some sort
of inference on the basis of our sense-impressions. But if I cannot know that my sense-
impressions accurately represent the world around me, then I cannot be certain of any
judgment I make about the external world.' In fact, I cannot be sure that any material
things exist at all.
Descartes considered the possibility that he is in fact a disembodied spirit who is
being deceived by an evil demon into thinking that there is a material world. This evil
demon might be the real cause of all his sense-impressions. Alternatively, his sense-
impressions might be caused by some hidden and unknown faculty in him. If I cannot
rule out these possibilities (and others like them), I cannot, Descartes thought, justifiably
claim to know that material objects (or even a material world) exist. If I cannot know this,
then I cannot be said to have knowledge about the world outside of my perceptions. The
1 Rene Descartes, Meditations,in The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, edited by
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sort of skepticism that denies that I can rule out the possibility of an unknown, sensory
idea-producing faculty in me, or of a deceptive evil demon with the power to create
sensory ideas in me, is the sort of skepticism about our knowledge that I will henceforth
refer to as 'Cartesian skepticism'.
Hume agrees with Descartes that we derive our alleged knowledge of objects
from inferences based on premises about the impressions of our senses. In fact, it is
Hume's view that all the knowledge we possess, and all the meaningful ideas we can
come up with, are ultimately derived either from the impressions of our senses or from
ideas derived from those impressions. 2 Hume's skepticism about our knowledge of the
material world is stronger than that of Descartes. On Hume's view, even if we knew that
our senses were not being deceived and that our sense-impressions accurately reflected
the world around us, we would still have no rational ground to infer on their basis the
existence of independent, spatially and temporally extended substances which cause
sense-impressions in us. If this is the case, of course, then we could surely not be said to
have knowledge of such substances.
Hume attacks our alleged knowledge of the material world by attacking the key
concepts of substance and causation. According to him, our idea of enduring substance-
an idea of a substratum which persists through changes in an object's qualities—arises
from the "easy transition" between one quality and another, in conjunction with the
John Cottingham. et al, Vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.12-6.
“ David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature, 2nd ed. (Oxford: The Oxford University
Press, 1978), p.4.
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mind's propensity to be deceived by this transition. 3 He claims that we never actually
non-inferentially perceive a substance underlying the changes in the sensory qualities we
experience when we look at supposed external objects. What we sense, rather, is a
succession of qualities which may or may not resemble each other; from this experience
we infer an unchanging cause of the succession. We are led to make such an inference by
a kind of confusion of our imagination somewhat similar to the kind of confusion caused
by optical illusions.
On Hume's view, all we really experience, when we are said to experience
substances independent of our minds, are similar impressions had at different times. His
account of why we think any external objects--any spatially and temporally extended
matter existing independently of our minds-exist is essentially the same as his account of
our belief in the existence of substance. Our ideas of external substances are derived from
ideas of apparent relations between similar but intrinsically unrelated sense-impressions,
and from the "easy transition" of the imagination from the thought of one such
impression to another.
4
Because of these factors we experience a psychological
compulsion to infer the existence of objects independent of our impressions which cause
them. The mere occurrence of these diverse impressions 'underdetermines', we might say,
the judgment that external, enduring objects exist; the same impressions could occur
without such things. On Hume's view, the only meaningful ideas we have are those












separate from our impressions, we go beyond what is actually given by our impressions
and beyond what could possibly be actually presented by our senses. Thus, strictly
speaking, beliefs about external objects, insofar as ideas of such things are ideas of
something separate from sense-impressions, are meaningless.
Hume takes a similar view of the idea of causation. He explains that what we
really experience, when we experience an alleged instance of cause and effect (such as
one pool ball allegedly moving because it has been struck by another), is a sequence of
sense-impressions. The conclusion that the first event caused the second is not a product
of reason: there is never any contradiction in supposing that an event of a given type is
not followed by an event ol another type, or vice-versa. The reason why we think there is
a causal connection between perceived events (or between the alleged substances they
represent) is that, in the past, we have seen that experiences similar to the first have been
followed by experiences of the second type. This leads us to think, Hume says, that there
is a causal connection between the two types of events. This is to say that we come to the
conclusion that there is a causal law stating that events of the first type are necessarily
followed by events of the second type. But there is no way to appeal non-circularly to
experience in order to justify any such judgment. To say that there is a causal connection
between events of two types is to say that their conjunction is necessary, rather than
coincidental. Thus it involves the claim that all past, present, and future occurrences of
the first type of event will be followed (given similar conditions) by an occurrence of an
event of the second type. Experience, however, can give us no evidence of what the
world will be like in the future. Since reason can give us no such guarantee either, there
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can be no justification for inferring a causal connection between two events. Thus, as in
the case ofjudgments concerning substances, since any such judgment is
underdetermined by reason and by any possible experiential evidence, we have no
rational or epistemic right to make such a judgment: any such judgment is unjustified.
Consequently, for Hume, we cannot justifiably or meaningfully say that causally
active objects independent of our minds exist. If this is so, then clearly we could not be
said to know that such objects exist; nor could we be said to have knowledge concerning
their properties or causal relations. I shall henceforth refer to this position as 'Humean
skepticism'.
2. The General Principle of Kant's Analogies of Experience
In the Preface to his Critique Kant laments that
it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general that the
existence of things outside us. ..must be accepted on faith , and if anyone thinks
good to doubt their existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any
satisfactory proof. (Bxl n.)6
The section of Kant's Critique entitled "The Analogies of Experience" plays a role in both
the two major answers Kant gives to Cartesian and Humean skepticism. 7 The Analogies
are involved in two different anti-skeptical arguments presented by Kant, corresponding
to the two editions of the Critique. Although the way he uses them against the skeptic
6
Unless otherwise noted, all references to Kant will be from the Kemp Smith
translation (Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason
,
translated by Norman Kemp Smith
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1929)). All references to this text will be in the form of in-
text notes, using page numbers from the two original editions (designated by A and B,
respectively)
7
The exposition of the Analogies that follows owes much to Paul Guyer.
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differs in these two editions, the Analogies themselves are essentially the same in each.
Kant attempts to show, while accepting Descartes' and Hume's premise that our
knowledge of particular substances and their causal relationships is inferential, that our
possession and application of the concepts of substance and cause is an a priori condition
of the formation of any representation of an objective world.
The term representation' is a technical term Kant uses frequently. In general, one
forms a representation when one brings a raw sense-impression, or a complex of such,
under some concept. One has a representation when one is aware of (when one
'represents') some data of consciousness as something. On the one hand, a representation
is what one has when one is aware of a bit of sensory information as a perceptual
experience. Another variety of representation comes when one represents a complex of
sense-data as of an object, such as of a house or a ship. Alternatively, a representation
may be the result of bringing some concept or concepts under another concept, such as
when one thinks of all men as mortal. All our conscious experiences, on Kant's view, are
representations of one of these kinds. What concerns Kant in the Analogies is the
representation of things as objective, or independent of the perceiver.
What Kant calls the "General Principle of the Analogies" is the statement that
"experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of
perceptions," where 'experience' is defined as knowledge of objects through the
unification of perceptions under a concept (B218). What Kant has in mind is the
inference, like the one Hume describes, from beliefs about sense-impressions to beliefs
about the existence of enduring, independent objects or substances. One way of looking
9
at this inference is as a unification of diverse impressions in the idea of an object which
endures and which bears a variety of properties. Kant's goal in the Analogies is to locate
some necessary conceptual presuppositions of such unification; in so doing, he will attack
Hume’s claim that the concepts of substance and cause (traditionally understood) are a
posteriori concepts derived (and derived illegitimately) from experience.
The ability to distinguish between an arbitrary and a non-arbitrary temporal
ordering of one’s experiences is the key condition, on Kant's view, of the representation
of objects and an objective world. He notes that "in experience, perceptions come
together only in accidental order" (B219). What he means by this is that the order in
which perceptions are apprehended by the mind does not necessarily reflect the temporal
ordering of the objects or objective events they are then taken to represent. To represent
an objective order of perceptions is to think of them as being related in a necessary (i.e.,
non-arbitrary) way, as opposed to the merely accidental order through which the mind
apprehends them. On this, Kant claims, is based the possibility of our distinguishing
between our subjective experiences and an objective world. In the First Analogy Kant
explains this notion, with reference to the role of the concept of substance in making the
distinction in question.
3. The First Analogy
In the First Analogy Kant argues that the concept of substance is essential to the
representation of an objective change. His opening (very opaque) summary of the
10
argument contains three curious claims which constitute the heart of his argument. 8 The




second (presented as a consequence of the first) is that "there must be found in the objects
of perception, that is, in the appearances, the substratum [or 'permanent'] which
represents time in general." The third (a consequence of the second) is that "all change or
coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this substratum, and through
relation of the appearances to it."
Later in the First Analogy Kant sheds some light on these claims:
Our apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and is
therefore always changing. Through it alone we can never determine whether this
manifold, as object of experience, is coexistent or in sequence. For such
determination we require an underlying ground which exists at all times, that is,
something abiding and permanent, of which all change and coexistence are only
so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists.... [I]n [the
permanent] alone is any determination of time possible. (A182-3/B225-6)
Alteration can therefore be perceived only in substances. A coming to be or
ceasing to be which is not simply a determination of that which endures cannot be
a possible perception. For this enduring thing is what makes possible the
representation of the transition from one state to another, and from not-being to
being. These transitions can be empirically known only as changing
determinations of that which endures. If you assume that something simply begins
to be, then you must have a point in time in which it was not. But to what do you
attach this point, if not to that which already exists? For a preceding empty time is
not itself an object of perception. But if we connect the coming to be with things
that have previously existed, and which persist in existence up to the moment of
this coming to be, this latter must be simply a determination of that which
precedes it. Similarly also with ceasing to be; it presupposes the empirical
representation of a time in which an appearance no longer exists. (A188/B231)
g
In all respects relevant to my purposes here, the arguments in the A and B editions of
the Critique are the same
9
Numbers preceded by an 'R' refer to Kant's Reflexionen
,
as they appear in Kants
gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften
(29 vols.), edited by Walter de Gruyter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902). R5637 is in
vol.XVIII, pp.271-2, and R631 1 is in vol.XVIII, p.61 1.
Kant's argument can be divided into three main points (I follow Guyer in this 10 ). Kant
observes that there is nothing that could count as the direct perception of the absence of a
state of affairs. Whenever we experience the world, we experience some state of affairs in
it. We experience changes in the states of affairs we perceive, but the experience of these
changes involves only the replacement of one state of affairs by another, rather than an
'empty' moment of time preceding or following some state of the world. Time by itself is
not an object of perception; we perceive only things in time.
The second premise Kant employs is that our apprehension is successive and
always changing. This is to say, the content of our representations is constantly shifting;
we may consider our raw, subjective experience of the world as a succession of fleeting
representations, even if what we think of them as representing, or represent through them,
is an independent and enduring thing or state of affairs. There is no such thing, Kant
believes, as the direct perception of the endurance of an object or state of affairs.
The important consequence of this fact is that, purely in terms of the content of
one's sense-impressions, any given succession of subjective experiences could be
interpreted in three ways. First, it could be taken to represent a change in one's focus or
point of view on an unchanging object or scene. Second, it could be taken to represent the
change in place of two otherwise unchanging objects. Finally, it could be interpreted as
representing an actual objective change: a change in the objective qualities of a state of
affairs (the succession of one state of affairs upon another).
10
Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims ofKnowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), pp.226-7.
What, then, could justify us in inferring, given a change in subjective state, that an
objective change has in fact taken place? The detection of some incompatibility between
the states we perceive would give us a ground to think an objective change has occurred.
But this alone is not sufficient. A rule stating simply a logical incompatibility between
something being, for example, both wooden and ashen will not do: a sequence in which
the perception of something wooden is followed by the perception of something ashen
could be caused by one’s seeing wood in one place and ash in another, or by the
replacement of something wooden with something ashen (A185/B228). In neither case
would there be change in the object. The experience of something wooden followed by
the experience of something ashen can be counted as evidence of objective change-
change in the object rather than in the perceiver's point of view-only if one postulates the
existence of some thing, or substance, which has undergone a transformation from wood
to ash.
The ability to distinguish between an objective temporal order and a subjective
one rests on the ability to distinguish objective change from the mere subjective
succession of perceptions. The order in which things happen in the world cannot be
directly inferred from the order of my perceptions, because that order could represent any
of a number of things—including a mere change in perspective on my part, rather than a
change in the world. As Kant explains in the First Analogy, I must add to a given
sequence of my perceptions the thought that that sequence pertains to a single enduring
and independent substance undergoing alteration in order to think of that sequence as
representing something objective rather than as just being an accidental subjective
13
sequence. The concept of substance, then, is necessary even to form the thought of a non-
accidental temporal order of perceptions. If this is so, then it is clearly also necessary to
judge that an objective change has occurred. We may call such a judgment an 'objective
temporal judgment' [OTJ],
This line of reasoning explains Kant's statement that "there must be found in the
objects of perception, that is, in the appearances, the substratum which represents time in
general; and all change or coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this
substratum, and through relation of the appearances to it." The postulation of a substance
which endures through changes is necessary to the distinction between objective change
and coexistence, and between objective and subjective change. Thus the concept of
objective change presupposes the concept of substance, and the possibility of making
OTJs is dependent on the possession and application of such a concept. But if the very
ability to distinguish between the mere play of one's subjective representations and actual
objective change rests on supposing that substance exists (and cannot be in two
incompatible states at the same time), and the empiricist concedes (as he does) that we do
(by making OTJs) make this distinction, then the empiricist must be wrong in claiming
that the concept of substance is derived from the experience of an apparently objective
world.
This does not, however, provide a response to the Cartesian skeptic or to the
skeptical empiricist who, like Hume, holds that all judgments asserting the existence of
substances may be false. At best, all Kant has shown is that the judgment that a substance
exists is a necessary presupposition of any judgment that an objective change has taken
14
place, rather than a merely subjective one. At best this would suggest that, if we have
knowledge of objective change, then we must also have knowledge of objects enduring
through such change. This does not itself establish that any judgments we make about
objects or objective change are true, or even justified. There are two ways Kant tries to
establish the claim that we do have knowledge of an objective world; these two methods
correspond to the two editions of the Critique. The first edition attempt is clearly
unsatisfactory; the second edition attempt is obscure and incomplete, but considerably
more interesting. I shall deal with each in turn.
4. Kant's First Edition Idealism
In the section of the first edition of the Critique entitled the 'Fourth Paralogism',
Kant employs his doctrine of transcendental idealism in an attempt to respond to
Cartesian skepticism. There he presents Descartes' view as the view that we must infer
the existence of outer objects—and an outer world—from our "inner perception" (A368).
Since "the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain,"
Descartes is concerned in his Meditations that whether the cause of our perceptions is
internal or external is always doubtful.
Kant counters with "transcendental idealism," or "the doctrine that appearances
[objects which appear to us] are to be regarded as being representations only, not things
in themselves" (A369). The transcendental idealist, Kant says, considers external bodies
to be "mere appearances, and "therefore nothing but a species of my representations"
(A3 70). Since the Cartesian concedes that we are immediately acquainted with our
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subjective representations, transcendental idealism "removes all difficulty in the way of
accepting the existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our mere self-
consciousness."
Transcendental idealism can be applied to the results of the First Analogy as
follows. By that argument Kant believes he has established that the application of the
concept of substance is necessary to the distinction between the mere accidental order in
which one experiences objects and events and the objective order of the events one
experiences. This is the case because we must think of different qualities as attaching to
the same substance, considered at different times, in order to represent to ourselves
objective change. Thus the representation of substances is necessary to the experience of
an objective world with its own temporal sequence. Since (by Kant's idealism), the mere
representation of an external body is sufficient evidence to say of it that it is real, then we
must know that substances exist.
One might respond that this account betrays an inconsistency, since on the one
hand Kant speaks of the need for a distinction between an objective and subjective order,
and on the other hand identities objects with their subjective representations. But
according to transcendental idealism, the key distinction between representing a
subjective order of representations and representing an objective order of things
represented is the indifference or accidental nature of the subjective order, as contrasted
to the necessity, non-arbitrariness, or rule-govemedness of the objective order. To
represent a subjective order is to represent an order of perceptions which could equally be
reproduced in another order; to represent an objective order is to represent a sequence of
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perceptions the order of which is determined or governed by rules of some kind. The
difference between these orders that the First Analogy reveals is just that, when we
represent objective change, we think of the order of the representations by which it is
constituted as caused by the changing states of something that endures through their
change.
Transcendental idealism thus responds to Cartesian skepticism by reducing
objects to representations and objective change in objects to a way of connecting
representations. Since the Cartesian concedes that we are immediately aware of our own
representations, or 'inner perceptions', there is no problem with asserting that we have
knowledge of objects and the objective world.
This response to skepticism is unsatisfactory because it degrades objects to the
status ol representations. Although Kant does give criteria to distinguish 'objective'
entities from 'subjective' ones, the objective entities of the Fourth Paralogism are not the
robustly independent objects the knowledge of which Descartes casts doubt upon.
Henry Allison tries to rescue Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism from this
charge. Kant describes "empirically ideal" objects as subjective appearances, or Cartesian
mental entities or impressions, while he characterizes "empirically real" objects as the
non-subjective objects that appear (B35/A20). The transcendental is for Kant, as Allison
puts it, "the level of philosophical reflection upon experience." 1
1
The empirical and the
transcendental refer to two different ways of considering objects: in relation to the
epistemic conditions of their appearing to us, and independently of any such conditions
1
1
Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New haven: Yale University Press,
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(A27/B43-A28/B44; see Allison, p.7). Space and time, for example, are held by Kant to
be merely the forms in which we represent, respectively, objects external to ourselves and
our own representations. Since objects, if they are to be represented (and thus known),
must be represented spatially and temporally, the representations of space and time are a
prion epistemic conditions of our perception of objects. Thus space and time are
empirically real (he claims) insofar as the objects which appear to us are thought of as
appearances, rather than as things in themselves, or things considered independently of
the conditions under which they can be known by us (A28/B44). Although spatiality, on
Kant's view, can be ascribed to objects insofar as we represent them, on his view nothing
can be said of whether objects considered in themselves—as they really are, in abstraction
from any of the epistemic conditions placed on our perceiving them-are spatial or
temporal (B44/A28, B52/A35-B53/A36). Thus space and time are, for Kant,
transcendentally ideal.
It is true that Kant's language sometimes suggests the interpretation of his
empirical realism/transcendental idealism distinction as resting on a distinction between
two ways of 'considering' objects. But it remains a mystery how the way in which we
think of objects, or the context in which we think of them, actually determines facts about
them.
Lacking a coherent defense of the doctrine, Kant establishes with transcendental
idealism no more than a demonstration of the existence of mental constructs, which
1983), p.7.
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Descartes never doubts. The challenge presented by Cartesian skepticism is to show that
a material world independent of us exists, and this Kant fails to do with his idealism.
5. The Second Edition Refutation of Idealism
Kant adds to the second edition of the Critique a section called the "Refutation of
Idealism (hereafter, 'the Refutation'). Once again he takes Descartes as his target, but
this time he gives an argument that does not take transcendental idealism as a premise.
He represents Descartes skepticism as the position that "the existence of objects in space
outside us" is "doubtful and indemonstrable" (B274). The Refutation is intended, then, to
prove that objects outside us exist. Kant's proof runs as follows:
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of
time presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent cannot
be an intuition'^ in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which
are to be met with in me are representations; and as representations themselves
require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so
my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined. Thus
perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not
through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the
determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of
actual things which I perceive outside me. ...In other words, the consciousness of
my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of
other things outside me (B275-6). (I have made changes in accordance with
Kant's instructions in the preface to the second edition [Bxxxix])
The second sentence is a clear reference to the First Analogy. This tells us that we
can understand 'determination of time' in this context as meaning the placement of
something in a time-order. In the First Analogy, the problem was explaining what is
presupposed by the interpretation of a given subjective succession as representing a
12
Note: an 'intuition' for Kant is a sensory representation, or an impression of either
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determinate, or particular, objective order; in other words, the question was of the
necessary conditions of making OTJs. In the Refutation Kant looks into the necessary
conditions of placing myself-my own existence-in time. By this Kant does not mean the
placement of myself qua enduring substance in time: as we have seen, Kant agrees with
Hume that substances are not directly perceived. Kant agrees with Hume that I have no
direct perception of myself qua an entity which endures through the changes that take
place in my subjective states. The only alternative is that Kant is looking into the
necessary conditions of my placing my subjective states in a particular order (thus
'determining' them in time). This reading is strongly supported by a later Reflexion on the
Refutation:
Since we therefore could not perceive succession in ourselves, and thus could not
order any inner experience..., even inner experience can be thought only by means
of the relation of our senses to objects external to us. 13
Thus the question in the Refutation, by contrast to the First Analogy, is that of how we
can perform STJs-subjective temporal judgments. The First Analogy is thus logically
posterior to the Refutation, for the First Analogy assumes that I have already determined
the sequence of my subjective representations, and that on the basis this sequence
together with an application of the notion of a substance I infer an objective order of
events.
It is an important and implicit premise, then, of the Refutation that even the
temporal order of my subjective representations is not immediately given, but must be
outer or inner sense.
13




somehow derived from some other information. This premise is most clearly expressed
by Kant in the A version of his Transcendental Deduction:
Every intuition contains in itself a manifold which can be represented as a
manifold only in so far as the mind distinguishes the time in the sequence of one
impression upon another; for each representation, in sofar as it is contained in a
single moment
,
can never be anything but absolute unity. (A99)
In order to interpret some inner state of mine as the representation of a temporally
extended event, I must link together some recollection or recollections of previous states
of affairs with my perception of the current state of affairs. In other words, I must bring
together past representation of mine with present ones. The claim made by A99 is that my
total subjective state at any “single moment” is in its formal reality just a single
representation; as Guyer puts it, "the manifold of successive representations is not in fact
before one's mind at the moment of its recollection in the way in which a dozen eggs can
be before one's eyes." 14 In order to have knowledge of even a subjective succession of
representations, I must interpret my current state as presenting such a succession. And
any such state can be interpreted in several different ways: as a single complex
representation (as in my experience of any scene which involves more than one type of
perceptual input); as a collection of temporally diverse representations (as in my
experience of a temporally extended event, such as a piece of wood turning into ash), or
as one part of an ongoing representation (as in my experience of a continuous tone). And
if it is a question of ordering any sequence of representations, then one must also






This interpretation cannot be made on the basis of the content of the complex
representation alone. There is no mark included in the content of my representations
which indicates its place in my subjective temporal order as a digital time display
included in the lower right-hand comer of every present impression or recollected
representation might do. I cannot directly 'read' the proper temporal position of a
representation off its content alone.
Hume agrees that the distinction, in reflection, between present sense impressions
and memories thereof cannot be explained in terms of the content or nature of the ideas to
which they give rise. 1 However, he claims that present perceptions and memories are
distinguished on the basis of their relative "force and vivacity"; 16 present perceptions
exhibit, on his view, a greater "pitch of vivacity" than memories, which allows us always
to distinguish between the two. On Hume's view, then, the interpretation of a current
complex representation as, for example, the representation of a current state of an object
and the representation of its previous state can be accomplished simply by considering
the phenomenological difference between the two kinds of representation.
One possible Kantian response to Hume might be that this phenomenological
feature, even if it exists, could not be the original explanation for my ability to make the
requisite sort of distinction. For to associate certain phenomenological features with
certain kinds of representation in the first place, I must already be able to make the




16 Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles
ofMorals, 3rd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975), p.17.
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correlate a particular sort of phenomenological feature with a particular sort of
representation. Thus, to come to the understanding that my current state is interpretable in
these kinds of ways, I must have some prior basis for distinguishing between them.
Let us suppose for the time being, then, that Hume's account is inadequate. What
other basis could I have for distinguishing between internal states which represent a
temporally simultaneous complex of perceptions and those which represent a temporally
diverse set of perceptions? As in the First Analogy, Kant in the Refutation suggests that I
can temporally order my perceptions only relative to some permanent thing. Once again,
the idea seems to be that I must apply some extra-logical rules in order to make such
distinctions; I must relate the parts of my subjective state either to changes in the states of
substances or my placement in respect to them.
The Refutation does not on the face of it fall prey to the major limitation of Kant's
Fourth Paralogism argument: unlike the Fourth Paralogism, the Refutation does not
appear to promote the reduction of objects to representations. In fact, the argument makes
the claim on the claim that access to my representations alone would be insufficient to
make STJs, and thus would be insufficient to form any determinate representation of
myself or of the external world.
The point of difficulty in the Refutation is the following. While the First Analogy
appears to ground only the claim that the representation or postulation of enduring things
is necessary to interpret subjective states as representing an objective order, he claims in
the Refutation that the mere representation of enduring things outside me is not sufficient
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to order my subjective perceptions: this ordering is said to be possible only given the
existence of actual things which I perceive outside me."
It would seem that, to judge that my representations are or have been either
sequential or simultaneous, it would be sufficient to conceive of an enduring subject of
those representations-the same subject who now is recollecting them and bringing them
together. By conceiving of my representations as all belonging to an enduring self, I can
then think of them as sequential alterations of myself. Why must the notion of an
enduring substance independent of myself be involved? Kant responds in a last-minute
note added to the preface to the B version of the Critique :
through inner experience I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently
also of its determinability in time), and this is more than to be conscious merely of
my representation. It is identical with the empirical consciousness of my
existence, which is determinable only through relation to something which, while
bound up with my existence, is outside me. ..The reality of outer sense is thus
necessarily bound up with inner sense, if experience in general is to be possible at
all; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things outside me, which
are in relation to my sense, as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in
time (Bxxxix-xli n.).
I think that Kant's answer is that, when we are speaking of the necessary conditions of
STJs, we are also speaking of the necessary conditions of having any knowledge of my
self at aH. Kant often contrasts this notion of self-knowledge, 'empirical self-
consciousness', with 'intellectual' self-consciousness, which can be summarized by the
analytic proposition that all of my experiences must belong to me (see Bxl n., B131-2).
This latter notion, however, being merely analytic, does not imply any empirical
knowledge of the self at all. Kant's idea seems to be that so-called empirical knowledge
of the self is just knowledge of the content and ordering of subjective experiences—none
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of which is itself actually experience of a self. The self, in Henry Allison's words, "in
referring its representations to itself in judgments of inner sense. ..does not conceive of
them as representations of itself in the way outer intuitions are regarded as
representations of outer objects. Instead, it conceives of these representations as
belonging to itself, as its own 'subjective objects'." 17 Thus the perception of a self cannot
be the condition of the ordering of subjective experience, since the only 'perception' of a
self one has is precisely the reflective experience of the order of subjective experience.
This answer is in line with Hume's thinking, since Hume agrees that there is no
direct perception of a self qua substance enduring through one's diverse states. 18 Hume,
ot course, also thinks there is no direct perception of external substances. However, Kant
thinks that the case of external substances differs from that of a self-substance. In a note
appended to the Refutation Kant says that
The consciousness of myself in the representation T is not an intuition, but a
merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This T
has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as permanent, might
serve as a correlate for the determination of time in inner sense-in the manner in
which, for instance, impenetrability serves in our empirical intuition of matter.
(B278)
There is an experiential criterion we can point to to identify an experience of an external
object; there is no such sense-experience when it comes to the self. I think it is this
distinction that Kant exploits in ruling out the possibility that the substance in relation to
which I order my subjective experiences is myself; the idea seems to be that, while there
is a manifold of sense-data, purportedly of external objects, which provides the content of
17







references to them, there is no such data when it comes to describing the self. The notion
of a self, of which we have empirical knowledge, and which is independent of the
experiences which we ascribe to it, is thus devoid of content. Consequently, it cannot be
knowledge of such a self which explains our subjective temporal judgments.
The obvious shortcoming of Kant's Refutation as it stands is that he fails to
explain why, as in the First Analogy, the mere postulation of an enduring external object
or objects would not be enough to explain the possibility of STJs. Kant appears to make
the leap from the notion that the concept of substance is necessary to represent objective
change, or a subjective succession, directly to the claim that an actual, veridical
perception of external substance is necessary to accomplish this. It is possible that this
stronger claim was what he intended all along in the First Analogy; but then the question
of why this must be so would apply equally there. In the Analogies and in the "General
Note on the System of Principles" (which comes shortly after the Analogies and the
Refutation) Kant states repeatedly that the perception of a "permanent" is necessary to
perceive or "determine" alteration (e.g., A182/B225), or to "obtain" or "exhibit" (e.g.,
B291) the notion of alteration. In Chapter Four I will examine some reasons why this
might be so. Regardless of how Kant justifies this claim, however, it would seem that the
Cartesian skeptic could concede it while still claiming that all such perceptions could be
the product of an evil demon or an unknown faculty within us. The Humean skeptic could
concede it (though this would mean conceding, contra empiricism, that the concept of
substance is innate) while still maintaining that our inferences that substances actually
exist are unwarranted.
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Kant thus does not say enough to establish the strong anti-skeptical claim of the
Refutation. Neverthless, numerous commentators have tried to fill in the gaps in Kant’s
argument and to make some version of his anti-skeptical claim stick. The central problem
in reading the Refutation is in understanding why Kant might think that to come to have
beliefs about or knowledge of the temporal order of one's subjective states requires the
actual experience of external objects. The challenge for a Kantian or neo-Kantian
refutation of skepticism is, then, to give a transcendental argument 19 which establishes a
connection between one's ability to make STJs (or to perform some other, related,
fundamental act necessary to cognition as we know it) and the existence of external
objects.
As it has turned out, there have been three ways the argument of the Refutation
has been reconstructed or revised; I shall explain and critically examine each of them in
the next three chapters. In Chapter Two I shall examine an interpretation of the
Refutation which connects the possibility ofjustified STJs with the existence of external
19
In the Critique Kant discusses the practice of epistemology at the level of the
"transcendental"; that level is the level concerned with the possibility of certain kinds of
experience or knowledge in general (A56/B80-A57/B81). Kant identifies an inquiry as
'transcendental' when it concerns the conditions of the possibility of the possession or
employment of intuitions, concepts, or knowledge. This has led to the coining of the term
'transcendental argument' to refer to arguments which fall within the transcendental realm
so defined. The argument of the First Analogy is a transcendental argument, in that it
deals primarily with the necessary conditions of coming to have a certain sort of
representation. It is not—by itself—primarily an anti-skeptical transcendental argument,
because the condition it identifies is that of the possession of a certain sort of concept,
rather than the existence of external objects or the possession of veridical beliefs about
external objects. When conjoined with Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism the
First Analogy becomes an anti-skeptical transcendental argument; the Refutation, as we
have seen, is an anti-skeptical argument which utilizes the conclusion of the First
Analogy.
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objects. In Chapter Three I shall examine several reconstructions of Kant's argument and
neo-Kantian refutations of skepticism which connect the ability to make legitimate or
meaningful judgments about external objects with the existence of external objects. In
Chapter Four I shall present my own reconstruction of the Refutation which. I shall
argue, is both more faithful to Kant's original intent and has a greater promise of success





1 . Guyer's Reading
Paul Guyer interprets the Refutation as an argument that the perception of
enduring, independent objects is a necessary condition for makingjustified judgments
concerning the order of our subjective states. He says that he cannot see
in what sense a principle which is not a psychological factor in the production of a
form of beliefcan serve as a condition of the possibility of a form ofjudgment
except by furnishing the basic framework for the justification of beliefs.
Guyer s conclusion is that the condition Kant cites in the Refutation—the perception of
material objects-is an epistemological condition: a condition for the verification of
STJs.
2
As Guyer notes, the argument requires the assumptions that any STJ requires an
act ofjudgment and that neither the representational contents nor the phenomenological
features of any subjective state are sufficient to justify an STJ concerning that state. 3 He
spells out his version of the argument as follows. Consider two objective states of affairs
A and B, and two possible subjective states which might represent these states of affairs.
Suppose we designate these subjective states as 'being appeared to A-ly' and 'being






Guyer's interpretation borrows a lot from Melnick's interpretation of Kant's Second
Analogy (Arthur Melnick, Kant's Analogies ofExperience [Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1973]).
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impossibility involved in supposing either that these states represent a subject's now
being appeared to A-ly and B-ly or that they represent that subject's now being appeared
to A-ly and now remembering having been appeared to B-ly, there could be no way for
the subject to justify either supposition.
Suppose A and B involve the presence of a desk and a chair, respectively. There
is no logical or spatio-temporal impossibility, Guyer notes, in the chair and desk being in
the room either at the same time or successively. According to Guyer, the only thing that
could justify one interpretation or the other is either a justified belief about the successive
presence of a chair and a desk or a justified belief about the simultaneous presence of a
chair and a desk. Therefore, given that we make justified STJs, we must be justified in
thinking that there exist objects external to us which are causally related to our subjective
states/
It is clear from this why the causal agent or agents in question cannot be our
enduring selves, or causally active hidden faculties within ourselves. Guyer's claim is that
our STJs are justified on the basis of beliefs about objective states of affairs and beliefs
about causal laws governing those states of affairs and their effects on us. On the
assumption that some of our STJs are justified he concludes that some of our beliefs
4
Note that Guyer is only discussing a necessary, rather than sufficient, condition of the
justification of certain sorts of belief.
5 Guyer is not clear about what he thinks a beliefs being "justified" entails. I think he
must be assuming an externalist theory ofjustification, according to which a beliefs
being justified depends in part on its actually being causally related (in the right sort of
way) to the state of affairs it represents. Otherwise, it would not be clear that this
argument would serve as a proof that external objects exist. This interpretation of Guyer
is also suggested by the fact that he sometimes equates a beliefs being justified with its
constituting knowledge (Guyer, p.3 1 5).
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about objective states ot affairs are also. But if all our external-world beliefs are actually
based on sense-impressions created by a hidden faculty within us, then none of our
beliefs about objective states of affairs can be justified. 6
Guyer notes that his argument could give rise to a charge of circularity. 7 Although
he claims that we must justify our STJs by means of causal inferences regarding the
action of external bodies on ourselves, he acknowledges that our knowledge of the causal
powers of objects is generated by means of induction from subjective successions. This
might be thought to result in a circular account of how we make STJs: one might think
his account implies that STJs are based on beliefs about causal laws which in turn are
based on induction on the basis of those very same STJs.
Guyer responds that this would indeed be circular, if his version of Kant’s
Refutation concerned necessary conditions of the psychological process through which
consciousness of subjective succession and objective causal laws is generated. But his
account concerns only necessary conditions of confirming or justifying beliefs about
subjective succession or objective causal laws, however those beliefs may arise. No circle
is implied, because Guyer is not claiming that my STJs depend for their very existence on
causal judgments which in turn depend for their existence on the very same STJs.
Neither is Guyer's account circular in the sense that it implies that the justification
of particular STJs is dependent on causal judgments that are themselves justified by the
same STJs. Other beliefs about my subjective sequences of experiences can serve to
6
Again, this assumes an externalist analysis ofjustification; Guyer's interpretation






confirm beliefs about objective states of affairs and objective causal laws, and various
beliefs about external objects can confirm particular STJs. Therefore there is no difficulty
"in the supposition that any particular belief about external objects might be accepted or
rejected on the basis of some belief about a subjective succession of representations." 8
For the same reason, Guyer's account does not require an objectionable form of
verificationism. His account connects ihe justification of STJs with justified beliefs about
the objective world; an objectionable verificationism, by contrast, would connect the
meaningfulness of STJs with such beliefs. 9
Although I am more concerned in this chapter with Guyer's claim that the
Refutation as he construes it provides a successful refutation of skepticism, I should also
note that Guyer's interpretation of the Refutation is a gross misreading. He interprets
Kant's argument as concerning the necessary conditions of the justification of particular
knowledge claims about the order of one’s mental states. But in a note on the Refutation
Kant says that
all we have here sought to prove is that inner experience in general is possible
only through outer experience in general. Whether this or that supposed
experience be not purely imaginary must be ascertained from its special
determinations, and through its congruence with the criteria of all real experience
(B278-9)
Kant thus explicitly contrasts his project in the Refutation with the project ofjustifying




See the following chapter for a discussion of neo-Kantian arguments involving forms
of verificationism.
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suggesting that Kant's concern is with the justification of STJs. Rather, he talks in terms
of the "possibility" of the determinate consciousness of one’s existence in time.
This being said, however, it is worth taking a look at whether the argument as
Guyer sees it has a chance against skepticism.
2. Brueckner's Criticism
Anthony Brueckner has a criticism of Guyer's argument which runs as follows.
Suppose that my current representation, Z, in fact represents two other representations, X
and Y, as having been experienced successively. For example, Z could be a memory of Y
succeeding X. Z is, in my terminology, an STJ. According to Guyer's account, if any
beliel like Z is to be justified, I must have a justified beliefW which represents X and Y
as being simultaneous with successive states of an object, or states of affairs. 10 The
presence of W, in fact, on Guyer's view determines the content of Z: recall that it is
Guyer's view that, in terms of content alone, any complex subjective state may be
interpreted as a representation of successive or simultaneous perceptions. Thus if, instead
ot W, I had a representation W' which represented X and Y as being simultaneous with
coexistent parts of an object, then Z would be a different representation; Z, in that case,
would be a representation ofX and Y as simultaneous.
As Brueckner observes, it is crucial to Guyer's argument that a representation like
W is necessary, rather than just sufticient, for any Z to be justified. 11 Brueckner suggests,
10
Anthony Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical Epistemology of the Refutation of
Idealism," Philosophical Topics
, 19 (1991), pp.34-6.
11
Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical...", p.38.
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however, that my belief of Z’s content might well be justified by virtue of its
membership in a coherent set of inferentially connected beliefs concerning only my
representations and their temporal relations." 12 Suppose, for example, I have a number of
beliefs B about X-like representations and Y-like representations. These beliefs,
according to Brueckner, could inductively justify, by demonstrating a constant
conjunction of X-like representations with Y-like representations, the judgment that X-
hke representations always precede Y-like representations. The set of beliefs B, he
claims, could directly justify my belief in the content of Z, without any need for a belief
W.
Guyer's unsuccessful answer to this criticism is instructive. He responds to
Brueckner s suggestion that STJs could be justified by internal regularities alone as
follows:
a genuine capacity for representation cannot be thought to be governed by
regularities of its own.. .for the simple reason that this would immediately
undermine its use as a faculty of representation. Changes in its contents must be
ascribable to changes in what it represents, or else it cannot be safely judged to
represent change outside itself at all.. ..A faculty of representation must be
primarily sensitive to what lies beyond it or give up its claim to representation. 13
These statements could mean a couple of different things. On the one hand, Guyer could
be saying that it is incoherent to describe a faculty as 'representative' if the judgments it
produces can be justified by its own regularities. This would not disturb a Cartesian
skeptic, however, who might simply acquiesce and agree that our purported faculty of
12






representation is not authentically representative. This would simply be equivalent, for
the skeptic, to the expression of his skepticism itself.
Alternatively, Guyer could be claiming that a given Z could not have the content
it does—could not represent what it does-without the W corresponding to it being true; in
other words, the claim is that an STJ could not represent what it does unless one is
justified in claiming that the objective sequence which purportedly gave rise to the
subjective sequence described by the STJ actually occurred. This response, however, falls
prey to the very charge of verificationism Guyer claims his epistemological version
avoids: if this were his claim, then he would be claiming that STJs could not have the
content they do without our knowing whether their truth-conditions were satisfied. As
Brueckner points out, this response would seem to involve a form of verificationism
which Guyer (correctly, on Brueckner's view) repudiates. 14
Despite the problems with Guyer’s response to Brueckner's criticism, that
criticism is in fact not entirely successful. Recall that Brueckner allows that regularities
among my representations could by themselves justify judgments concerning the
temporal order of my representations. Hume, famously, explains causal inferences by
reference to regularities among one's impressions: he claims that we have a psychological
trait or instinct to come to expect, upon the occurrence of a familiar sort of experience,
other experiences of a kind which has been associated with that sort of experience.
However, he also denied that induction can ever justify such judgments; this
psychological trait of ours only explains
,
for Hume, why such judgments occur. He did
14
Brueckner, "The Anti-Skeptical...", p.43.
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not address the question of the origin of STJs, but it seems likely that he would have the
same attitude towards the inductive justification of STJs. If Brueckner concedes that
some of our STJs are justified, and are justified through induction, he needs also to
explain how this is possible.
Brueckner is also never clear on whether he concedes that some of our Z-type
beliefs are justified, and justified explicitly by W-type considerations. If he does concede
this, then he must also concede that some of our beliefs about external objects are
justified.
The most important shortcoming of Brueckner's criticism, however, is that the
inductive justifying process he describes could not apply to the justification of many, if
not most, of our STJs. Consider Guyer's original example: that of my interpretation of my
subjective state as a past representation of a chair being succeeded by a present
representation of a desk. According to Guyer, such a judgment can be justified only if
one has a justified belief about a correlation between one's representations and an
objective succession. According to Brueckner, such justification of STJs could take place
by means of induction on past conjunctions of similar representations. But in the case in
question, it is very unlikely that, in the past, one's chair-like representations would always
be followed by desk-like representations; and even if they had, it seems strange to
suggest that this alone could do much to justify the STJ in question. If Brueckner
concedes that some of one’s judgments like this one are justified, then it is entirely
mysterious how they could be justified by the inductive process he describes. Many STJs
concern sequences the like of which have not been experienced before, or which are not
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inductively supported by previous regularities in representation-types. If Brueckner
concedes that any judgments like Guyer's paradigmatic STJ are justified, then the only
possibility seems to be that they are justified by W-type judgments; and if any of my W-
type judgments are justified, then I am justified in stating that a material world exists.
3. The Real Problem With the Epistemological Interpretation
Brueckner s main criticism of Guyer, then, is not convincing. But Brueckner
concedes more than he needs to. The epistemological version of Kant's Refutation fails as
a refutation of either Cartesian or Humean skepticism because neither sort of skeptic need
concede that any of our STJs are justified. 1 ^ As Brueckner points out, the Cartesian
skeptic is generally understood to allow only that we have knowledge of our current
experience, to concede that we have knowledge of the order of some of our subjective
states is to concede that we have knowledge that the self is temporally extended. 16 So an
argument which takes as a premise that some ot our STJs are justified cannot succeed as
a transcendental argument against the Cartesian skeptic: to successfully refute the skeptic,
a transcendental argument needs to derive the rejection of skepticism from premises the
skeptic accepts. The same is true of Guyer's argument when it is applied to the Humean
skeptic, since the Humean skeptic is also not committed to the immediacy of anything
other than present experience.
This point is also made by Patricia Kitcher (Kant's Transcendental Psychology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 177-8).
16
Brueckner, "Transcendental Arguments II," Nous, 18 (1984), p.2 1
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Guyer does briefly attempt to discount the possibility of a skepticism which
hypothesizes that all of one's STJs are false. His response is that
it is hard to think oneself into this position. If one can really entertain the
proposition that all of one's even subjective temporal judgments are false, of
course one can do without commitment to another set of propositions which could
provide evidence for these. 17
Guyer thus suggests that skepticism about (all of) one's STJs may be somehow incoherent
or impossible. However, he does not give any evidence for this. It seems perfectly
possible to doubt the accuracy of all one's STJs. Although the hypothetical state of error
in which all of one's STJs are false would indeed imply that one has very little knowledge
at all, this sort of implication does not by itself make a form of skepticism incoherent.
Doubting the accuracy of one’s STJs does not require that one stop making STJs, or stop
depending on them for judgments about objective events or states of affairs. Therefore
the admission that one's STJs might be mistaken would not prevent one from carrying out
any of one's normal judgmental activities.
Brueckner suggests that the only way for Guyer to make the required claim that
some STJs are justified is to employ a verificationist thesis connecting the
meaningfulness of saying that an experience of mine occupies a determinate place in my
time-order with the ability to determine what that position is. 18 This could be justified by
a more general verification principle connecting the meaningfulness of a sentence with
the ability to determine if its truth-conditions are satisfied. While Guyer does not employ
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refutations of skepticism which do implicitly or explicitly rely on such a principle. Such
arguments are the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER III
VERIFICATIONS AND WITTGENSTINIAN VERSIONS
1 . Logical Positivism
Verificationism is the doctrine that a sentence or thought is cognitively
meaningful if and only if it is either tautological or at least in principle empirically
verifiable or falsifiable. If verificationism is true, then any proposition about the external
world that the skeptic admits is meaningful must also be confirmable or infirmable. If,
consequently, we are able to conclusively confirm or infirm a statement we make about
the external world, then we must be in a position to know whether external objects exist.
This fits our general definition of a transcendental argument, because, on this view, the
skeptic who accepts that any of our statements about the external world is meaningful is
vulnerable to a reductio of his position if he also claims that we are not in a position to
know whether an external world exists.
It sometimes sounds as though Kant embraced some sort of verificationism with
regard to statements about substances and their causal relations. For instance, he says that
[m]any empirical concepts are employed without question from anyone. Since
experience is always available for the proof of their objective reality, we believe
ourselves, even without a deduction, to be justified in appropriating to them a
meaning, an ascribed significance. But there are also usurpatory concepts, such as
fortune, fate, which, though allowed to circulate by almost universal indulgence
are yet from time to time challenged by the question: quidjuris. (A84/B1 16-7)
He then goes on to say that the concepts of substance and cause require a 'deduction' to
establish the legitimacy of their use (A85/B1 17). For this reason it has appeared
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reasonable to some that Kant's anti-skeptical strategy had something to do with finding
the necessary conditions of the legitimate or meaningful use of external world terms. This
tact justifies an examination of verificationism and its role in a Kantian or quasi-Kantian
refutation of skepticism.
The major proponents of verificationism, 'logical positivists', fall into three
general categories: phenomenalists, physicalists, and proponents of a 'thing-language'.
One might think that one could derive on the basis of one of these approaches a neo-
Kantian transcendental argument against Cartesian and Humean skepticism. In this
section I explain why none of these hypothetical arguments could supply a satisfactory
response to the epistemological skeptic.
The phenomenalist holds that all meaningful statements are either true by
definition or reducible to statements about one's subjective experiences or sense-data . 1
The phenomenalist thus holds that all meaningful statements about the external world are
reducible to statements about one's sense-data. Such statements were sometimes called
protocol statements'; according to the phenomenalist all meaningful empirical
propositions in language, properly understood, can be expressed by such statements.
If phenomenalism is true, then there is no problem with skeptical questions about
whether one is radically deceived about the source of one's perceptions, since even the
skeptic admits that our subjective experiences are immediately accessible to us. Since
according to the phenomenalist statements about material objects are reducible to
1
See A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1936 ).
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statements about the immediate objects of my subjective experiences (sense-data), and I
cannot be deceived about the character of my subjective experiences, then I can know
whether my statements about external objects and the external world are true or false.
Because I can verify them, my statements about external things are thus also meaningful.
The immediate problem for the phenomenalist to solve is the question of how
objects can be mind-independent when the content of statements about them is exhausted
by facts about the subjective experience of perceivers. Phenomenalism appears to
degenerate into a form of idealism, which is not only questionable in itself, but does not
(as we saw with Kant) provide a satisfactory response to skepticism.
The standard answer to this criticism of phenomenalism is for the phenomenalist
to equate statements that certain physical objects or objective states of affairs exist with
propositions about what impressions or sequences of impressions one would have were
one to have certain others. ‘ Physical object propositions are thus reducible, for such a
phenomenalist, either to categorical propositions about sense-data, which are
immediately verifiable, or to hypothetical propositions about sense-data, which can be
experimentally confirmed. 3
To this reduction, however, one can respond that, given any physical proposition,
one can describe a possible situation in which that proposition is true but the alleged
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Note that the phenomenalist assumes an answer to the problem of induction.
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false. C.I. Lewis, for example, says that the proposition (p) that there is a doorknob in
front of me and to the left implies the hypothetical sense-content proposition (q) that, if I
seem to see such a doorknob, and seem to be reaching for it, in all probability the feeling
of contacting a doorknob would follow. 5 Chisholm, however, points out that p does not
entail q: I might, for example, be paralyzed but suffering from delusions about the
motions of my limbs.
A consideration of the basic proposition of Cartesian skepticism reveals that this
is a general difficulty for phenomenalist logical positivism: given any physical world
proposition (including the proposition that there is none), an evil demon or hidden faculty
in me could always bring it about that the corresponding hypothetical sense-content
proposition is false. Alternatively, the consequence of the activity of an evil demon or
hidden faculty could be that any hypothetical sense-content proposition is true, even
though the corresponding physical world proposition is false. The phenomenalist analysis
of propositions regarding material objects must thus assume an answer to epistemological
skepticism. The only alternative seems to be to abandon the attempt to preserve the
objectivity of physical world propositions and embrace idealism. Regardless of the
success or failure of phenomenalism as a theory of meaning, then, it seems that it must
fail as a non-idealistic response to the skeptic.
4
Roderick Chisholm, "The Problem of Empiricism," The Journal ofPhilosophy, 45
(1948), pp.512-7.
?
C.I. Lewis, An Analysis ofKnowledge and Valuation (La Salle: Open Court, 1946),
p.240.
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A related version of logical positivism was the doctrine that, in addition to (or
instead of) the protocol sentences of phenomenalism, a meaningful language can be
reduced to protocol sentences which include predicates referring to psychological acts,
such as ’being angry' or 'perceiving a dog'. 6 This version of logical positivism is similar to
phenomenalism, in that it also holds that language should be reducible to propositions
that are verifiable by considering the contents of one's subjective experience alone. Its
advantage over phenomenalism is that it does not require a private language of sense-
contents which cannot be understood by others. 7
This development of phenomenalism fails as a potential response to the skeptic
because its treatment of objectivity is essentially the same as phenomenalism. In this
case, statements about objects and objective events are reducible to hypothetical
statements about subjective experience which use psychological predicates, rather than
predicates about sense-contents. Once again, the problem is that, owing to the possibility
of deception, any hypothetical statement about what I would experience were I to have
some other experience is consistent with any statement about the external world.
Logical positivism developed into another doctrine according to which the
sentences of a meaningful language must be reducible to protocol sentences whose
empirical terms refer to basic objective entities. 8 This doctrine was sometimes called
‘physicalism’. According to physicalism, all meaningful empirical terms must be
6
Otto Neurath, "Protocol Sentences," Logical Positivism, edited by A.J. Ayer (New
York: The Free Press, 1959). Also see John Passmore, One Hundred Years ofPhilosophy
(New York: Basic Books, 1966), p.386.
7
See Section Three of this chapter.
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translatable into a basic 'thing-language’ of physical predicates, such as 'heavy', 'warm', or
'blue'. In this way the major proponent of this doctrine, Carnap, hoped to preserve the
objectivity of science that the other forms of logical positivist could not account for.9
Carnap thus abandoned the requirement that the basic statements of a meaningful
language must be directly verifiable. His basic terms refer to things to which one does not
have direct access in the way one has direct access to one's own sense-contents or
psychological acts. So Carnap simply took for granted that statements about the external
world are verifiable or confirmable. Consequently, his verificationism must take for
granted a reply to the epistemological skeptic.
None of the major versions of verificationism, then, manages to show that the
skeptic is inconsistent in claiming that his statements about the external world have
meaning while claiming that such statements are always unverifiable. A skeptic could
thus agree with these verificationist theories of meaning without giving up skepticism.
The verification principle also implies that the skeptical claim-the claim that the
world, for all I know, might not exist—is itself meaningless if skepticism is true; but to
this the skeptic can reply that verificationism is unsatisfactory because, as we have seen,
it cannot account for the objectivity of statements about the external world without
slipping into idealism or simply taking for granted a reply to the skeptic.
There are also several other reasons why verificationism might be considered an
unsatisfactory theory of meaning. Verificationism has been attacked as ruling out as
Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," Philosophy ofScience (1936-7).
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meaningless certain kinds of statements essential to empirical science, such as law-like
statements and statements involving disposition terms and theoretical constructs. 10 Also,
the verification principle itself, if construed as an assertion, does not satisfy its own
criterion of meaningfulness and is thus self-defeating! If construed as a definition or
recommendation, it appears arbitrary as well as inconsistent with common practice. 11
Finally, the first variety of logical positivism, phenomenalism, is subject to
Wittgenstein s criticism of the notion of a phenomenalist language; this criticism is the
subject of the third section of this chapter.
2. Putnam, Burge, and Theories of Reference and Content-Ascription
Hilary Putnam takes a somewhat different tack in attempting to refute the skeptic.
He bases his anti-skeptical strategy on his direct' or causal' theory of reference, which he
illustrates by the following example. “ Suppose that elsewhere in the universe there exists
a planet exactly like Earth, Twin Earth'. The residents of Twin Earth are exactly similar
to the residents of Earth, and speak a language exactly like English. The only difference
between the two planets is that on Twin Earth the molecular structure of what is called
See Passmore, One Hundred Years
,
p.386, and Oswald Hanfling, Logical Positivism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp.103-10.
Carl Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning"
Semantics and the Philosophy ofLanguage, edited by Leonard Linsky (Urbana: U. of
Illinois Press 1952), pp.168, 175-9.
11
See Hempel, "Problems and Changes," pp. 181-3, and Judith Jarvis Thomson,
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water is XYZ instead of H20. Call this substance
'twinwater'. Putnam claims that what
the word ’water’ refers to, when spoken by a Twin Earther, is XYZ rather than H20. This,
in other words, is what a person means when he utters the word 'water' on Twin Earth.
Meaning, for Putnam, is established in part by causal relationships between names and
the things they name. The crucial point is that, according to him, facts about one's
internal state can be exactly similar to facts about another’s, but what internal states or
languages mean-that is, what they refer to-by their terms can be different, depending on
facts external to their subjective existences.
Putnam exploits this doctrine in responding to a modem version of the Cartesian
skeptical hypothesis. The modem version of the hypothesis that I might be an immaterial
soul in the process of being deceived by an evil demon or hidden faculty is that I might
be a brain in a vat whose sense-impressions are being manipulated by a scientist or
computer with the purpose of giving me the impression that I am not a brain in a vat.
Putnam's key point is that, if I am a brain in a vat, then my utterance of "I might be a
brain in a vat" does not really refer to a brain in a vat: the right causal connection does
not exist between brains in vats and my idea or concept thereof. 13 When we, who are not
brains in vats, think of or speak of trees, there is a causal connection between our use of
the term 'tree' and actual trees. On his view, it is, in part, by virtue of this causal
connection that we can refer to trees. A brain in a vat, by contrast, according to Putnam's
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containing this hypothetical vat). A brain in a vat’s use of the word 'tree' is only
connected to images of trees. When a brain in a vat uses the word ’tree’, on his view, what
the brain in the vat means, or refers to, is something like a 'tree-in-the-image', 14 rather
than an actual tree. A 'tree-in-the-image' could variously be described as a mental image,
or as a set of sense-impressions, electrical impulses, or computer code; but it is one of
these things the brain in a vat really refers to, when ostensibly thinking of trees.
A consequence of this claim is that the truth-conditions of the external world
propositions of brains in vats will involve only the occurrence of certain sense-contents
(or electrical impulses, or computer code). The truth conditions of what are superficially
the same propositions, if entertained by normal human beings, will, by contrast, include
the actual presence of the physical substances or states of affairs in question. The
consequence of this that Putnam wants to draw is that the skeptical hypothesis that I
might be a brain in a vat is self-refuting. If I am not a brain in a vat, then my hypothesis
that I am a brain in a vat is false. If 1 am a brain in a vat, than my statement "I am (or
might be) a brain in a vat" does not refer to brains in vats. In that instance, unbeknownst
to me, I am speaking not English but rather vat-English, in which my external world
propositions refer to brains in vats "in the image," or sense-impressions, or electrical
impulses, rather than actual brains and vats. 15 Since on the skeptical hypothesis that I am










being a brain in a vat, then the skeptical hypothesis as expressed in vat-English must be
false as well. Thus the hypothesis that I am a brain in a vat is self-refuting.
It is easy to see how this theory could also be applied to Descartes' evil demon or
hidden faculty skepticisms. On those hypotheses, one is being deceived into thinking that
an external world exists, thanks to false sense-impressions. On Putnam's theory of
reference, if these hypotheses were true, then my references to evil demons or hidden
faculties would refer to specific sense-impressions or electrical impulses (i.e.,
impressions of evil demons or hidden faculties, or corresponding electrical impulses of
certain kinds). Since I have immediate access to my sense-impressions, I can know that I
do not have impressions of this kind. Therefore, as with the case of the brain-in-a-vat
hypothesis, if I am not being deceived then my statement that I am would be false, and if
I were my statement that I was would again be false. Since any such Cartesian skeptical
hypothesis can be similarly shown to be false, I can conclude that I know that an external
world exists.
The problem with this kind of response to the skeptic, however, is that it simply
relocates the skepticism to the level of reference, or meaning. All Putnam can show is
that a certain sentence is false whether expressed by a normal human being or by a brain
in a vat. What I do not know, however, is what language I am speaking when I say,
truthfully, "I am not a brain in a vat." Specifically, I need to know that I am speaking
English, and thus referring to actual brains in vats, when I deny that I am one. 16 Thus, at
16





best, all Putnam has accomplished is to take skepticism about whether I am a brain in a
vat (or whether I am being deceived by an evil demon, etc.), and transformed it into
skepticism about what language I am speaking, or whether I can really refer to brains in
vats or evil demons.
Putnam responds that I can simply know- i.e., immediately-that I am referring to
actual brains and actual vats when I say I am not a brain in a vat, and thus that I simply
know that I am speaking English rather than vat-English. 17 But this is simply to deny one
of the implications of the causal theory of reference. The causal theory of reference
implies that some of the facts which determine what my terms refer to are not
immediately epistemically accessible to me. Consider the case of non-scientists on Earth
and Twin-Earth (i.e., individuals with no knowledge of the actual molecular structure of
what comes out ol their taps). Neither can say whether they refer to water or twinwater
with the word 'water'. In this case, it would be possible for each of them to determine
empirically just what they are referring to, through an examination of the molecular
structure of the fluids in question. However, this is not an avenue one can take with
regard to whether one is a brain in a vat or not. The nature of the hypothesis is such that
the causal factors determining the reference of one's terms are not epistemically
accessible. In order for Putnam to claim, as he does, that I can just tell' that I am speaking
English rather than vat-English, he must reject the causal theory of reference, which
states that what one refers to can be determined in part by factors other than those of
which one is immediately aware.
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Tyler Burge's very similar approach to refuting skepticism focuses on the
attribution of ’thought-contents." On his view, the thoughts of a being in a solipsistic
world regarding the external world would have indeterminate contents. 18 Imagine a
subject, Adam, who exists solipsistically in a world without water or a community of
other speakers. According to Burge, we could not attribute to Adam a propositional
attitude concerning water, because such an attitude could not be distinguished from an
attitude about, for example, twinwater. Because of this kind of indeterminacy, Burge
denies that we could attribute any external world concepts to Adam at all. Thus neither
could we fix truth-conditions to his beliefs about the external world.
It is easy to see that this approach will be subject to an objection similar to the one
given to Putnam. This potential response to skepticism, again, at best relocates one’s
skepticism to the level of meaning. If Burge is right, then one can conclude that the
skeptical hypothesis is either false or meaningless. However, one can conclude from
Burge s findings that one does not live in a solipsistic world only if one can assume that
one's skeptical hypothesis is meaningful, and thus that one is a normal human being,
rather than a solipsistic consciousness.
3. The Private Language Argument
Wittgenstein gives a theory of meaning which could also be employed in a refutation of
skepticism similar to those considered above. 19 Wittgenstein introduces his theory of
17
Putnam, Lecture (Smith College, Oct. 25, 1996).
18
Burge, “Other Bodies”, pp.l 14-5.
19 #
1 1
Wittgenstein did not use his theory of meaning in this way (although, as we shall
see, he did suggest that skepticism should be disregarded for reasons related to his
51
meaning by introducing an argument which denies the possibility of a language which is
logically impossible for any other person to understand. Wittgenstein's argument runs as
follows.
20
His immediate intent is to deny the possibility of a language in which
a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences-his
feelings, moods, and the rest-for his private use. ...The individual words of this
language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his
immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the
language/
Statements about private sense-contents are not translatable into publicly understandable
statements, since others can never know exactly what you refer to when you refer to a
private experience, such as the experience of a color, sound, or emotion. The protocol
sentences of phenomenalism are, as we have seen, sentences about private sense-
contents. Both Humean and Cartesian skepticism describe a situation in which we infer
the existence and nature of external objects from propositions about our internal states.
Hume explicitly claims that our ideas are all ultimately derived from sense-impressions
and that the content of ideas like those of substance or cause, which purport to refer to
entities or laws not directly experienceable by us, is actually derived from our subjective
experiences. What we really mean, he claims, when we assert that a physical object or
objective causal relation exists, is that we have experienced a certain sequence of sense-
impressions. Hume is thus an explicit phenomenalist. He is a skeptic, however, because,
theory). What follows is a discussion of a hypothetical argument based on his theory.
I owe portions of the following interpretation to Thomson ("Private Languages"),
Robert J. Fogelin ( Wittgenstein , 2nd ed. [New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987])
and Saul Kripke ( Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language [Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982]).
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unlike the phenomenalist logical positivist, he does not suppose that the objectivity of
external world statements can be preserved by hypothetical sense-content propositions.
He could not hold this, because the verification or confirmation of such statements would
require induction. Descartes thinks we can successfully speak of substances and causes,
but he also paints a picture in which all we are immediately aware of are subjective
experiences from which we infer the existence of material substances. A phenomenalist
might therefore portray Descartes as a phenomenalist who made some inappropriate (and
thus meaningless) inferences. The views of both Hume and Descartes thus could appear
to depend on the existence of private languages in Wittgenstein’s sense, or languages
whose terms ultimately refer to entities which are private both in the sense that others
cannot experience them and in the sense that one can never know whether others
experience such things at all. Wittgenstein's private language argument, then, could be
construed as both an attack on phenomenalism and on the epistemological picture
necessary for external world skepticism.
Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language rests on the
observation that, in order to have a meaningful language, there must be rules or criteria
which govern the way the terms of the language are to be used. If there is no rule or
criterion which governs one's use of a word, then that word cannot be said to have any
fixed meaning. The case Wittgenstein makes against private languages consists for the
21
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
,
3rd ed., translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1958), Section 243, pp.88-9.
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most pan in explaining why the rules governing the use of terms of a private language
could not be said to be fixed or known.
The Cartesian and Humean pictures of the use of language seem to be that we
identify and re-identify types of subjective experiences; the occurrence of, and patterns
among, these events are then the basis for inferences to external causes and the
generation of external world concepts. The re-identification of types of experiences,
however, requires rules of re-identification: rules which will tell us when a sensation or
impression is a reoccurrence of a certain type of experience.
According to Wittgenstein, the received view of how subjective events are re-
ldentified is by reference to a prior private ostentive definition. On this view, I simply
concentrate on a subjective occurrence (e.g., an experience of a certain shade of red), and
name it. Then, on future occasions when I think I am having an experience of the same
shade of red, I re-identify it as such by comparing it to a memory of the one I had
previously ostensively defined as red. Wittgenstein explains why this cannot be the
source of rules for a private language. He points out, first of all, why the use of a term can
never be established by ostensive definition alone. He notes that you could not teach
someone the use of the term "two" by ostention alone. Suppose you pointed to two nuts
and said, "this is called 'two'." The person to whom one gives this definition could never
be sure what you are referring to by 'two'; he could think you were referring to this group
of nuts, for example.
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[H]e might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give an ostensive
definition, as that of a color, of a race, or even of a point of the compass. That is
to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case.22
The private analogue of pointing is a concentration on ’this' sensation, which one
subsequently names. The question is how one fixes, exactly, what 'this' is, and how one
knows when one is experiencing another instance of it. What is needed is some
independent criterion or criteria to determine whether one is using a word correctly. In
the case of a public language-a language whose terms refer to entities with which others
can be acquainted-there is an objective, public practice relative to which one's use of the
language in any given instance can be proper or improper.
Could there be a private practice analogous to the public one, relative to which
one can fix the use of one's private sensation terms? Wittgenstein argues that there
cannot. He claims that
to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey
a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one is obeying a rule would be the same
thing as obeying it. 23
The idea underlying this reasoning is that there is no fact of the matter one can appeal to
in order to determine whether one is obeying the rules of one's private language correctly.
One is then reduced to identifying obeying a given rule with thinking one is, and this
cannot constitute rule-following. But why can't I determine that a current sensation or
impression matches a previous one simply by comparing it to my memory of the past
experience? This would give me a ground to use the same private language term to
describe the current experience.




Wittgenstein responds that a practice cannot be self-confirming. If 1 use only
memory to confirm private rule-following, I can then have no legitimate ground for my
claim that I am following the rule correctly:
Let us imagine a table (something like a dictionary) that exists only in our
imagination. A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a
word Y. But are we also to call it a justification if such a table is to be looked up
only in the imagination?
-"Well yes; then it is subjective justification."-But
justification consists in appealing to something independent.-"But surely I can
appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I have
remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind
how a page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?"-No; for this process
has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image of the
time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the
correctness of the first memory?24
A dictionary, for example, is an objective record of the manner in which words are
publicly used; a dictionary is a concrete manifestation of a linguistic practice. By
appealing to it, one can verify that one has been using a word correctly. An appeal to
memory cannot serve the same function, according to Wittgenstein, because what is
being verified is the accuracy of a memory report itself—the report that the sensation I am
experiencing now is of the same type as the sensation I experienced previously and
ostensively named. To have a legitimate private language, I have to be able to verify
correct rule-lollowing in this way if my terms are to be meaningful. Since I am relying on
memory alone to verify that I am correctly using the terms of my private language, there
is no distinction between my remembering correctly the correlation between an





Section 202, p. 8 1
.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 265, pp.93-4.
56
IS no rule or criterion governing my use of the word, the word has no meaning. Thus a
private language is impossible.
From this conclusion one could draw the further conclusion that, since a private
language is impossible, there must be accessible public criteria for the use of my
language. Consequently, an external, 'public', world must exist.
This argument would function similarly to the phenomenalist argument against
external world skepticism. Like the anti-skeptical argument implicit within
phenomenalism, it concludes that the skeptic cannot consistently accept that his language
has meaning and yet suppose that the external world might not exist. Flowever, it also
falls prey to an objection somewhat similar to that leveled against phenomenalism.
Recall that Wittgenstein claims that a public practice is sufficient to establish the
proper use (and thus the meaning) of a word because the public practice gives us
something objective to check our use against; a private practice, by contrast, would no
give us something distinct from our use of a term itself to determine if the term is being
used correctly. Wittgenstein illustrates this contrast by contrasting the use of a timetable
to check one's memory of a train's departure time with the use of a memory of a timetable
to check one's memory of the train's departure time. Wittgenstein says that the second
sort of appeal cannot constitute a justification because there is no appeal to something
"independent" to check the accuracy of one's use: I cannot justify my faith in my memory
reports by appealing to other memory reports.
But on what basis can Wittgenstein say that the appeal to a public timetable or
practice can justify our use of a term any more than an appeal to memory can? The claim
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that an appeal to public practice can justify our use of terms is subject to two related
objections. As Fogelin points out, the epistemological skeptic shows that one's reliance
on an 'independent' source of confirmation is no more sound than reliance on one’s own
memory. 25 Suppose I consult a timetable to see if it matches my recollection. What is my
basis for saying they match, other than that they seem to match? What justifies my faith
in my observation reports? How do I know they are independent and objective? The
claim that independent criteria for the use of language are needed does nothing to answer
skepticism, in fact, for this claim to be other than vacuous, a prior answer to skepticism is
needed.
Furthermore, any check of one's recollections requires an inference from the
present state ol the world to some past state, which in turn requires a law-like statement
about the world. The justification of such statements depends on beliefs about what one
has observed in the past-i.e., recollections. Thus even public checking depends on
recollection.
In response to skeptical challenges like these, Wittgenstein says that, in such
matters, we simply do not doubt:
How does someone judge which is his right and which his left hand? How do I
know that my judgment will agree with his? ...Must I not begin to trust
somewhere? That is to say: somewhere I must begin by not-doubting; and that is
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There is a point, on his view, at which we simply no longer doubt, since doing so would
remove all ground for our judgments. But why can't we, in the same way, take on faith
the private practice of relying on memory to confirm private rule-following? His reason
for rejecting such a strategy is that an objective ground is lacking for the claim that one is
using a term consistently with one's practice; but. as the skeptic points out, we also lack
such a justification for our claims about what the public practice is. Why does the
skeptical possibility of being mistaken about a practice apply to private practices and not
public ones?
I can think of two likely and initially plausible answers a Wittgenstinian could
give to this question. As I shall now argue, however, neither of these hypothetical
responses would result in a refutation of epistemological skepticism.
One could claim that the skeptical claim that possibly no external world (and thus
no public practice) exists implies that the doubter's language is meaningless—and the
same holds for the expression of the skeptical hypothesis. But then skepticism is either
self-refuting or impossible, since the very expression of it directly implies the
meaninglessness of that expression. The skeptic, however, could respond that, given the
meaning-as-use doctrine, it is possible to say something meaningless unknowingly. In
fact, Wittgenstein himself acknowledges this very possibility: in On Certainty, he argues
that skeptics unknowingly speak nonsense. 27 In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus he
27
See, for example, Sections #624 and #627 of On Certainty.
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claims again that skeptics unknowingly speak nonsense when they express their doubts,28
and also adds that metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics all involve nonsensical questions—
unbeknownst to their usual practitioners. 29 But then he cannot consistently deny the
skeptical hypothesis on the ground that it suggests that our language might be
meaningless without our knowing it. 30
Another route one could take would be to hold that Wittgenstien never intended to
have his necessary condition for meaning contain an epistemological element. His
demand for independent criteria for correct language use is misleading: he errs in
implying, via his use of examples like the timetable example, that meaning depends on an
epistemically accessible confirmation of correct use. All he really wants is a way to make
the logical distinction between correct and incorrect language use. What he says is that a
term’s having a meaning requires the user to be able in principle to distinguish between
what it is to follow the rule of its use and what it is just to think one is following that rule.
Even supposing that this is not possible for a private language, it does not follow that a
public practice must exist-the possibility of a public practice establishes a ground for
language use that does not exist even in principle in private use. One can distinguish, in
principle, between a language which could not conform to a public rule and one which
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certainly the skeptic does not deny) is enough to establish a distinction in principle
between language use which could and which could not conform to a public practice. But
then, of course, we are still in a position in which we do not know if the external world
and the public practice actually exist. Thus we can accept Wittgenstein's theory of
meaning, along with his denial that a private language is possible, without giving up
skepticism. At best, his theory of meaning could force the skeptic to give up
phenomenalism, but not to give up the possibility that one's language is a 'private public'
language—a language that would be public if an external world were to exist.
Another argument Wittgenstein may give against private languages also fails to
answer such skeptical doubts. Fogelin claims that there is a second argument for
Wittgenstein's thesis: he calls it 'the training argument'. 31 Wittgenstein holds that a person
who follows a rule "has been trained to react to a sign in a particular way." 32 This
explains how the person knows how to follow the rule correctly. "What this shows," he
continues, "is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation
,
but
which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual
cases." In order for there to be a distinction between my following a rule and my only
thinking I am, there must be a sense in which I non-interpretively follow it. In order for
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Could this training take place in the absence of an external world? Wittgenstein
gives no reason why the perfect illusion of training in a language—an illusion created by,
for example, an evil demon or hidden faculty-could not produce the same result as actual
training in a public practice. The result of illusory training would, again, be a private
public language: a language which as a matter of fact no one else understands, but which
could be comprehensible to others if one's experience were veridical and other people
existed. Thus, again, there is no violation of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning inherent in
the skeptical hypothesis, even if the skeptic were to choose to accept that theory.
4. Strawson’s Objectivity Argument and His Reading of Kant's Refutation
In his book on the Critique ofPure Reason
,
P.F. Strawson gives two widely
discussed anti-skeptical arguments, which he thinks reflect the essence of Kant's actual
reasoning on the issue. The goal of these arguments is to prove what Strawson calls "the
objectivity thesis":
experience must include awareness of objects which are distinguishable from
experiences of them in the sense that judgments about these objects are judgments
about what is the case irrespective of the actual occurrence of particular subjective
experiences of them. 34
The first such argument, often called Strawson's 'objectivity argument', takes the form of
an attack on the alleged possibility of a pure "sense-datum experience."35 According to
the skeptic (Cartesian or Humean), all we are immediately aware of is a succession of
sense-data, from which we infer the existence of objects around us. The skeptic also
34
P.F. Strawson, The Bounds ofSense (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), p.24.
35
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agrees, however, that we are self-conscious, in that we ascribe all these subjective
impressions to a single, temporally extended subject of experiences. The sense-datum
theorist's hypothesis, then, is that it is possible to have the concept of a self without
having experience of objects independent of one's subjective experiences. Strawson
responds by arguing that one's concept of a subject of experiences presupposes the
concept of an objective world independent of one's experience of it. Without such a
concept, he asks,
how can we attach a sense to the notion of the single consciousness to which the
successive 'experiences' are supposed to belong? We seem to add nothing but a
form of words to the hypothesis of a succession of essentially disconnected
impressions by stipulating that they all belong to an identical consciousness.. ..The
[skeptical] hypothesis seems to contain no ground of distinction between the
supposed experience of awareness and the particular item which the awareness is
an awareness of.
36
He thus suggests that, on the sense-datum hypothesis, there are no criteria on the basis of
which one could pick out a subject of experience distinct from its experiences. That there
is no such thing as a distinct perception of a self separate from its experiences is
explicitly acknowledged by Hume, and implicitly by Descartes. Without such a
perception, and without the concept of an objective world, Strawson argues, there would
be no basis for conceptually distinguishing experiences from a subject of them:
the minimum implied [by the possibility of self-consciousness] is that some at
least of the concepts under which particular experienced items are recognized as
falling should be such that the experiences themselves contain the basis for certain
allied distinctions: individually, the distinction of a subjective component within a
judgment of experience (as 'it seems to me as if this is a heavy stone' is
distinguishable within 'this is a heavy stone'); collectively, the distinction between
the subjective order and arrangement of a series of such experiences on the one
36
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63
hand and the objective order and arrangement of the items of which they are
experiences on the other. 37
I f
' per imP°ssibile i all of one's experiences lacked the "conceptual character" of being
such as must be conceived of as existing independently of the experience of them,"
even the basis of the idea of the referring of such experiences to an identical
subject of a series of them by such a subject would be altogether lacking; and if
the basis of this idea were lacking, it would be impossible to distinguish the
recognitional components in such 'experiences' as components not wholly
absorbed by their sensible accusatives; and if this were impossible, they would
not rate as experiences at all.
Strawson's argument seems to be that the distinction between an experience and a self-
conscious awareness of an experience requires conceiving of an order of events distinct
from the subjective order of experiences: to conceive of the subjective, and thus of the
subject, there must be the conception of an objective to contrast it to. To conceive of an
objective order, the argument goes, some of one's experiences must be such that they
"must" be conceived of as objective. This is the "basis" for the distinction between
subjective and objective (which we know we make). He concludes that the objectivity
thesis is correct, in that only objective experience can provide the basis for a subject's
conceptual distinction between it and its experiences. Without objective experience, he
claims, "it would be impossible" to be self-conscious—to ascribe experiences to oneself. 38
But how can Strawson draw this anti-skeptical conclusion? All he appears to have
even attempted to show is that the concept of a subject requires the concept of an
37
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64
objective world; all that seems required is the beliefthat some of one's experiences are
objective. His claim must be that a succession of merely subjective experiences is
insufficient to give rise to the idea of objects or an objective order (and, in turn, the
subjective/objective distinction). On the skeptical hypothesis, we experience certain
regularities in our subjective experience and are led on their basis to think that we are
experiencing an objective world. What is wrong with the skeptical picture? What is
lacking in it such that the self-ascription of experiences would be impossible?
Strawson exhibits the same anti-skeptical strategy in his interpretation and
defense of Kant s thought in the Refutation. Like Guyer, Strawson thinks that the
Refutation, in speaking of the necessary conditions of "empirical self-consciousness,"
concerns the temporal ordering of one's subjective experiences. Unlike Guyer, however,
he thinks that the Refutation concerns the necessary conditions of making subjective
temporal determinations, rather than those of makmgjustified ones.
Strawson says that the essence of Kant's reasoning in the Refutation lies in the
claim that the raw successive order of subjective states is insufficient to "sustain" or
give any content to the idea of the subject's aw’areness ofhimselfas having such-
and-such an experience at such-and-such a time (i.e., at such-and-such a position
in a temporal order). To give content to this idea we need, at least, the idea of a
system of temporal relations which comprehends more than those experiences
themselves. But there is, for the subject himself, no access to this wider system of
temporal relations except through his own experiences. Those experiences,
therefore, must be taken by him to be experiences ofthings (other than the
experiences themselves) which possess among themselves the temporal relations
of this wider system. But there is only one way in which perceived things can
supply a system of temporal relations independent of the order of the subject's
Transcendental Arguments," Kantstudien
, 75 [1984], pp.469-95), and Shirley (“A Neo-
Kantian Refutation of Cartesian Skepticism”, The Southwest Philosophical Review )
65
percepti°ns of them-viz. by lasting and being re-encounterable in temporally
different perceptual experiences. 39
On this basis, Strawson concludes.
Awareness of permanent things distinct from myself is therefore indispensable to
my assigning experiences to myself, to my being conscious of myself as havinu.
at different times, different experiences.
He thus claims that a necessary conceptual presupposition of the notion of a determinate
subjective order of experiences is the notion of an objective temporal order, separate from
the accidental subjective order of perceptions-in other words, he claims that having the
concept of a subjective order requires having the concept of an objective order, in much
the same way that Kant argued in the First Analogy that the concept of an objective order
of events requires the concept of substance. The skeptic must agree, since we obviously
do make STJs and are empirically self-conscious, that we have and employ the notion of
a subjective order. Thus the skeptic, by the above reasoning, must also agree that we have
and employ the notion of an objective world and objective temporal order.
Again, however, we are left with the same problem. How can Strawson move
from the claim that the idea of an objective order is a necessary conceptual
presupposition of the idea of a subjective order to the claim that the actual experience of
an objective order is a necessary condition of one's having the idea of a subjective one?
Strawson's claim, again, is that experience must provide a 'basis' for making such
distinctions, or else such distinctions are impossible. But the skeptic does provide a basis
for making such distinctions: patterns or regularities in subjective experience. The skeptic






Of an objective world. The challenge for Strawson, if his Kantian arguments are to have
any hope of success against the skeptic, is to show why having experience that is
sufficient for know ledge of an objective world is necessary in order to have experience
that is sufficient for conceiving of an objective world.
One answer could be thought to lie in Strawson's "principle of significance":
there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful, employment of ideas or concepts
which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their
application. 0
According to Strawson, Kant accepts a principle like this (see. e.g., B298). Elsewhere.
Strawson often says that, if we are not in possession of "adequate" criteria to apply a
certain concept, then it has neither meaning nor legitimate use. 41 As the principle of
significance makes clear, when he says 'criteria', he means experiential criteria—criteria
defined in terms of sense-experience. Although the principle of significance (like the
Wittgenstinian 'meaning-as-use' doctrine) concerns the meaningfulness of concepts rather
than propositions, it has more in common with the verification principle, for it ties the
meaningfulness of ideas or concepts to their possession of empirical content.
Recall, however, that the skeptic thinks he has given experiential criteria for the
application of external-world concepts: criteria defined in terms of regularities in sense-
experience. The skeptic points out that the occurrence of such regularities explains, but
does not justify, conclusions about the external world.
40
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Presumably, then, by ’empirical (or experiential) criteria', Strawson means criteria
that provide more of a basis for applying the concept of an object than mere sense-data
alone; otherwise, the skeptic's pure sense-data experience would be rationally sufficient
to infer the existence of an external world. To establish the objectivity thesis, Strawson
must show that these criteria must be 'adequate' in the sense of adequate to determine
whether the concept in question is instantiated. In the context of another argument, he
seems to make this claim:
Clearly there is no sense in talking of identifiable individuals of a special type, a
type, namely, such that they possess both M-predicates and P-predicates, unless
there is in principle some way of telling, with regard to any individual of that
type, and any P-predicate, whether that individual possesses that P-predicate. And
in the case of at least some P-predicates, the ways of telling must constitute in
some sense logically adequate kinds of criteria for the ascription of the P-
predicate.
42
But then, for Strawson to be successful in establishing what he concludes from his own
objectivity argument and from his interpretation of Kant's Refutation, his principle of
significance must amount to something very like a verification principle for the
meaningfulness of concepts: it must mean that a concept is meaningful only if one can
know whether or not it is instantiated. This is similar to the classic version of
verificationism, which says that a proposition is meaningful only if it can be verified. If
so, however, then the arguments Strawson gives to support his anti-skeptical conclusions
are superfluous, because, if a principle like this is true, we can immediately conclude






whether or not the external world and its contents exist.43 What Strawson's arguments do
is to show that we must use external world concepts in order to be self-conscious. But if a
verification principle like the one just described is true, all we would need to know is that
we do in fact employ external world concepts, and that they are meaningful.
One problem with this strategy of responding to the skeptic is that it will be
subject to all the objections raised against verificationism generally. The skeptic can
accept this form of verificationism and yet respond that we cannot know whether our
external world concepts are meaningful, on this definition of meaningfulness. Thus, as in
the case of an anti-skeptical argument based on classical verificationism, the skeptic can
respond by relocating his skepticism to the level of meaning: the skeptic can simply
respond by denying that we can know that our external world concepts are meaningful-
indeed, this is essentially what Hume does, when he says that our concept of substance,
strictly speaking, has no content!
As in the case of the classic version of verificationism, it could also be objected
that, given this verification principle, many of the concepts of empirical science must be
adjudged meaningless. (It is less clear, however, that this version of the verification
principle falls prey to another objection to the classic version-namely, that it does not
satisfy its own condition on meaningfulness.)
43
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This principle also must not be allowed to collapse into phenomenalism or
idealism, as some versions of verificationism do. As we have seen, neither of these kinds
of positions can provide a satisfactory answer to the skeptic.
Proponents of a Strawsonian response to the skeptic are thus confronted with a
dilemma: Strawson can either rest his anti-skeptical conclusions on verificationism, in
which case it is subject to many of the problems that beset traditional verificationism, or
it can confine itself merely to being an argument about what is conceptually presupposed
in judgments concerning self-consciousness and subjective time-determination. On this
reading, all Strawson can claim is that the concept of an external world is analytically
necessary to the concept of subjecthood and a subjective order. If he confines himself to
this, however, his argument can have no more anti-skeptical weight than can the First
Analogy, which merely says that the existence of external objects must be posited in
order to distinguish conceptually an objective order from a subjective one.
Even if Strawson can overcome objections to his verificationism, the 'principle of
significance', read as a verification principle for concepts, does not yield the conclusion
Strawson draws from it, namely, that it is "impossible" to make the distinction between
subject and subjective experiences without suitable criteria; all this principle can show is
that if the skeptic is right one could not legitimately or meaningfully make the
subjective/objective distinction and the subject/subjective experience distinction. As we
have seen above, Strawson draws the conclusions that "awareness of permanent things
distinct from myself is therefore indispensable to my assigning experiences to myself,"
and "the fundamental condition of the possibility of empirical self-consciousness in time
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IS the awareness of enduring objects in space."44 He does not limit his claim to the
necessary conditions of the legitimate or meaningful use of external world concepts and
thus to the necessary conditions of the legitimate or meaningful self-ascription of
experiences: he seems, rather, to make the stronger claim that actual contact with
external-world entities is a condition of self-consciousness.
Strawson is right that Kant articulates, at times, a view like that expressed by
Strawson's principle of significance:
We demand in every concept, first, the logical form of a concept (of thought) in
general, and, secondly, the possibility of giving it an object to which it may be
applied. In the absence of such an object, it has no meaning and is completely
lacking in content....We therefore demand that a bare concept be made sensible
,
that is, that an object corresponding to it be presented in intuition. Otherwise the
concept would, as we say, be without sense, that is, without meaning (A^39-
40/B298-300)
But Kant does not say that we cannot employ concepts which are without sense; all he
says is that we cannot do so legitimately or meaningfully. All Kant says, furthermore, is
that an object to which a given concept can be applied must be "presented in intuition"
for the use of that concept to be legitimate; but evil demons and hidden faculties can be
responsible for the presentations of intuition just as well as external objects.
One possibility is that Strawson is simply conflating the conditions of the
meaningful or legitimate use of concepts with the conditions of employing them at all.
This, in addition to the claim that the meaningful use of concepts requires being in a
position to know if they are instantiated, would allow him to conclude that actual
awareness of objects is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. What would remain
44
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mysterious, however, is why one cannot use external world concepts illegitimately. This
is exactly what Hume says we do: on his view, we use external world concepts despite
the fact that all our knowledge is based on sense-impressions merely; we are led to use
these concepts illegitimately because of regularities in our experience and the action of
irrational, psychological dispositions. By conflating the legitimacy of concepts with their
possibility, Strawson would simply be denying that this is possible; but such a denial is
no substitute for an argument.
The more interesting possibility is that Strawson is making some kind of claim
about the psychological conditions of having certain beliefs; in other words, it is possible
that he is pointing out certain necessary conditions of generating certain sorts of belief in
the first place, meaningful or not. If so, then he would at least avoid the problems
associated with his version of a verification principle of meaning. Of course, this
approach would then require some kind of principle different from, and stronger than, the
principle of significance.
However, and perhaps unfortunately, Strawson explicitly denies that this is his
intent in giving the kind of argument he does: he denies that what he is doing is "a priori
genetic psychology. "
4? He says, rather, that this kind of argument is simply intended to
"make it seem intelligible to us. ..that we have the conceptual scheme we have." This
characterization of his project tends to suggest that he limits himself, as Stroud claims,
either to giving a verificationist argument or to merely supplying a conceptual analysis of
self-consciousness.
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Strawson has since conceded that anti-skeptical reasoning like that in his Bounds
of Sense cannot rebut the skeptic by providing conclusive proofs of the existence of
independent substances.46 Rather, he falls back on saying that skeptical doubts are "idle,"
in that we are so constituted that we cannot truly doubt the existence of an external world.
Our conceptual scheme, he argues, requires positing one, and so we cannot truly
hypothesize that it does not exist. Strawson now concedes Stroud's claim that the
transcendental arguer faces a dilemma between an argument resting on verificationism
and one which merely establishes "a certain sort of interdependence of conceptual
capacities and beliefs. He now only represents his reasoning as the latter—
a
connective analysis' which shows only what our conceptual scheme conceptually
requires. Skeptical doubts are idle', on his view, because the skeptic, in forming his
skepticism, accepts that self-conscious thought is possible; since, as Strawson thinks he
has shown, this requires positing-or believing in-an external world, skeptical doubts
about such a world are incoherent or pointless. As he puts it, the skeptical hypothesis
"involves the pretended acceptance of a conceptual scheme and at the same time the
silent repudiation of one of the conditions of its existence."48 He claims that he stands
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This position is disappointing as an answer to the skeptic. It is clear the skeptic
can accept that it is necessary for us to posit or believe in the existence of external
objects, while questioning whether we really can be certain they exist. Our alleged
inability actually to imagine ourselves in a solipsistic world only tells us something about
our conceptual scheme; it remains an open and reasonable question as to what actually
exists independently of that scheme.
5. Bennett’s Revision of Strawson's Argument
Inspired equally by Strawson and Wittgenstein, Jonathan Bennett gives a revision
of Kant's Refutation which rests on a principle similar to the principle of significance and
which, like Strawson's argument, draws a conclusion which appears to go beyond a claim
about conditions for the legitimate use of concepts.
Bennett begins by describing what he regards as the failed strategy of the
Refutation, and then goes on to give a revised version which he thinks is successful. He
describes Kant's Refutation as a Wittgenstinian 'public check' argument. He says that this
argument fails because of reasons similar to those cited above against Wittgenstein's
private language argument; he thinks, however, that a revised-and more clearly
Wittgenstinian-version of this interpretation can work as a refutation of skepticism.
Bennett agrees that the Refutation is logically prior to the First Analogy, showing
that we must have experience of objects outside us, while the First Analogy shows the
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manner in which we must conceptually parse this external world into substances. 50 Kant's
summation of what the Refutation has proved is that
outer experience is really immediate, and that only by means of it is inner
experience—not indeed the consciousness of my own existence, but the
determination of it in time-possible. (B276-7)
Bennett thinks that Kant's reasoning to this conclusion went along lines similar to
Wittgenstein's 'public check' argument against private languages. 51
Like Guyer and Strawson, Bennett holds that Kant's notion of a "determination of
time refers to one s placing of a given subjective state in a subjective time-order of
states. Also like Guyer, Bennett thinks that Kant is concerned with the necessary
conditions of X\\qjustification of such judgments. He hypothesizes that Kant's line of
thought is that my memory tells me what state I was in at any earlier time, but I know that
I can trust my memory only by checking it against objective states of affairs: if I check it
against other memories alone, I fail thereby to justify my practice of relying on memory.
Bennett describes this as a Wittgenstinian argument, even though he does not mention
necessary conditions of the meaningful use of language; he only mentions conditions of
justified subjective temporal determinations.
Bennett thinks that this is what Kant has in mind when he says that
"representations themselves require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which
their change, and so my existence in time wherein they change, may be determined"
(Bxxxix n.). I require objects and objective states of affairs to justify my practice of
50
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relying on memory to order my subjective states. On his view, this is the rationale for
Kant s conclusion that "the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a
determinate consciousness of the self’ (B278).
(What Bennett does not explain is how, even in principle, Kant is supposed to get
irom the claim that the existence of outer things is necessary to justify STJs to the claim
that the existence of outer things is necessary to make STJs at all, and thus to acquire a
determinate consciousness of the self." Thus the argument that Bennett actually
represents as Kant's is invalid as it stands.)
Bennett continues by noting two objections that he says are "fatal" to the above
argument, that the practice of relying on memory is just as epistemically trustworthy as
the practice of relying on public checks, and that public checking itself requires reliance
on lawlike statements and thus on recollection. 52 However, he thinks that a different
version of the same argument can be successful.
He bases this new argument on his "theory of concept-utility":
If one has a language L in which to describe a subject-matter S, it is legitimate to
add a new concept C to the stock of concepts in L in proportion as L-with-C can
describe S more simply than can L-without-C/ 3
Suppose someone were limited to purely inner experience (this is the picture that the
Cartesian and the Humean support); in other words, all this person is immediately
acquainted with is sense-data. Could such a person, Bennett asks, "enlarge the scope of
his language so as to describe not only his state at the time of his speaking but also his
51
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states at earlier times?" 4 Bennett notes that what this person says now about his past
states would depend entirely on his recollections. Bennett suggests that, in this situation,
the concept of the past will not satisfy the theory of concept-utility: the addition of the
concept of the past is useless, since there is a one-to-one relation between what this
person can say about his past states and what he can say about his recollections. The
distinction between 'I recollect being thus' and 'I was thus' is "idle," on Bennett's view,
because any evidence for the one is evidence for the other. Adding the concept of a past
state does not add anything to the descriptive power of the person's language: so this
concept has no utility for this person.
By the theory of concept-utility, this person cannot
"
legitimately" add the concept
ot the past to his stock of concepts. As we have seen, this is not a sufficient conclusion to
refute the skeptic: the skeptic can always respond that, unbeknownst to us, we use such
concepts illegitimately. However, from this conclusion Bennett draws a much stronger
one:
for the man who has only inner experience there is only one way in which
anything can seem to have been the case, so that his so-called judgments about the
past pair off neatly with his present-tense judgments about his so-called
recollections. He therefore cannot construct a past out of his present data: his
'past' states collapse into his present 'recollections' of them, because no work is
done by the distinction between the two. ...I conclude that someone who had only
inner experience could not make judgments about his past: for him to do so would
be not rash but impossible.”
53
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By contrast, the man with genuine outer experience can "bring several present data to
bear on a single judgment about the past," since he has access not only to his
recollections, but also to information about the present state of the world, from which
information about his past states can be inferred. Because of this, the man with outer
experience "has a complex relationship between 'I was...’ and 'I recollect...'." Thus the
concept of the past is not idle for him, so by the theory of concept-utility he can
legitimately use the concept ot the past; and as a consequence of this, according to
Bennett, it is possible for this man to make judgments about his past.
Bennett thus moves directly from conclusions about whether concepts can be used
legitimately to conclusions about whether such concepts can be entertained at all. What
could license such a connection? Like Strawson, Bennett seems to be conflating the
legitimate use of concepts with the possibility of generating them. As before, however,
this is just to deny what Hume asserts: that we illegitimately generate external world
concepts on the basis of mere regularities among mere sense-data.
If Bennett (or Strawson) had made a case for the claim that certain external world
concepts are psychologically impossible without our being in a position to know whether
they are instantiated, then they might have had an anti-skeptical argument. As it stands,
however, at best all they each can claim to have shown is that external world concepts
formed on the basis of sense-data alone are meaningless or illegitimate. But to this the
skeptic can happily agree.
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There have been a few recent attempts made in the direction of directly arguing
that external world experience is a necessary condition of the possibility even of
entertaining external world concepts. These arguments are the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF EXPERIENCE
1 . The Problem of the Refutation
In his book on Kant, Henry Allison indeed denies that in the Refutation "Kant, in
proto-Wittgenstinian fashion, is concerned with the conditions of the justification or
verification of particular knowledge claims about the self." 1 Kant's concern, he says, "is
rather with the conditions of the possibility of making such judgments (judgments of
inner sense) at all."
Allison's interpretation of the argument is very simple. First, Kant’s claim is that
the consciousness of one's existence as an enduring subject of successive experiences that
the skeptic agrees we have involves consciousness of the order of one's states in time and
placement of oneself in a universal time-order. 2 But the determination of the existence of
anything in time "presupposes the perception of something permanent in space."
Therefore the skeptic cannot consistently doubt that we actually perceive, and not just
imagine or believe that we perceive, enduring spatial objects.
Allison's version of the argument may be summarized as follows:
PI : I ascribe to myself a determinate order of temporally successive experiences.
1 Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1983), p.297.
2
Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism
, pp.302-3.
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P2: The formation of beliefs about temporal order requires the perception of something
enduring in space.
C. I have perceived something enduring in space.
Allison seems to think this is a successful response to the classical skeptic. This argument
falls short, however, in one crucial respect: P2 depends on the undefended assumption
Allison calls the "Backdrop Thesis," which he believes is supported by the First Analogy.
The Backdrop Thesis is the view that
the unperceivability of time makes it necessary to presuppose some perceptually
accessible model for time itself as a condition of the possibility of determining the
temporal relations of appearances.
...Consequently, an enduring, perceivable object
(or objects) is required to provide the backdrop or frame of reference by means of
which the succession, coexistence, and duration, of appearances in a common
time can be determined. 3
The first part of this claim is the claim I have previously said is made by Kant in the First
Analogy: that one's having the idea of enduring external-world substances is a necessary
condition of one’s forming any beliefs about an objective temporal order of events. The
second part of the claim in an addition on Allison’s part: he thinks that the First Analogy
argument also shows that an external-world object must actually exist in order for one to
get the idea of an objective temporal order.
In Chapter One I said that the basic problem in reading the Refutation lies in
understanding why Kant thinks that actually perceiving an enduring external object,
rather than just thinking one has perceived such a thing, is necessary for subjective time
determination. Allison answers this question by referring us to the First Analogy. But I
have argued that the strongest conclusion we can get from the First Analogy is that we
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must assume the existence of enduring objects (substances) when we distinguish between
the subjective change of mental states and objective change in an external world. Allison
moves directly from this to the claim that we must actually perceive enduring objects as a
condition of making this distinction. But this just relocates the problem to the First
Analogy (though I will not deny that there are passages in the First Analogy which could
lead one to think Kant has this stronger claim in mind there). Now the question is, what
could justify this move in the First Analogy? Allison does not tell us.
While Allison does not attempt to explain this key move, there are a couple of
contemporary writers who say something which might help fill in the gap. In particular.
Morris Lipson’s neo-Kantian refutation of skepticism may provide some clues in divining
Kant s intentions in the Refutation. I shall therefore examine Lipson's argument in detail
before returning to Kant's.
2. Mental Contents and Objective Experience
Morris Lipson thinks he can supply what Strawson, and others, fail to offer: a
direct connection between (a) the very ability to conceptually distinguish between an
objective temporal order and the order of one's subjective experiences and (b) the
existence of an objective world. Lipson agrees that, as it stands, Strawson’s neo-Kantian
refutation of idealism does rely on an implausible sort of verificationism. 4 Lipson also
3








recognizes that, as I argued in the previous chapter, Strawson does not explain how he
can get from the necessary conditions of employing certain concepts legitimately to what
he needs: namely, the necessary conditions of employing certain concepts at all.
Lipson would like to claim that the distinction we make between a subjective
order of perceptions and an objective order of events could not take place without there
being some non-subjective feature of our experience; in other words, some component of
our experience must genuinely indicate some facts about an external world. Otherwise, he
would like to claim, it would be psychologically impossible for us to make the
subjective/objective distinction at all. Lipson's goal, then, is to provide a reductio of the
skeptic s position by showing that skepticism about the external world is inconsistent
with a claim the skeptic must accept: namely, that he does distinguish between his
subjective states and an objective order of events. As we saw in Chapters Two and Three,
neither the epistemological approach nor the verificationist approach can accomplish this,
since those approaches say that the ability to make, respectively, justified STJs or
meaningful reference to external things is inconsistent with skepticism. As we saw in
those chapters, however, the skeptic can avoid inconsistency by denying that my STJs are
justified or that my external world propositions are meaningful. But if, as Lipson tries to
do, one can show that it would be psychologically impossible even to generate a belief
about my subjective order of mental states without genuine experience of objects, then
the skeptic would be stuck: he cannot deny that we do have beliefs of that kind.
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Lipson notes, with Strawson (and Kant), that the only order our immediate
experience presents is the subjective one. But "that is not enough," he claims, "for them
to give rise to the idea" of an independent objective order. 5 Neither the temporal ordering
of the subject s subjective states nor the content of any particular state can explain, he
claims, the thought of an objective order. Yet this is all that is "presented" in the subject's
experience.
Lipson thinks that there must be some further feature of experience, separate from
what is presented there, which explains' the idea of an objective order. Why does he
think this is so? He answers this by examining the content of experience on the skeptical
hypothesis. According to that hypothesis, we have only the merely subjective experience
of our actual states, nothing more; from this, the skeptic would like to say, we
unjustifiably infer the existence of things independent of our experience. Lipson asks us
to
imagine a subject who as yet has no conception ofpossible states differentfrom
the actual ones he experiences. Is there anything concerning his actual states or
their succession (or both) which would give him the idea of distinguishing
between himself qua subject and the states of which he is the subject?
The subject experiences variegated phenomena. But the phenomena are
not 'referential'. Nothing about them indicates that they are about anything. On the
contrary, the blue patch say, bears precisely its content which, though it may be
information, is not information that the patch has such and such a source, or that
the patch is information, or that the patch bears a certain relation to other states.
More important, the content of any such state does not include information
as to whose state it is. There is nothing in the content of the state which could
identify it as the state ofX, rather than of Y. But then, it can't be that it is just
apparent to the subject, on the basis of his experience of any such state, that he is
5
Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.324.
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a subject For what exists for him (as per our stipulation) are all and only actual
states oi his. He will frame no idea which the content of these states does not
immediately present to him. And no such content presents anything whatsoever
about ownership.
Finally, Lipson claims that this subject could not even acquire the idea of a subjective
succession of states:
to get the idea of succession in this case, one needs the idea ofstates which
succeed each other. But since there is nothing in any of the states which presents
(or even suggests) to the subject the idea of himself, he will not be able to
distinguish between himself and his states. He will, therefore, have no idea of a
state either. Indeed, our imagined subject is in no better position to recognize
himself as subject than is a movie camera.
If >ou look at the content ot the states of a subject who experiences only an actual
succession of subjective states, there is no obvious explanation--no immediately evident
source-for the additional content contained in the thought of an objective order separate
from the subjective one, which the subjective one represents; nor is there an explanation
for the content of the idea of a succession and a subject experiencing it. The problem with
the skeptical position, in short, is that the content of certain of our judgments—such as our
distinction between subjective and objective and our STJs-is " underdetermined ' by
subjectiv e experience alone; the input' of mere subjective experience does not account for
the 'output', the idea of oneself as a subject of successive experiences of an objective
world. Lipson wants to claim that, if the skeptic were right, and our experience were
limited to our actual subjective experiences alone, then we could not make such a
judgment at all . 6
6 Obviously the term 'content' plays a key role in this argument. This notion is used by
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Hume, however, thinks that our judgments about external substances can be
explained by patterns, or regularities, in our experiences. On his view these patterns, in
conjunction with inborn psychological tendencies, cause us to infer, unjustifiably, that
external objects exist. Speaking in Lipson's terms, Hume might agree that the empirical
content of a given mental state must be explained by reference to some adventitious
process, but he would insist that this explanation can be made in terms of the occurrence
of a pattern or regularity in subjective experience. It is true (still speaking in Lipson's
terms) that the content of the thought of a substance or cause goes beyond the content of
the thought of a subjective regularity; but this is exactly what Hume cites in making the
further claim that our references to substance and cause are, strictly speaking,
meaningless. It is Hume s view, recall, that these terms either are nonsense or in actuality
merely refer to subjective occurrences.
Lipson as a primitive concept, to designate whatever it is that makes a thought a thought
about a given thing. For instance, we may say that the difference between a perception of
blue and a perception of red is, simply, the presence of blue-content rather than red-
content. The key difference between a thought of John and Jack and a thought of John
and Jack and Marcie is the presence of 'Marcie-contenf in the latter. How to describe
blue-content or Marcie-content more precisely is a difficult question; however, most
would agree that it is reasonable to describe thoughts as having a certain content, which
determines what they are thoughts about. A very similar way of looking at thought-
content is as the truth-conditions of a thought, when that thought is expressed as a
proposition. Using this notion we would say that the thought of a unicorn is a composite
of two thought-contents: the thought of a horse and the thought of a horn. Each is needed
in order to think of a unicorn. So, when speaking of the difference between the thought of
an actual mental state and the thought of a possible state, we could note, as Lipson does,
that the thought of a possible, non-actual mental state involves the notion of a temporal
order different from the actual one, and thus involves a thought with content that seems to
go beyond what is contained in the thought of an actual mental state or set of actual
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Lipson anticipates this objection. His response is that a subject whose experience
is merely patterned" will not develop the idea of an alternative present. 7 That is because
his judgments are made solely on the basis of 'successful' expectations. Such
expectations, he claims, will give rise at best to judgments about his past and present
actual states, and his future actual states; the idea of a pure possible state-a state which
might have been experienced but which never will be-cannot be explained on the basis
of a merely patterned input of actual states, no matter how well-ordered that input is.
Once again, then, Lipson's idea is that the idea of a pure possible state involves
representational content which cannot be explained by the experience of actual states
(however patterned) alone. Without the idea of merely possible experiences, he adds,
there can be no idea of an order independent of the subjective order of experiences. So, he
concludes, there must be more to our experience than our merely subjective experiences;
otherwise, we could not form judgments about an objective order.
Lipson goes on to say that the notion of a merely possible experience will often be
conceived by the subject as related to a different stance or point of view that the subject
could have taken with regard to the objects of his experiences. 8 Experience, he says, as
the skeptic conceives it-as consisting just in a patterned sequence of subjective
representations-cannot be sufficient to provide one with the idea of a point of view.
Suppose the contrary were the case;
mental states.
7
Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.329.
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then the idea would arise either out of the content of (some of) the subject's states,
or out of their succeeding each other according to rules. But it is a familiar
fact...that the content itself of a state presents nothing whatever on the basis of
which one point of view rather than another could be associated with it (the
content)—and hence presents nothing whatever about point of view itself.
Lipson agrees that some order or apparent rule-govemedness among a subject's states
might allow the subject to get the idea of merely possible states. This might happen if a
subject made Humean associations between certain sorts of experiences, and then failed
to have the kind of experience such an association leads him to expect; he might then
form the idea of something that might have taken place but did not. But Lipson claims
that this would not be enough for a subject to get the idea of his taking a stance with
respect to his states (by taking a different stance, or point of view, with regard to an
objective world), as opposed to his states simply being governed by a set of rules
different from the one that the subject had previously attributed to them. There would be
insufficient data, in other words, for the subject to get the idea of his being in a position
to experience different sequences of perceptions by taking a different stance towards an
objective order, as opposed to getting the idea that his states can take up different stances
with respect to him. 9 If there is no reason for the subject to choose one of these
alternatives over the other, Lipson claims, "there is no reason to think he could come to
the idea of either of them."
8
Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.333.
9
Lipson, "Objective Experience," p.334.
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In order for the subject to get the required idea of his agency with regard to
different points of view, Lipson concludes, there must be (and the subject must
experience), in addition to the subject's states, some independent, relatively abiding,
p°ints ofreference relative to which the subject's point of view can change. Natural
candidates for such points of reference would be enduring material objects or places
independent of the subject. The point is that some such objective entity or entities must
be experienced by the subject in order for the subject to make the requisite distinction
between his states and an objective order independent of them; and this would give us the
desired anti-skeptical result.
Lipson notes that one might object that it would be sufficient if it just seemed to
us that such independent points of reference existed without it being the case that they
do . 10 He responds that
it cannot just seem that way to us. To suppose otherwise is to think we could come
to the idea of our agency solely on the basis of an experience consisting of states
and a non-temporal ordering of them which determined their temporal ordering in
us. But we have seen already that that experience is not sufficient to give rise to
the idea of that agency. Rather, a condition of that idea's arising is that there
actually exist independent points of reference with respect to which our points of
view are fixed.
Why is it that the non-veridical experience of an independent point of reference—which
would seem to have the same representational content as a veridical experience of the
same-cannot explain the content of my subjective/objective distinction? Lipson does not
address this question in more detail; however, his reasoning may run along the following
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lines. The reason why the mere (non-veridical) appearance of independent points of
reference cannot explain my subjective/objective distinction is that, in order for
independent points of reference to appear to me as enduring, I must already have the idea
of a distinction between my subjective states and an objective order. Without such a
distinction, I could not interpret my subjective states as representative of an objective
world containing independent points of reference in the first place. Any such inference
would require me already to have interpreted my states in such a way that they could be
taken to be representative of an objective order; but this capacity on my part is precisely
what we need the experience of independent points of reference to explain. There is thus
no alternative to the actual presence of such independent markers: without it, no
interpretation of one's experience as representing anything like such markers would be
possible. This piece of anti-skeptical reasoning is an instance of what I like to call the
cart-before-the-horse strategy'. The following is a general statement of this strategy:
The Cart-Before-the-Horse Strategy:
Show that having some particular sort of objective experience is a necessary condition of
making inferential judgments about an objective world. From this conclude that the
original objective experience must have been non-inferential and thus not subject to
skeptical doubts concerning one's ability to infer facts about the objective world from
subjective states.
If one can show that objective experience is a necessary condition of inferential
judgments, then one can say that the skeptic, in questioning all such inferences at once, is
making a mistake. By accepting the existence of inferential judgments about the external
10
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world, he is accepting objective experience not subject to his doubts about inferential
objective judgment. His doubts about our objective inferences presuppose beliefs about
the objective world based on inference; but these beliefs (Lipson claims) depend for their
existence on objective experience. Thus the skeptic puts The cart before the horse' by
placing beliefs about an external world before the actual experience of such a world. As
we shall see in a later section, Kant could be interpreted as employing a very similar
strategy in the Refutation. First, however, by way of gaining a deeper understanding of
this type of argument, I shall examine Anthony Brueckner’s criticism of Lipson’ s version
of it.
3. Brueckner's Criticism and Lipson's Reply
Bruecker criticizes the above argument as essentially similar to the Strawsonian
tvpe ol argument that he and Stroud had revealed to be dependent on a sort of verification
principle tor concepts. Strawson, recall, claimed that we had to have the concept of an
objective order of events in order to conceive of a subjective order of experiences and
thus to represent ourselves as having experiences at all." From this he seems to leap
unjustifiably to the conclusion that we must actually experience an objective order if we
are to make the required subjective/objective distinction.
Stroud and Bruecker both claimed that this argument could be valid only if one
includes a quasi-verificationist principle connecting the possession of external world
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concepts with the possession of experiential criteria adequate to tell whether the concepts
in question are instantiated. Such a principle would be prima facie implausible, however.
It also would make any further anti-skeptical argument superfluous and would suffer
from at least some of the other defects of the original verification principle.
Brueckner believes that Upson's argument represents exactly the same mistake.
He agrees that, in order to have the idea of my being an agent with respect to my points of
view, I need to have the idea of points of reference independent of myself. 12 But he does
not see how any anti-skeptical conclusion could be inferred from this without the use of a
verification principle connecting the possession of the concept of a point of reference
with the knowledge that the concept has instances.
As I have noted, Lipson anticipates the objection that, for all his argument has
shown, it still might be that it just seems that there exist independent points of reference,
although in fact they do not. He responds that this is impossible, because he thinks he has
shown that the existence of such points is a condition of there even arising the idea of
one's agency.
In attacking this response Brueckner asks us to compare the experiences of a
subject who actually experiences independent points of reference with those of a self-
aware subject who merely seems to experience such things and whose judgments
11
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concerning such things are always non-veridical. 13 Although Lipson argued that the latter
scenario is impossible, Brueckner simply claims that nothing could justify such a
contention except some kind of verification principle. 14 He concludes that Lipson's
argument fails for this reason.
In an unpublished manuscript, Lipson gives an interesting response to Brueckner's
criticism. 15 He first explains the general skeptical position as stating that our experience
underdetermines our judgments concerning the external world and that alternative
judgments are compatible with the available evidence—e.g., that an evil demon is making
it appear to me that there is an external world of physical objects.
"Given this setting," Lipson explains,
it is natural enough to suppose that a transcendental argument 16 disputes that
skeptical charge and, in particular, that it tries to show that the relevant evidence
is sufficient to establish the related existence judgment. 17
Although this is a likely interpretation of the Strawsonian response to the skeptic, Lipson
rejects such a description of transcendental arguments in general. He notes that
Brueckner, in response to his original argument, simply asked us to consider the
experience of two persons with exactly similar phenomenal experience, one veridically
perceiving an external world, and the other being deceived and experiencing only non-
13
Brueckner, Another Failed...," p.528.
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Lipson, "How Not To Understand Transcendental Arguments" (unpublished
manuscript).
16
Lipson does not, as I have (see Ch.l, above), distinguish between an anti-skeptical
transcendental argument and transcendental arguments generally.
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veridical perceptions. Brueckner merely claimed, Lipson adds, that nothing could show
us that this scenario is impossible if we did not assume a verification principle like the
one Brueckner describes.
As I understand him, Brueckner's point is that no phenomenal experience of
external things is sufficient to guarantee any inference to their existence without a
principle analytically connecting the possession of certain concepts with knowledge of
experiential criteria adequate to determine their instantiation. Lipson, however, sees this
as a misconstrual of the strategy of an anti-skeptical transcendental argument. 18 His idea
is that Brueckner thinks the proponent of such an argument is trying to dispute that
external world concepts are underdetermined by experience. Lipson responds that this
underdetermination is in fact the main premise of an anti-skeptical transcendental
argument. What the transcendental argument is intended to do, he claims, is to explain
how the external world judgments we make are possible, given this fact.
Lipson illustrates his claim by reference to Kant's Second Analogy. 19 According to
Lipson, in the Second Analogy Kant attempts to show that the concept of cause is
presupposed by the distinction one makes between a subjective order of experience and
an objective order of events. -0 In this way Kant holds that we must possess an innate
17
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Kant goes on in the same section to claim that, in fact, those objects which are
possible objects of our experience must therefore be causally related, and that our innate
concept of cause is for this reason "objectively real"-i.e., justifiably applicable to the
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concept of causation which we must in turn apply to our experience. In the Second
Analogy Kant agrees with Hume that experience does not reveal causal connections to
us. What Kant seeks to explain, however, is how, given this fact, we can judge that a
given succession of internal states [A', B’] is a representation of an objective sequence of
events [A, B], He explains such judgments by claiming that we make the required
distinction by conceiving of the order of our perceptions [A', B’] as necessary, and by
accounting for that necessity by reference to a causally determined objective sequence [A,
B] which gives rise to the corresponding subjective sequence of perceptions. Thus the
notion of causation is involved in the original subjective/objective distinction; this in turn
means that Hume must be wrong in attributing our concept of cause to unjustified
inferences from experiences already conceived of as objective.
objects of our experience. Kant deduces this claim directly from the claim that we must
represent the order of certain of our experiences as being determined by objective rules,
as a necessary condition of thinking that there is an objective order of events distinct from
an accidental sequence of perceptions (see, e.g., A193/B238, A198-9/B243-4,
A199/B244, and A201-2/B246-7).
The only way I can explain this transition is by reference to Kant's doctrine of
transcendental idealism, which reduces objects to the status of representations. He seems
to think that by showing that applying the concept of cause is a necessary condition of
our thinking of an objective order of events he can conclude that objects, insofar as they
exist and are objects of our experience, really are causally related. The only way I can see
for Kant to make this inference is for him to rely on some highly problematic principle
(i.e., transcendental idealism) which says that, if we must represent objects in a certain
way, then any objects we represent must really be that way. But this would be to lose any
robust sense of objective independence.
As I explained in Chapter One, I think that the parallel argument in the First
Analogy regarding the concept of substance is also unsatisfactory, for the same reason.
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Lipson wishes to emphasize that Kant's argument in the Second Analogy is not
that the experience of the subjective succession A', B' must be sufficient to indicate a
particular objective sequence; indeed, the fact that this is not the case is precisely what
calls for explanation. Lipson’s point is that "Kant does not argue from the content of A'
and B' to the causal relatedness of what they represent." 21 He concludes, rather, that,
given the fact that the content of experience underdetermines any judgment of causal
relatedness, the idea of causality must be in our possession prior to any causal judgment.
Only this can explain the content of causal judgments, since this content, as Hume and
Kant both observe, is not contained in our experience. In a similar manner, in the First
Analogy (as I noted earlier) Kant holds that the employment of the idea of substance is a
necessary condition of the representation of objective alteration.
Lipson feels that as regards skepticism, the starting point of a transcendental
argument is analogous to Kant's in the Second Analogy. The deviser of a transcendental
argument sees that experience presents, say, a set of features A1 ...An. This set of features
(as Hume and Kant agree) underdetermines our external world judgments; yet those
judgments take place anyway. The deviser of an anti-skeptical transcendental argument
accepts that the content ofsubjective experience underdetermines our external world
judgments and seeks to show what more our experience must contain beyond the
presentation of features A1 ...An in order to explain the "excess content" contained in our
21
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external-world judgments—and thus to explain how such judgments are even possible. 22
This is what Lipson thinks is Kant's general procedure in the Refutation.
If Lipson is correct, then the criticism of Kantian transcendental arguments
leveled by Stroud and Brueckner is misguided. On Lipson's view such arguments not
only fail to premise a verification principle but also deny any necessary connection
between having external world concepts and possessing adequate experiential criteria for
their application. In supposing that any Kantian transcendental argument must endorse
some verification principle, Lipson says, Stroud and Brueckner mistakenly suppose that
the only empirical content thinkable must be extracted from, or at least traceable to, the
presentations of experience. But it is exactly this point that the transcendental arguer
denies."'- Lipson agrees that it is possible for it merely to seem to us as though there were
independent points of reference. But he denies that it is possible for us even to think that
there exist such points of reference if there do not exist such points. Since the
presentational features of experience-those aspects of one's representations that are
traceable to actual sense-experience—underdetermine objective judgments, experience
must also contain some "non-presentational" features which explain the empirical content
of objective judgments. The only features that could do the trick, he continues, would
have to involve, at the least, the existence of independent points of reference. If such
22
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independent points of reference exist, the skeptical hypothesis must be mistaken. On the
basis of this argument we can rightly claim to know that an external world exists.
There is a crucial principle underlying Upson's reasoning that he does not make
explicit. His key point is that, if the content of ('presentational') experience
underdetermines the content of objective judgment, then there must be some source of
that content other than presentational experience. Lipson requires this premise in order to
conclude that there must be some other aspect of experience which makes the judgment
possible. Given this conclusion, he infers that the most likely candidate for this role is the
presence of independent points of reference.
This argument assumes that I myself cannot be the source of the content which, as
all parties agree, is underdetermined by my presentational experience. If it were possible
for me originally to generate the additional content necessary to fulfill the content
inherent in judgments about the external world, then it would not follow from the
underdetermination of objective judgments that something independent of me exists.
I conclude that Lipson must be assuming the truth of a principle something like
the following:
The No Original Empirical Content Principle [NOECP]:
It is impossible for me to generate original empirical mental content.
It is easy to see how NOECP is necessary to Lipson's anti-skeptical cart-before-the-horse
strategy. That strategy denies that my subjective-objective distinction can be based on the
non-veridical experience of independent points of reference (or independent substances),
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because such non-vendical experience would require that I make inferences based on
subjective states already understood as representative of an objective order. Lipson
concludes that my experience must contain genuine experience of independent points of
reference.
This reasoning, however, relies on the claim that the content inherent in my
distinction between subjective and objective needs to be accounted for in experience.
Why can 1
1
just come up with the idea that my states represent an external world? It
seems that the only way Lipson can answer this is by implicitly assuming that it is simply
impossible to do so; in other words, by assuming that something like NOECP is true.
Whether we should accept Lipson's argument clearly depends on whether we want
to accept NOECP. Hume, one of the natural targets of a refutation of skepticism of this
kind, did say that all our ideas must ultimately be traceable to impressions of our senses;
this was in fact the fundamental tenet of his empiricism. 24 How does NOECP differ from
the Stroud/Brueckner quasi-verification principle? The latter would connect the
possession of any concept with the ability to determine whether that concept is
instantiated. Lipson does not want to say that, whenever one makes a judgment
underdetermined by the available evidence, there must be some 'non-presentational'
aspect of one's experience which justifies the judgment. Consider Hume's celebrated
comments on induction. Hume pointed out that no amount of observation could justify
" 4 David Hume, A Treatise ofHuman Nature , 2nd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1978), p.4.
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judgments concerning future observations or events. Unlike Hume's skeptical claim about
substances independent of us, Hume's claim concerning induction has been widely
accepted. And yet we do make judgments involving induction, even though, using
Lipson's terms, experience 'underdetermines' such judgments. Lipson's claim thus cannot
plausibly be based on a general principle stating that, anytime a judgment one makes is
underdetermined by the available evidence, one's experience must be sufficient for one to
determine whether that judgment is true; for it would then follow that our judgments
concerning induction must be justified: as with the quasi-verificationist principle, an anti-
skeptical result would follow directly from the truth of such a principle. Such a principle,
furthermore, would be implausible on its face, as it would also be possible to conclude
from it that it is essentially impossible to arrive at an unjustified belief!
Lipson is not clear about what principle he is relying on; however, he need not be
relying on such an overly strong one. NOECP only says that the contents of our concepts
cannot ultimately be due to our own imagination. As in the case of the quasi-verification
principle employed by Strawson, one cannot immediately conclude from NOECP, in
conjunction with the fact of the possession of external world concepts, that we can know
whether such objects exist. In order to draw this conclusion, it would also be necessary to
show that the presence of the content in one's external world concepts can be explained
only if such concepts are instantiated. While Hume agreed that we do not invent
representational content, he also held that our judgments concerning an external world
100
can be explained by reference to patterns or regularities among our experiences in
conjunction with a natural tendency on our part to explain these patterns by positing
enduring existences which give rise to them. Furthermore, Hume thought our idea of
substance is lacking in content. If our idea of substance is without content, then there is
no underdetermined content to be accounted for.
This Humean alternative must be ruled out, and Lipson does not tell us enough
about his strategy so that we can determine if it can succeed at this. Thus there are several
questions to be answered in assessing an argument employing a strategy like Lipson's.
First, should we accept NOECP? Second, would the truth ofNOECP, in conjunction with
the fact of the awareness of temporal succession, entail the existence of an external
world? There is reason to believe that Kant held something like NOECP, and there is a
credible interpretation of his Refutation which has him employing something like it in his
argument against epistemological skepticism. In the following sections I shall sketch this
interpretation and also discuss NOECP's potential usefulness in refuting such skepticism.
4. The First Edition Argument From Idealism
In the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the Critique Kant attempts to refute
skepticism by applying to it his doctrine of transcendental idealism: he describes this
doctrine as the view that the objects that appear to us "are to be regarded as being, one
and all, representations only, not things in themselves" (A369):
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[Transcendental idealism] removes all difficulty in the way of accepting the
existence of matter on the unaided testimony of our mere self-consciousness, or of
declaring it to be proved in the same manner as the existence of myself as a
thinking thing is proved. There can be no question that I am conscious of my
representations; those representations and I myself, who have the representations,
therefore exist. External objects (bodies), however, are mere appearances, and are
therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are
something only through these representations. Apart from them they are nothing.
Thus external things exist as well as I myself, and both, indeed, upon the
immediate witness of my self-consciousness..
..For in both cases alike the objects
are nothing but representations, the immediate perception (consciousness) of
which is at the same time a sufficient proof of their reality. (A370-1)
It is difficult not to read this argument as expressing a straightforward form of idealism.
Transcendental idealism is the doctrine that the characteristics which we ascribe to
objects—including even their spatiality and temporality—hold of objects only insofar as
they are considered representations or appearances, and not insofar as they are considered
things in themselves. Thus our statements about objects should be confined to statements
about representations; any attempt to make claims about things in themselves is an
inappropriate use of reason. Kant and Kant's defenders have tried to explain how
transcendental idealism is different from the empirical idealism of Berkeley, but it is not
clear that they have succeeded in any substantive way.
Kant's argument could be sketched as follows:
PI : All external objects exist only by virtue of being represented. 25
P2: Representations of external objects exist.
C: External objects exist.
“ 5
In Chapter One I explained that, while Kant would hardly have agreed to this
premise, no one has yet succeeded in giving a plausible reading of his argument in the
Fourth Paralogism in which he does not in some way commit himself to an idealism he
wanted to avoid.
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It hardly seems possible that this is what he actually had in mind, but it is equally difficult
to see what else can be made of the above passage. Kant has been criticized by many
commentators on the point that it seems impossible on the one hand to say that it is a
mistake to make claims about objects independent of our representations and, on the
other, to claim that robustly independent material objects exist. Many of these
commentators have concluded that he does not successfully distinguish transcendental
idealism from empirical idealism. However, shortly after the above passage he gives a
somewhat different and more interesting argument against the skeptic. While this second
argument includes some idealistic-sounding comments, I do not think it rests on idealism
('transcendental' or not) to the extent the first one does.
5. The First Edition Argument From Empiricism
Immediately following his idealistic answer to skepticism, Kant gives another
argument, which involves a claim similar to Hume's claim that all simple ideas are
ultimately derived from simple impressions of the senses. This claim is then combined
with Kant's idealism regarding space:
Space and time are indeed a priori representations...But the material or real
element, the something which is to be intuited in space, necessarily presupposes
perception. Perception exhibits the reality of something in space; and in the
absence ofperception no power ofimagination can invent andproduce that
something. ...This admits of no doubt; whether we take pleasure and pain, or the
sensations of the outer senses, colors, heat, etc..perception is that whereby the
material required to enable us to think objects ofsensible intuition mustfirst be
g/ve«....[S]pace is itself nothing but mere representation, and therefore. ..what is
given in it, that is, represented through perception, is also real in it. For if it were
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not real, that is, immediately given through empirical intuition, it could not be
pictured in imagination, since what is real in intuitions could not be invented a
priori.
All outer perception, therefore, yields immediate proof of something real
in space, or rather is the real itself. In this sense empirical realism is beyond
question; that is, there corresponds to our outer intuitions something real in space
(A373-5, my emphases.) P
'
In this passage Kant declares that the imagination is unable to invent empirical or
qualitative content, such as the empirical content of perceptions of color or heat. To this
he adds the transcendental idealist claim that what is represented in space actually exists
in space.
It is not obvious how this argument is supposed to go. One way to interpret it
would be to ignore all the talk in the above passage about the imagination not being able
to invent qualitative content and just focus on the claim that what is represented in space
must actually exist in space. Since we represent objects as being in space, and space is
described as nothing but "mere representation," it would seem to follow that objects exist
in space. On this reading, this is no more than a restatement of the idealistic main
argument of the Fourth Paralogism, which we just discussed. I think that many
commentators on Kant have seen it this way, as one sees many references to 'the' Fourth
Paralogism refutation of skepticism (i.e., what above I called the ‘argument from
idealism ), which is then described and usually decried as a simple application of
transcendental idealism. 26
6
See, for example, A.C. Ewing, A Short Commentary on Kant ’s Critique of Pure
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), pp. 176-7; Norman Kemp Smith, A
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But I think that the second argument represents a strategy different from that of
the first one. The first Fourth Paralogism argument rests on reducing objects in general to
representations; the second mentions only that space is a mere representation. Thus, only
the spatiahty of objects is assured in this argument. In contrast to the first, in the second
argument Kant is explicitly sensitive to the fact that we can imagine the presence of outer
objects, and so it seems possible that we should actually be imagining all our outer
representations. The first argument would objectify all our outer representations,
regardless of whether they had their source in perception or imagination. In the second
argument Kant recognizes that he has to prove that some of my apparently adventitious
ideas of the external world must come from perception rather than from imagination. The
transcendental ideality of space still guarantees the spatiality of outer representations; but
skeptical scenarios such as Descartes’ dream argument question whether we can know if a
representation is, genuinely, 'outer'.
Kant responds in this argument by making the Humean claim that the qualitative
content of my external world representations cannot ultimately have its origin in the
imagination; there must have been original perceptions which supplied this content. So at
least some of my external world representations must have been perceptions rather than
creations out of the whole cloth of my imagination. This is not to say that I know which
ones they are; all this argument is meant to refute is a global skepticism based on the
Commentary to Kant 's Critique of Pure Reason, 2 nd ed. (New York: Humanities Press,
1962), pp. 301-5, 462; Strawson, p.246; Bennett, p.2 1 5; and Allison, pp.14-5.
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ability of the imagination to generate its own objects-a skepticism which questions
whether any of my supposedly adventitious ideas come from external objects.
To this Kant adds that those representations that are outer perceptions must be
representations ol spatial objects, since space is just the form of outer representation. But
this, by contrast to the argument from idealism, is to apply transcendental idealism
regarding space only to representations which have (supposedly) already been shown to
be representations of things which exist independently of the perceiver, rather than to
show that all my representations of external world objects are genuine outer
representations just because they are representations of something outer.
This argument depends on the claim that I am incapable of generating empirical
content which is original to me-in other words, on NOECP. We could sketch this
argument as follows:
PI •' I could not have ideas of empirical qualities without perceiving something
independent of me which bears them. [NOECP]
P2: I have ideas of empirical qualities.
P3: I have perceived things independent of me. [P1,P2]
P4: Space is just the form in which I represent that which is independent of me.
P5: Anything I represent as independent of me is spatial. [P3.P4]
C: Some spatial objects have existed in my lifetime.
In assessing this argument, there are two important questions to consider, which I shall
now deal with in turn: “Do we have reason to accept NOECP as Kant expresses it in this
argument?" and, “If we do, should we then conclude on the basis of this argument that
external objects exist?”
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6. What Reasons Do We Have to Accept NOECP?
The challenge for Kant is to get a valid argument whose premises the rationalist
and empiricist skeptics will accept. So I shall now return to Descartes and Hume, and
assess their likely attitudes toward NOECP.
There is some indication that Descartes would reject NOECP. 27 The denial of this
principle would follow from his famous 'causal principle', when it is conjoined with his
theory of reality, or perfection. His causal principle, applied to ideas, states that there
must be at least as much 'reality' or 'perfection' in the efficient and total cause of an idea
as is contained in that idea either formally or objectively (whichever is greater). 28
According to Descartes, human minds are substances, and sensory qualities have less
reality than substances. Thus it would be consistent with Descartes' causal principle for a
human mind to be the efficient and total cause of the idea of an empirical quality.
On the other hand, Descartes's support for his questionable causal principle is very
weak: all he says is that its truth is evident to him by the "natural light." The only support
he cites for relying on the 'natural light' involves either an argument which circularly
assumes the causal principle as a premise (his cosmological argument for the existence of
God) or an obviously fallacious argument (the ontological argument for the existence of
~ 7
This fact is not derived from his doctrine of innate ideas, however, since he thought
those he identified were placed in me by God [see, e.g., CSM II, pp.76-7, 132],
8 Rene Descartes, Meditations
,
in vol.II of The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes,
trans. by John Cottingham et al (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.28.
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God). Secondly, the conclusion that NOECP is false also would depend on his
identification of human minds as substances and their thoughts as modes of substance
(Kant actually argues against this in his "First Paralogism" [A348-9]). Descartes'
hypothetical a priori argument against NOECP thus is not a source of great concern for its
proponent.
A more pressing worry than the preceding is that NOECP also might be
contradicted by Cartesian hidden faculty skepticism. As I explained in Chapter One, one
of the sources of Descartes' skepticism was the possibility that I have a hidden faculty
unknown to me which is capable of producing my apparently adventitious ideas. This
possibility might be taken by a Cartesian skeptic to cast doubt on NOECP, since such a
hidden faculty might, despite appearances, have capabilities which I (or, rather, the
faculties I have which I am aware of) do not. Such capabilities might include the ability
to generate original empirical content, such as shades of blue and the like.
Descartes responds to this concern by establishing the reliability of clear and
distinct perception through his two (rather questionable) proofs of the existence of God,
and then claiming that he can clearly and distinctly conceive of his mind as existing
distinct from his body. This establishes that minds are substances. Since, on his view, the
essence of mental substance is thought, he concludes that he must be aware of the activity
of any faculty in him (since the product of any such faculty is a thought, of which he
would by definition be aware).
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Unfortunately, since Descartes' support for his active faculty awareness thesis is
questionable, so is the claim that we are necessarily aware of the activity of any idea-
producing faculty in us . :9 One might respond, however, that any faculty which is not
accessible to our mind is not, strictly speaking, part of our mind, and thus represents
something independent of us; so positing the possibility of such a faculty requires the
rejection of solipsism. I shall return to this point later, after I have spelled out my reading
of Kant's Refutation.
There is a line of thought which would support the acceptance ofNOECP by the
Cartesian. The most extreme form of skepticism that Descartes mentions in the
Meditations arises from the possibility that the evil demon not only deceives me about the
real source of my adventitious ideas, but also affects my ability to reason, thus routinely




thinks he responds successfully to this sort of skepticism through his proofs of the
existence and non-deceptiveness of God, but it is an obvious answer to say that those
proofs themselves are called into doubt by an extreme skepticism about my very ability to
reason.
One might be tempted by this to consider any form of skepticism which calls into
doubt my ability to make correct logical inferences of even the simplest kind to be a
”
^ It is interesting to note that one way of characterizing anti-skeptical transcendental
arguments is as arguments which purport to show that mind cannot be conceived of as
existing distinct from body, if we think of those minds as having, for example, the
capacity to distinguish between what is subjective and what is objective.
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skepticism on another level from the more ordinary forms of Cartesian and Humean
skepticism concerning my beliefs about the external world. It seems to follow trivially
from skepticism about my own reason that any argument I give against such skepticism
will depend on my ability to reason, and thus is circular. One might argue that it is
reasonable to separate a discussion about basic external world skepticism from a
discussion about this most extreme form of skepticism and to treat them as two entirely
separate topics. If so, then it seems a reasonable procedure to provisionally consider my
ability to reason as a constant as I try to prove that an external world exists.
If I am warranted in taking my ability to reason on faith as I try to respond to the
more ordinary forms of skepticism, then it might be said that I am also warranted in
taking certain other of my basic cognitive capacities for granted when discussing baseline
skepticism. NOECP implies that I do not have the cognitive capacity to generate original
empirical content. One might claim that if it is reasonable to take my capacity to reason
tor granted, then it is also reasonable to take a broader basic description of my cognitive
capacities for granted as well. This seems especially appropriate in the case ofNOECP, a
negative principle which puts a limit on my abilities (in this case, on my ability to
generate empirical content), instead of extending them into some questionable area.
This line of thought hardly establishes NOECP as certain, but I think it at least
shows that a Cartesian skeptic could consistently maintain NOECP while questioning the






principle in question is even stronger, given that Descartes did think he had established
that he would be aware of any idea-producing faculty in him. He, at least, would as a
consequence accept as sufficient evidence the reason Hume gives for thinking that we are
not the ultimate cause of our empirical ideas-i.e., the evidence of introspection. 31
This brings us to the empiricist skeptic. NOECP does appear to be something the
classical empiricist would accept, as part of the general principle that all ideas are
traceable to original impressions of the senses. As Hume puts it, all our complex ideas are
constructed from simple ones, and "all simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv'd
from simple impressions" 32 He bases this principle on the evidence of introspection and
the observation of the inability of children and the blind or deaf to acquire ideas of
empirical qualities without corresponding impressions. He finds that
any impressions either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an idea,
which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and liveliness. The
constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the
one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal
proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not the ideas of our
impressions. 33
He also notes that it would be to proceed "absurdly" to try to give the idea of a color, like
scarlet or orange, or a taste, like sweet or bitter, to a child who did not possess them
without exposing the child to the proper sensory input. Also, he claims that the blind and





33 Hume, Treatise, p.5.
In relying on these empirical considerations to prove his contention about the
source of simple ideas, Hume seems to be presupposing something like NOECP. I think
that what Hume thinks is absurd about the idea of a child getting an idea of a color or
taste is the notion that the child could just come up with the idea on his own without a
corresponding impression to supply the child with the sensory content contained in the
idea.
Hume does concede that there could be an exception to NOECP: he says that, in
the case where a person has encountered every shade of blue except one and is presented
with a set of color swatches representing all the shades of blue except that one, that
person could actually use his imagination to generate the idea of the missing shade of
blue.-
4 He says, however, that this exception is so "particular and singular" that it "does
not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim."
As many commentators on Hume have observed, though, if this were a genuine
exception to the rule, then it would seem to warrant altering the maxim in question. If I
can generate a simple idea of an empirical quality in this instance, then why not in others?
Hume does not say why this would be impossible; his support for the maxim is inductive,
and, in the cases of the child and the blind man, rests not even on direct observation but
rather on inferences made at best on the basis of the reports of such subjects that they do




conceivable for a man blind from birth to have colored mental images.35 But even if he
did, he would not be able to identify the image as colored, since he would have no access
to the public language of visual qualities, and would thus have no criteria by which he
could confirm that what he was experiencing was the same sort of thing that the sighted
refer to by using color terms. (Even if such criteria actually exist for the sighted.. .we
might imagine a cross-sensory problem analogous to the inverted spectrum problem.) But
if Flew is right, then neither the verbal reports nor the behavior of the blind could count
as evidence for or against NOECP.
So, while Hume supports the principle, his empirical support for his general
principle (which implies NOECP) is tenuous. As an empiricist, of course, he could hardly
allow an a priori argument for any non-analytic principle (as this one surely is). Kant, on
the other hand, does allow for a priori synthetic principles, and so in principle could at
least consistently attempt such an argument. Unfortunately, he does not: he introduces
NOECP in his "Fourth Paralogism" without further argument.
Let us suppose for the time being that NOECP could be established and proceed
to investigate what can be proved on its basis. Kant in the Fourth Paralogism thinks it is a
short step from NOECP, in addition to the occurrence of simple empirical representations
in me, to the existence of empirical objects. But Hume disagrees. Hume, after all,
maintained the truth ofNOECP, but certainly did not think that this principle could be
used to prove that external objects exist. He thought that our ideas of external objects are
35 Antony Flew, David Hume (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1986), p.22.
113
complex ideas constructed out of ideas of qualities. 36 Thus there would be no problem
with the imagination coming up with the idea of such an object, so long as there were
prior impressions which supplied us with the component simple ideas. So how can
NOECP be used as evidence that external objects exist?
7 1 UTiether Kant's Argument Shows That the Existence of External Objects Follows From
the Truth ofNOECP
If it is true that I cannot invent empirical content, and thus that I can infer the
existence of outer things from the occurrence of empirical ideas in me, then clearly no
other argument would be necessary to refute skepticism. Descartes, however, considered
and rejected a very similar argument in his First Meditation. As his initial response to
dream skepticism, Descartes suggests that, despite the possibility that any particular
judgment of mine about the world may unbeknownst to me be based on a dream, the
elements out of which dreams are fashioned must be real, including the "nature," "shape"
and "quantity" of extended things, the "place in which they may exist" and "the time
through which they may endure." 3 But in response to this suggestion he notes that an evil
demon may exist which is the real cause of my ideas of all these things, so I cannot infer
with certainty any facts about the external world from the mere occurrence of empirical
ideas in me.





Kant appears to agree with Descartes: Kant himself in the Fourth Paralogism
seems to counter his own argument, by admitting that
the inference from a given effect to a determinate cause is always uncertain, since
the effect may be due to more than one cause. Accordingly, as regards the relation
of the perception to its cause, it always remains uncertain whether the cause be
internal or external. (A368)
Even it NOECP is true and we cannot ultimately be the cause of the empirical content of
our representations, that cause may still lie in a hidden faculty in us, or in an evil demon
outside us, rather than in actual spatial objects. In other words, even if we can establish
that my passive faculty of sensation—rather than my active faculty of imagination—must
have been involved in the creation of certain representations in me, this does not
eliminate other possible explanations of the origin of those sensations. At best, NOECP
can show that I have been passive with respect to the acquisition of certain
representations. But this does not tell me what active cause is responsible for them.
As Hume also said, while ideas must ultimately be traced to sensations, the real
cause of those sensations must always be in doubt:
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in
my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and 'twill always be
impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the
object, or are produced by the creative powers of the mind, or are derived from the
author of our being. 38
So even the empiricist Hume, who thought that all ideas come from sensation, did not
feel he could conclude from this fact that external causes resembling the images given in
sensation exist; he recognized that the senses could be stimulated by other causes, and
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thus that any inference regarding objects on the basis of sense-impressions would be
uncertain.
This argument is the reason why Kant feels he must show-as he tries to do both
in the first edition "Fourth Paralogism" and the second edition "Refutation of Idealism"-
that the experience of external objects is "immediate ," rather than inferential. But the
NOECP-based argument in the Fourth Paralogism does not show that our experience of
the external world is non-inferential. It does not deny that my judgments concerning the
external world come by inferring the existence of external objects from the occurrence of
states internal to myself; it claims only that the occurrence of the ideas of empirical
qualities on whose basis I ultimately infer facts about the external world could not occur
in me without corresponding sensations. But any inference from the occurrence of certain
sensations (even though they are genuine sensations, as opposed to images created by my
imagination) to the existence of some particular cause of them is uncertain.
Perhaps as a consequence of this reply Kant also presents, in the Fourth
Paralogism, the argument from idealism, in which he appears to reduce objects to mere
representations in the mind. Since space is the form of outer representations, we know
objects exist and are spatial just from the fact that we have representations of objects
outside us. Since we have immediate access to our representations, we must also have




As noted above, however, Kant's argument from idealism would indeed
demonstrate our immediate knowledge of objects, but would do nothing to refute
skeptical idealism.
In the second edition of the Critique
,
Kant omits the anti-skeptical argument of
the Fourth Paralogism that is based on NOECP (along with the argument in the same
Paralogism which rests on an unattractive form of idealism). Flowever, it is not clear that
he abandons NOECP altogether in the anti-skeptical strategy of the second edition. I
think that there is a possible reading of the "Refutation"-as it is elucidated by Kant's
"General Note on the System of Principles" and his later Reflexionen on the "Refutation"-
-which has him basing his argument on NOECP, in conjunction with a specific claim
about the necessary conditions of the possession of a particular sort of empirical
representation.
8. The Refutation of Idealism Revisited
In the second edition of the Critique Kant introduces the Refutation of Idealism,
which I will repeat here:
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of
time presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent cannot
be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination of my existence which are
to be met with in me are representations; and as representations themselves
require a permanent distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so
my existence in the time wherein they change, may be determined. Thus
perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not
through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the
determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of
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actual things which I perceive outside me. ...In other words, the consciousness of
my existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of
other things outside me. (B275-6. 1 have made changes in accordance with Kant's
instructions in his preface to the second edition [Bxxxix])
Kant claims in this argument that I must perceive a "permanent" in order to "determine
my existence in time." The permanent needed for this cannot be a mere enduring
representation, he continues, because the succession of my representations cannot be
determined by me without it. My ability to determine my existence in time—to order
my own states in time—is dependent on my ability to conceive of my own subjective
states as succeeding each other in some determinate order.
One thing problematic about Kant’s argument is why he concludes that I must
perceive some permanent thing in order even to conceive of succession in my own states.
As we saw in Chapter Two, Guyer takes this to be an argument about the necessary
conditions of making justified judgments about my subjective order of perceptions.
Strawson, as we saw in Chapter Three, takes it to be an argument about the necessary
conditions of making legitimate or meaningful judgments of this kind. Yet a more
straightforward reading of the argument would be that it describes the necessary
conditions of making any 'temporal determination'—any judgments about temporal order-
-at all. The difficulty, of course, lies in finding an argument which plausibly identifies a
necessary connection between this ability and the existence of objects in space.
Kant claims in his First Analogy that the notion of a temporal succession involves
the notion of an alteration in a substance. Why is this? Because time itself is not an object
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of perception, and thus time's successiveness must be given by something other than a
direct apprehension of it. In other words, time's successiveness must be found in the
successiveness of the changing states of substances.
On this basis Kant can conclude that the notion of substance is innate in us. This
conclusion is not problematic for him, because the notion of a substance is derived from
the notion of logical or grammatical subjecthood. As such, the notion has no intrinsic
empirical content.
The key question then becomes, "How do we acquire the idea of alteration, and
thus the concept of temporal succession?" In his "General Note on the System of the
Principles," which comes shortly after the Refutation, Kant answers this question. His
answer is that we must perceive alteration, because the concept of alteration is irreducibly
empirical and cannot be produced by the operation of reason alone. He claims that, in
order to comprehend alteration,
we must take as our example motion, that is, alteration in space. Only in this way
can we obtain the intuition of alterations, the possibility of which can never be
comprehended through any pure understanding. For alteration is combination of
contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing.
Now how it is possible that from a given state of a thing an opposite state should
follow not only cannot be conceived by reason without an example, but is actually
incomprehensible to reason without intuition. (B291-2)
Here Kant makes the claim that we must experience alteration in order to conceive of it.
He also explains that the notion of alteration cannot be understood without the notion of
different times
,
since the notion of alteration involves the notion of a thing being in two
different and mutually exclusive states; for example, if a thing alters color from
(completely) blue to (completely) red, then it is true that the thing instantiates both
blueness and redness. This is a contradiction, and thus not conceivable, unless we
understand these states as being instantiated in the thing at different times. So it is Kant’s
view that the notion of alteration is inextricably bound up with the notion of individual
and distinct times.
Leibniz thought that both spatial and temporal facts and relations could be
reduced to and derived from non-spatial and non-temporal facts or relations, respectively.
In his "Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics" Leibniz says that "we deny that what
occurred last year and this year are simultaneous, for they involve incompatible states of
the same thing." 39 It was Leibniz's view that we invent the notion of a temporal relation to
account for apparent contradictions in perception of the sort Kant alludes to in the
General Note. This would account, then, on Leibniz's view, for the idea of temporal
succession.
But Kant goes on in the General Note to reject Leibniz's answer. He claims that
the only way for us to gain the idea of a temporal succession is actually to experience
change in an external object:
The intuition required is the movement of a point in space. The presence of the
point in different locations (as a sequence of opposite determinations) is what
alone first yields to us an intuition of alteration. For in order that we may
afterwards make inner alterations likewise thinkable, we must represent time (the
39
L.E. Loemker, ed. and trans., Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz-Philosophical Papers and
Letters (Dordrecht, 1969), p.666.
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form of inner sense) figuratively as a line, and the inner alteration through the
drawing of this line (motion), and so in this manner by means ofouter intuition
make comprehensible the successive existence ofourselves in different states. The
reason of this is that all alteration, if it is to be perceived as alteration, presupposes
something permanent in intuition, and that in inner sense no permanent intuition
is to be met with. (B292, my emphasis)40
Kant sees that the content of my judgments concerning temporal order is
underdetermined by the mere experience of my actual states: as he repeatedly states, a
succession of representations is not the same as a representation of a succession. 41 To
represent a succession, he claims, I must perceive something undergoing alteration. But—
as Kant now observes—the idea of such a thing (an enduring substance undergoing
alteration) cannot come from introspection, because he agrees with Hume that
introspection reveals no enduring self. The claim Kant makes is that the mere experience
of my actual states cannot explain the content of my thought of my own succession of
states, because any temporal determination requires the idea of change, and such an idea
cannot originally come from reflection on my own inner workings. So Kant's conclusion
is that it must come from genuine outer sense: it must come from the actual experience of
alteration in an external object. Therefore external objects exist.
But how can Kant justify his claim that I must have an experience of alteration in
order to conceive of it? To this he gives no explicit answer. I think, however, that a
likely-and completely overlooked-answer to this is evident. Kant's claim is that the idea
40 The experience of motion in space may or may not be only one example of how one
could get the idea of alteration. Presumably, the experience of other kinds of objective
alteration, such as change of color in an object, could also do the trick.
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of temporal succession must be given by such an experience; this idea in turn would
allow me to resolve the inherent contradiction in the notion of a single thing instantiating
opposed states; this resolution, finally, would allow me to conceive of succession in my
own subjective states. Since the skeptic surely must concede that I assign my own states a
temporal order, then he must admit that I have experienced objective alteration. But why
must temporal succession be given by an experience of alteration? Why can’t I just be
spurred by apparent contradictions in perception to use my imagination to construct the
notion of temporal succession, the way Leibniz suggests? Here is where I think NOECP
is in play. On this reading, Kant's claim that I must experience alteration in order to
conceive of it, and thus to represent temporal succession in my own states, would be
intended to follow from the general Humean claim that I cannot use my imagination to
invent empirical content, in conjunction with the claim that the concept of alteration (or
rather, the concept of change over time) is irreducibly empirical. In other words, the
notion of alteration is held by Kant to contain a Humean simple idea, which must come
from experience. As I noted earlier, some of Kant's comments in the Fourth Paralogism
strongly indicate that he did endorse a principle like this and attempt to apply it in
refuting skepticism. Also, in the Refutation he echoes the 'argument from empiricism'
when he says that representation by the imagination "is merely the reproduction of
previous outer perceptions, which. ..are possible only through the reality of outer objects"
(B278).
41
See, for example, A99 and B225.
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For the application ofNOECP to the idea of temporal succession to be
appropriate, however, we must also be convinced that the idea of alteration contains a
primitive, or (Humean) simple, idea: only then can we conclude from NOECP that an
experience of succession (or something embodying it, viz., objective alteration) is
necessary to conceive of it. So we need an account of why the idea of alteration is
irreducible to some component ideas, which in turn could be supplied by experiences
which do not imply the existence of outer things.
Jonathan Vogel has an account of why Kant may have thought that alteration
contains a primitive idea. 4 ' Vogel thinks that this claim depends on the point that there is
nothing outside of what happens at a given time to distinguish individual times from each
other; in other words, individual times have no inherent characteristics by which they
may be distinguished. In the section of the Critique devoted to a discussion of Leibniz's
Law, Kant contrasts different yet exactly similar drops of water with different parts of
space (A263-4/B3 19-20). Even if two drops of water have all their internal characteristics
in common, he says, they may still be distinguished by their external characteristics—their
spatial or temporal location. In the same way, we might suppose, exactly similar events
may be distinguished by their spatial and/or temporal locations. This is not so, however,
with regard to individual times.
42
Jonathan Vogel, "Kant's 'Refutation of Idealism* Reconsidered" (unpublished
manuscript), pp.l 1-2.
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According to Vogel, when Kant says that we must experience objective change in
order to comprehend the possibility of "contradictorily opposed determinations in the
existence of one and the same thing" (be that thing an external object or myself), what he
means is that the idea of a change of property in a thing (and thus the resolution of the
apparent contradiction) cannot be derived from the direct postulation by the
understanding of individual temporal locations (i.e., times) at which the object can
display different determinations without contradiction. This would require the direct
postulation of distinct, indiscernible individuals. Only after postulating the existence of
such individuals could one then identify distinguishing characteristics on their part by
hypothesizing that they represent different times. But the point of saying that individual
times are indiscernible is that one cannot postulate the existence of different times to
explain different perceptual contents without presupposing the relation of temporal
succession needed to differentiate them. Once we have or understand the notion of
temporal succession, we can interpret our current subjective state as a complex
representation involving components representing a single object at different times. But
since the relation of succession can neither be directly given by the experience of
different times nor invented by the direct postulation of individual times with nothing to
distinguish them other than succession itself, succession must be experienced, as Vogel
puts it , " in concreto, i.e., in the intuition of something that alters." 41 This follows from the
claim that time is not an object of perception: if the temporal location of an experience
43
Vogel, “Kant's ‘Refutation’,” p.l 1.
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could be read directly off the content of that experience alone, then there would be no
problem in coming up with the idea of change over time. If times were discemibly
marked as being located in a particular order, the distinction between a subjective and
objective order of events could be derived from a comparison between the order indicated
by the marks and the order of their reproduction by memory or imagination. Any
deviation in the latter would be direct evidence of a distinct subjective order of
experiences. Since times are not so marked, then by NOECP the idea of succession must
be got by something else: namely, by an experience which is not the result of a judgment
presupposing the idea of succession.
But why can't we get the idea of succession from introspective experience of the
successive change of our own mental states? In other words, why can't we get this idea
from inner sense, rather than outer? Vogel thinks that Kant hints at a compelling answer
to this question. He notes that Kant states repeatedly that intuitions of inner sense are not
distinct from their objects (A190/B235, A368, MAN preface AK 4.471). Does Kant have
good reason to say this? As Vogel notes, "the identification of a mental state with its
intuition would help avoid a certain kind of infinite regress." 44 If one thinks that a mental
state cannot exist unperceived, then for each mental state there will exist another which is
an intuition of it. But since the latter is also a mental state, then there must be another
which is an intuition of that one, and so on.
44
Vogel, “Kant's ‘Refutation',” p.15.
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Vogel thinks that Kant's answer to the suggestion that I could get the idea of
succession by reflecting on the succession of my inner states is that I cannot get the idea
of succession in this way because the intuitions of inner sense are not identical with the
mental states of which they are intuitions. Inner sense, Vogel says, cannot provide a
direct perception of change because:
Inner sense discloses determinations of the subject itself, so that a change
disclosed by inner sense would have to be the transition of the subject from one
mental state to another. That is, one's mental state would not continue to exist
throughout the time when the change occurs. Yet, in order to observe a change,
one’s mental state (the representation of that change) has to continue over the time
interval of the change. Thus, we have a dilemma. If one's mental state remains
unchanged, there is no change to be perceived. Alternatively, if one’s state does
change, there is no persisting representation that comprehends the change. Inner
sense alone, then, does not allow for the observation of alteration. 45
If we assume that intuitions of inner sense are not distinct from their objects, Vogel
claims that we can then conclude that there cannot be a direct intuition of the change of
one's inner states: for this, there would have to be a continuing representation (a
perception of inner sense) which endured through a change in mental state. But if there is
a change in mental state, then there is no enduring state which could serve as the
experience of the change. This is how Vogel interprets the intended consequence of
Kant's claim that "space [the form of outer sense] alone is determined as permanent,
while time, and therefore everything that is in inner sense, is in constant flux" (B291).46
45
Vogel, “Kant's ‘Refutation’,” pp.7-8.
46
See Vogel, Appendix to “Kant's ‘Refutation’,” p.4
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It he is right, then there can be no direct perception of change in one's mental
state. Such a change can be inferred by recollecting different mental states and
concluding, since they are not the same, that they took place at different times and thus
that a change has taken place in one's mental states. But this presupposes the idea of
succession and the ability to order one's states in time. So this non-direct, inferential way
ol noticing that one's mental states undergo change cannot be the explanation for my
having the idea of succession; some direct, non-inferential perception of change (this
reasoning goes) must be responsible for such an idea. But there is no time when you
directly intuit change in your mental states as such, since change in your mental states
means the non-continuity of any intuition of inner sense that could count as an experience
of change.
But is my actually perceiving an external object undergoing change the only way I
can come to have an idea of succession? Not for Hume. He has a different account of the
acquisition of the concept of alteration in an enduring substance. He agrees with Kant that
time is not an object of perception:
The idea of time is not deriv'd from a particular impression mix'd up with others,
and plainly distinguishable from them. ..The ideas of some objects [the mind]
certainly must have, nor is it possible for it without these ideas ever to arrive at
any conception of time; which since it appears not as any primary distinct
impression, can plainly be nothing but different ideas, or impressions, or objects





Hume thus agrees that our idea of time is derived from a succession of perceptions which
are themselves ascribed to objects undergoing alteration.
But Hume does not agree that the fact that we have an idea of succession proves
the existence of objects independent of me. He has an account which is intended to
demonstrate that it is not a violation ot NOECP for us to have an idea of objective
alteration without actually experiencing it. He thinks that our judgments about external
substances can be explained by mere patterns, or regularities, among our experiences. He
says that these patterns, in conjunction with inborn psychological tendencies, cause us to
infer, unjustifiably, that external objects exist (and undergo alteration). He thinks,
therefore, that the experience of alteration in an enduring external thing is just an
unjustified inference from a succession of internal states. What does Kant say to rule out
the possibility that my conception of temporal succession is derived from this kind of
process?
I believe that Kant rules out Hume's alternative by implicitly employing, in the
Refutation and the above passage from the General Note, a version of what above I have
called the 'cart-before-the-horse strategy'. Kant's later reflection on the Refutation of
Idealism strongly suggests this kind of reasoning:
The intuition of a thing as outside me presupposes the consciousness of a
determinability of my subject, whereby I am not myself determinant, which
therefore does not belong to my spontaneity, since the determining object is not in
me... Therefore the possibility ofrepresenting things in space is grounded on the
consciousness ofa determination through other things...
That dreams produce the illusion of existence outside me proves nothing
against this; for there must have always been preceding external perceptions.
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Originally to acquire a representation of something outside me without in fact
being passive is impossible...
[I]f we were affected only by ourselves, yet without noticing this
spontaneity, only the form of time would be found in our intuition; and we would
not be able to represent any space (an existence outside us)....[E]mpirical
consciousness as the determination ofmy existence in time would be caught in a
circle andpresuppose itself—but obviously be impossible
,
since even the
representation ofthat which endures would be lacking. (R5653, 18: 307-8, my
emphases throughout)48
Kant's response to the Humean account is that the idea of an independent, enduring
substance undergoing alteration cannot be merely inferred from some sequence of inner
states of mine because the idea of alteration, and thus the idea of a substance, is a
condition of the recognition of any subjective sequence as a (temporal) sequence. It is
only after I order my states temporally that I will be able to detect a pattern in those states
which could then be taken by my understanding to indicate the presence of an external
object (or an internal object—i.e., the self) causing that pattern; but the experience of a








49 As I noted in Chapter One, Hume claims that present perceptions and memories are
distinguished on the basis of their relative "force and vivacity" (Enquiries
,
p. 1 7); present
perceptions exhibit, on his view, a greater "pitch of vivacity" than memories, which
allows us always to distinguish between the two. One possible Kantian response to Hume
might be that this phenomenological feature, even if it exists, could not be the original
explanation for my ability to make the requisite sort of distinction. For to associate
certain phenomenological features with certain kinds of representation in the first place, I
must already be able to make the distinction between these kinds of representation;
otherwise, I would not be able to correlate a particular sort of phenomenological feature
with a particular sort of representation. Thus, to come to the understanding that my
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We can illustrate the point of difference between Hume and Kant as follows.
Suppose I experience a succession of subjective impressions Sl....Sn, where SI presents
the image of an object in one part of my visual field, S2 the image of it in a slightly
different part, and so on. Hume says that my subsequent judgment that an object is before
me undergoing motion is an inference based on the resemblance and apparent continuity
and contiguity of the impressions; I have a psychological trait, on Hume's view, which
leads me to take impressions demonstrating such relations as representative of an
enduring object undergoing motion in space. I think Kant's response is that, in order for
me to infer from this sequence of perceptions that there is an object undergoing alteration
in place, I must have already decided that SI preceded S2, and S2 preceded S3, etc. And
his claim is that, in order even to make such a judgment (whether justified or not), I need
the notion ot temporal succession, which I can only get by perceiving a permanent
undergoing alteration; this notion in turn allows me to order my subjective perceptions.
Since (his claim goes) such a permanent is not to be found in inner sense, I must be aware
of one by outer sense. But then my judgment that there are external objects undergoing
change cannot originally come from inference on my subjective experiences, as Hume
would have us believe. To claim otherwise, as Kant says in R5653, is to give a circular
account of the development of my conception of myself as a being that experiences an
current state is interpretable in these kinds of ways, I must have some prior basis for
distinguishing between them.
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independent world by means of a succession of subjective experiences. As Kant says in
R5654,
[I]f there were not an external sense, that is, a capacity to become immediately
conscious (without an inference ofreason ) of something as outside us and of
ourselves, on the contrary, in relation [to it], then the representation of outer
things as such, space itself, would not even possibly belong to our intuition.
(R5654, 18: 313-14, first emphasis mine)
Kant concludes in the Refutation that "consciousness of my existence in time is
necessarily bound up with consciousness of the condition of the possibility of this time-
determination, and it is therefore necessarily bound up with the existence of things
outside me, as the condition of this time-determination" (B276). If, per impossible, my
representations of outer objects were all merely spontaneous inner representations, then
there would be no way for me to make judgments-justified or not-conceming an
objective order. Once I have the required representation of an objective order, I can begin
to think of my internal states as themselves having a determinate order—an order
determined by my experience of objective events: in Kant's terms, this is to 'determine
my existence in time', or to have 'empirical self-knowledge'. Without this empirical self-
knowledge, any inference from internal states to external objects would be impossible.
Therefore my representation of alteration cannot originally come from an inference from
beliefs about my internal states.
Kant finds on this basis that "the consciousness of my existence is at the same
time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" (B276): his
argument shows that I must have some immediate—some non-inferential-contact with
external objects in order to order my experiences and thus become conscious both of my
self as subject of successive experiences and of my experiences as potentially
representative of an objective order.
I conclude that we can summarize Kant's argument in the Refutation as follows:
PI : I can make inferences about external things on the basis of beliefs about my
subjective states.
P2: If PI, then I can order my subjective states in time.
LP3: I can order my subjective states in time. [PI ,P2]
P4. If I can order my subjective states in time, then I have a concept of temporal
succession.
LP5: I have a concept of temporal succession. [P3,P4]
P6: Time itself cannot be perceived (i.e., temporal succession is not itself directly
apprehensible).
TP?: If I have a concept of temporal succession, then I have a concept of alteration. [P6]
(This deduction relies on Kant's reasoning in the First Analogy.)
P8: I have a concept of alteration. [P5,P7]
P9: NOECP.
P10: The concept of alteration contains a simple idea.
LP1 1 : If I have a concept of alteration, then I have had a perception of alteration
[P9,P10]
LP12: Therefore I can make inferences about external things on the basis of beliefs about
my subjective states only if I have had a perception of alteration. [PI -PI 1]
LP13: I have had a perception of alteration. [P8.P 10-1 1]
LP14: I have had a non-inferential perception of alteration. [PI,PI 2- 13] (The cart-before-
the-horse strategy is implemented.)
PI 5: A non-inferential perception of alteration must come from either inner sense or outer
sense.
PI 6: Inner sense cannot yield a non-inferential perception of alteration.
LP17: 1 have had a non-inferential perception of alteration by means of outer sense. [PI 4-
16]
PI 8: If I have had a non-inferential perception of alteration by means of outer sense, then
an external object undergoing alteration has existed during my lifetime.
C: An external object has existed during my lifetime. [PI 7,P1 8]
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This argument explains why Kant feels he can claim in the Refutation that "even our
inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption
of outer experience" (B275). Since I can prove that the existence of an external object
follows from my ability to order my inner experience, the skeptic is wrong in claiming
that I cannot know that an external world exists. 50
Note that Kant is not claiming that any of my particular judgments about the
external world are true, or even justified. In a note appended to the Refutation, he
observes that,
[f]rom the fact that the existence of outer things is required for the possibility of a
determinate consciousness of the self, it does not follow that every intuitive
representation of outer things involves the existence of these things, for their
representation can very well be the product merely of the imagination (as in
dreams and delusions). ..Whether this or that experience be not purely imaginary,
must be ascertained from its special determinations, and through its congruence
with the criteria of all real experience. (B278-9)
Kant s intent in the Refutation is only to defeat a sort of global skepticism which states
that there may for all we know not be any material reality outside us at all. Particular
judgments about the world remain dubitable, thanks to the possibility of any particular
judgment being based on dream or delusion. Kant's argument, if successful, shows just
that I must at least at some point have been in contact with some external object as a
necessary condition of my being aware of the succession of my own states. So global
skepticism is false: an external world exists, or at least must have existed at some point in
50 Or the skeptic is at least wrong in claiming that I cannot know if an external world
has ever existed, since all this argument (if sound) proves is that I have at one time
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my lifetime. Knowing that global skepticism is false, however, it is reasonable to suppose
that some of one s experiences are veridical and to measure their credibility in part against
their coherence with the rest of our experience.
—
How is the Refutation of Idealism Different From the First Edition ’Argument From
Empiricism’?
I have proposed that the Refutation of Idealism in the second edition of the
Critique ofPure Reason relies on the empiricist premise NOECP, just like the 'argument
from empiricism' in the first edition of the Critique.
But does the Refutation succeed in avoiding the same problem that beset Kant's
NOECP-based argument in the first edition Fourth Paralogism? In that argument, Kant
held that we could not be the cause of our representations of empirical qualities like
colors and sounds, and concluded that they must come from external things. He
conceded, however, that inferences from internal representations to external things are
always uncertain, owing to the possibility of more than one cause of those states. Even if
our representations of empirical qualities could not come from our own imagination, they
could still have their source in a hidden faculty in us or an evil demon outside us.
experienced an object independent of my mind.
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In the Refutation, Kant holds that we could not be the cause of our representation
of alteration and concludes that, since inner sense does not reveal an enduring substance
in which we might perceive alteration, this representation must come from outer sense.
But is this not another case of inferring external things from inner representations? Why
can’t an evil demon, for example, be responsible for our alleged outer intuition of the
"moving point in space”?
In fact, despite a superficial similarity, this argument is not parallel to the
NOECP-based Fourth Paralogism argument. The reason for this is that, unlike that
argument from empiricism, the second edition Refutation of Idealism (as I have
interpreted it) concerns not only the necessary conditions of gaining a certain kind of
representation (in this case, the representation of alteration), but also the necessary
conditions ofmaking any inferences at all. This is the defining characteristic of the cart-
belore-the-horse strategy, and explains the advantage the Refutation has over the first
edition NOECP-based argument. The first edition argument from empiricism accepts the
view that our knowledge of external things is wholly inferential, while claiming that our
imagination could not produce all the inner states representing empirical qualities. By
contrast, the second edition argument, through its use of cart-before-the-horse reasoning,
denies that all our knowledge of external things can be inferential, because the experience
of something external—alteration in an enduring substance—is a necessary condition of
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subjective time-determination, and thus of the possibility of any external-world
inferences at all.
So the Refutation argument differs from the 'argument from empiricism' by
denying that our contact with external world objects is always inferential. The Cartesian
and Humean skeptics do not question our beliefs about our current, immediate subjective
experiences; the Refutation argument, unlike the 'argument from empiricism', shows (if
successful) that some of my experience of external world objects has had the same
epistemological status as my immediate subjective experiences. Therefore, if the skeptic
does not question the latter, he should not question the former.
Once it has been established that I have had non-inferential contact with external
objects, the final step is to claim that the only possibility is that I, as a consciousness
which is aware of its states as successive, have actually experienced objective alteration.
Since I have perceived an external object during my lifetime and (according to the
Transcendental Aesthetic) space is the form in which independent objects perceived
through outer intuition are presented to me, an object in space has existed during my
lifetime.
Note that this argument requires no transcendental idealist premises, save perhaps
lor Kant s views on space. The language of the Refutation is to be contrasted, in fact, to
the idealist language of the first edition argument from idealism: there Kant explicitly
reduced objects to representations; in the Refutation he says that the required perception
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of an external object ‘is possible only through a thing outside me, and not through the
mere representation of a thing outside me" (B275). On the reading of the Refutation I
have given, Kant may be taken seriously on this: since his argument lacks transcendental
idealist premises, objections regarding his transcendental idealism need not affect our
appreciation of this more mature anti-skeptical argument of the second edition. 51
This is the very same general strategy that Lipson uses in his "Objective
Experience. There, like Kant, Lipson argues that experience of things independent of us
is a necessary condition of our being aware of succession in our own states. While Lipson
did not do a good job of explaining his reasoning, I argued that it went as follows. In
order to be aware of subjective succession, it is necessary for us to think of ourselves as
agents with respect to our points of view. In order for this to be possible, we need the idea
of points of reference independent of ourselves. But we cannot come up with this idea on
our own (this is where I suggested Lipson is relying on NOECP). Neither can it merely
appear to us that such points exist; this would require a judgment based on subjective
experiences already thought of as subjective and organized temporally, and such an
ordering is impossible without the prior idea of an independent point of reference (this is
where I thought Lipson was implicitly using a cart-before-the-horse-type strategy).
51
Paul Guyer in fact argues that it is Kant's intention all along in the Refutation to
depart fromn his transcendental idealism and establish the existence of objects in a pre-
critical and non-phenomenal sense (Guyer [1987], pp.280-3). Whether or not this is so, it
is of interest that Kant’s argument on my reading does not have to concern objects in the
transcendental idealist sense.
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So, if Kant and Lipson are arguing as I have interpreted them, the only major
difference between their argument lies in the necessary condition they focus on for a
subject's awareness of the succession of his internal states, a condition they take to imply
the existence of something independent of a self. In Kant's case the necessary condition is
the presence of the idea of alteration; in Lipson’s case it is the presence of the idea of an
independent point of reference. In each case, they claim that the relevant idea could
originally arise neither spontaneously as a result of the action of the imagination nor from
an inference based on a succession of one’s internal states. Their final step is to claim that
the only possibility is that I, as a consciousness which is aware of its states as successive,
have actually experienced either objective alteration or independent points of reference;




The argument as I have construed it occupies an unusual niche among
philosophical arguments. It has one foot in both the a priori and empirical camps.
Although it is an a priori argument not relying on any particular observations, it is
empirical in relying on the fact of empirical experience in general--on the premise, that is,
that one does make judgments about enduring and causally related external-world objects.
52 Note that some verificationist arguments discussed in the previous chapter give a
stronger result than the line of reasoning I am examining here. Strawson's neo-Kantian
argument says that, assuming our subjective/objective distinction is legitimate or
meaningful, we must be in possession of adequate criteria to apply external-world
concepts; but then we must be in a position right now to know whether the world
currently exists.
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These judgments indicate that one must be capable of ordering one's experiences in time.
From this reasoning Kant feels one can conclude that something exists or has existed--
namely, an external object undergoing change, the perception of which is responsible for
my capacity to order my experiences.
Descartes looked for some marks by which definitively to distinguish between
dreaming and waking experience; his failure to identify any such marks in a convincing
way led to Cartesian skepticism. Kant does not look for any such phenomenological
evidence that one's experience is veridical:
In the realism of outer sense nothing is asserted except that not even imagination
could make any things at all representable as objects of the senses outside us as
such, unless there really were such a sense; thus we do not distinguish the latter as
a capacity distinct from the imagination by sensation alone, but by a certain
inference... (R63 16, 18:622-3)
Kant looks for some capacity any skeptic must agree we have-in this case, the ability to
represent an outer world, which in turn is dependent on the ability to order one's
experiences—and gives reasons why that capacity would be impossible in the absence of
external objects. This allows us to infer from the reality of our inner sense that outer
sense really does present (or at least has in the past presented) an outer world. The result
is a reductio of the skeptic's position; Kant demonstrates (or hopes to) that the skeptic's
acceptance of the reality of inner sense is incompatible with complete skepticism about
the reality of an external world. Thus Kant's argument is an anti-skeptical transcendental
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argument: an argument that the necessary conditions of experience in general include the
existence of outer objects.
Lipson considers this sort of argument to be a distant relative of the Cartesian
Cogito argument, which he represents as follows:
P 1 : An experience occurs at t.
P2: If an experience occurs at t, then a self exists at /.
C: A self exists at
This argument premises not some particular empirical experience, but rather just that
some experience is taking place (which I can know immediately whenever I am thinking).
From this, it concludes that something independent of experience exists—namely, a self.
Like the Refutation argument (according to my construal), it does not depend on some
suppressed premise connecting the possession of a concept of a certain sort with access to
criteria sufficient to determine whether the concept is instantiated. It is not, therefore, a
verificationist argument and is not subject to the standard criticism of anti-skeptical
transcendental arguments given by Stroud and Brueckner.
10. Making Sense of Non-Idealistic Immediacy
If we reduce objects to lawfully related representations, as Kant appears to do in
his more idealistic moments, then it is easy to see how we can be in immediate contact
with them. But if we do not want to do this—and I don't think Kant wants to do this in the
Refutation—then what is a non-inferential alternative?
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What the Refutation says is necessary is a perception of alteration which is not
arrived at by inference from beliefs about a succession of different perceptions. Neither
can the content ot this mental representation be spontaneously arrived at. So what is
needed is an account of perception which describes single, direct perceptions of change,
without degrading the status of objects to that of representations. What this leaves open is
whether the only way to sense change is to sense change in an object. The possibility that
my original contact with temporal succession-the original contact that NOECP demands-
-could come from introspection on my changing mental states appeared to be blocked by
Vogel's argument that there is no intuition of inner sense which could count as a direct
intuition of change of mental state, since any change in mental state means non-
continuity of any inner intuition. However, there are several available compromise
positions which could be thought to explain the possibility of a non-inferential perception
of change, though they each fall short of a refutation of skepticism.
There are several existing views on perception which would explain how one
could directly sense temporal complexity in an intuition which is not itself temporally
complex (i.e., not itself in need of ordering). In other words, there are several views of
perception according to which temporal extension is an apprehensible property like sound
or color. The first two of these views employ what is called the ‘specious present’
account of perception. On the specious present account, experience is composed of
atomic moments of perception, each of which is temporally extended. One such view
53
Lipson, "How Not To...," p. 1
.
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holds that one may be able to sense change by means of a single intuition which is itself
temporally extended, and thus comprehend an extended span of time, in which change
may take place and be represented by it; this view has been put forth by Henry James,
A.N. Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, and Adolf Grunbaum. Another view maintains that
one may be able to directly sense an extended span of time by means of an intuition
which is not itself temporally extended; this view has been maintained by Thomas Reid
and C.D. Broad. Finally, Jonathan Vogel claims that one can sense change by means of
an intuition which is neither itself temporally extended nor able to directly present a span
of time. The first two of these three theories employs the notion of a 'specious present' of
perception. I shall discuss each of these three views, respectively, in the next three
sections.
1 1 . Grunbaum's Specious Present
Taking his lead from James 4 and Whitehead, ^ Adolf Grunbaum claims that,
when we attend to the "coming into being" of the component parts of processes or events,
phenomenological evidence points to the stream of our consciousness being divided into
atomic, temporally extended acts of consciousness. 56 Peter Mclnemey adds that, if mental
life were made up of infinitesimal temporal parts, any mental act of recollection or
" 4 See William James, Some Problems ofPhilosophy (New York: Longmans, Green,
1948), pp. 154-5.
55 See A.N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, 1929), p.53.
56 Adolf Grunbaum, "Modem Science and Zeno's Paradoxes of Motion," The
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synthesis would be of infinite complexity. 57 Grunbaum consequently divides perceptual
experience into a series of 'specious nows' whose duration is determined by the duration
of our acts of becoming aware of the occurrence of events. Consider his description of
our perception of the movement of a runner:
suppose that we are perceptually aware of a runner's motion as it is taking place
and think of it as actually happening. Then our actual experience of its
becoming. ..has the following feature: there is a first event of the motion,
constituted by the runner’s presence at the point of his departure, a temporally next
event right after the departure event, consecutively ordered temporally
intermediate events...and the terminal event of the motion constituted by his
arrival there. 58
Our temporal experience, on Grunbaum's view, is constituted by temporal "minima
pet ceptihilia which themselves— in the case of the experience of a process which
involves continuous change—may encompass a change in perceptual content. 59
This might be thought to solve the problem of how it is one can have a direct
experience of alteration, because on this view what we experience with a single act of
consciousness is an extended event; assuming a change in perceptual content over the
period in question, one could assert that one has had a non-inferential experience of
alteration—at least, that is, of alteration in perceptual content.
Does the notion of the direct experience of alteration in subjective states conflict
with the doctrine of the First Analogy? In the First Analogy Kant argues that the
Philosophy of Time, ed. by Richard M. Gale (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p.436.
57
Peter K. Mclnemey, "What Is Still Valuable in Husserl's Analyses of Inner Time-
Consciousness," The Journal ofPhilosophy, 85 (1988), pp.605-16.
58 Grunbaum, "Modem Science," p.437.
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distinction between a subjective order of experiences and an objective order of events
requires the postulation of enduring substances whose alteration gives the objective order
its necessity (i.e., the non-accidentalness of its order). This necessity is what he identifies
as the characteristic which we use to distinguish between subjective and objective. This is
not inconsistent with the suggestion that we perceive changes in perceptual content
within a single act of apprehension; one could still maintain that, in order to distinguish
an objective order from such a subjective succession, one needs to postulate enduring
external objects whose change is responsible for the change in states which one directly
apprehends.
Note that, even if we accept this account of temporal awareness, we would not
necessarily get an anti-skeptical result: all this view says is that our subjective experience
ol the passage of events is divided into a sequence of atomic, temporally extended
awarenesses. This theory would get us non-inferential awareness of change
,
since it
would not take some unification of separate subjective states in order to infer a change in
some independent object. However, it would not give us non-inferential contact with
objects or their alteration; what it would mean is that we experience changes in
perceptual content in the space of a single intuition. This would by itself tell us nothing
about the cause of these changes in content, or about the cause of the content itself: this
theory, in other words, would not rule out the possibility of something other than external
objects being responsible for our changing experiences (recall that all the First Analogy
59
This is not intended by Grunbaum to be a claim about objective, or physical, time.
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shows is that we must suppose that those changes are caused by enduring external
substances).
The question for Grunbaum is, "Why does our experience allegedly demonstrate
this atomicity? His answer appears to be that perceptual experience, insofar as it can
represent experience placed in a determinate subjective temporal framework, requires
judgment; and judgment requires time. He claims that our experience of temporal
succession involves an awareness of the passage of a succession of 'nows' he calls
temporal becoming.' 60 This becoming, he thinks, "is mind-dependent because it is not an
attribute of physical events per se but requires the occurrence of states of conceptualized
awareness”.
6 ' As he says,
what qualifies a physical [or mental] event as belonging to the present or as
now.. .is that at least one human.. .is conceptually aware of the following complex
fact: that his having the experience of the event coincides temporally with an
awareness of the fact that he has it at all.62
So the extendedness or atomicity of experience is accounted for by fact that our
awareness of temporal passage is a conceptual awareness, and so requires a temporally
extended process to arrive at the judgment that an experience conforms to the concept in
question.
60 Grunbaum, "The Status of Temporal Becoming," The Philosophy of Time, p.322.
61 Grunbaum, "The Status...," p.324.
62 Grunbaum, "The Status...," p.333.
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Izchak Miller questions Grunbaum's original impetus for the claim that our
experience is made up of enduring acts of awareness. He first denies that reflection
reveals this, and also claims that,
[although we cannot reflectively individuate an instantaneous act, or a phase of
an act, we do reflectively experience the continuity of our acts. It is an overly
narrow empiricism which demands that every theoretical notion of a
phenomenological theory be directly linked with reflective observables. 63
Even if we ignore this objection, Grunbaum's account cannot be the ultimate
explanation for our awareness of succession. According to Kant's argument, we are
unable to make subjective temporal determinations and thus order our states in time
without the (non-inferential) experience of alteration. Our hypothesis was that
Grunbaum's account of experience could explain how we can have a non-inferential
experience of alteration, since his account implies that our perceptual acts are themselves
temporally extended and thus capable in a single act of comprehending a change in
perceptual content. But we see now that this account cannot fulfill the required role: a
temporally extended conceptual process requires the mind to go through steps and make
comparisons between data and a concept; but in doing so it involves successive stages
and thus requires the ability to determine the order thereof. 64 In addition, if the awareness
of temporal becoming is a conceptual awareness that an experience is 'now', then the
concept of temporal change must be employed in such an awareness; but Kant's claim is
6
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Press, 1984), p. 1 73.
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that this concept cannot arise on its own, and thus requires a prior perceptual experience
of succession. Grunbaum’s account thus falls prey to a cart-before-the-horse-type
argument, which would point out that a conceptual awareness of temporal succession
cannot be presupposed by the ultimate explanation of our ability to have a conceptual
awareness of temporal succession.
For these reasons, then, what Kant's argument demands, as a necessary condition
of time-consciousness, is a temporally extended perception (or ‘intuition,’ to use his
term), rather than a temporally extended conception. So the James/Whitehead/Grunbaum
account—regardless of whether it is a correct account of the conceptual nature of human
temporal experience cannot account for an original, single experience of change.
12. Broad's Specious Present
Following Reid,65 C.D. Broad maintains that the contents of our acts of awareness
themselves have to have some duration. 66 Broad and Reid both think so basically because
it is difficult to see how a durationless event could be an object of perception.67 Broad
claims that "a sensible event has a finite duration which may be roughly defined as the
time during which it is sensed, as distinct from being remembered...;what can be sensed
65 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers
,
ed. by A.D. Woozley, p.209.
66
J.D. Mabbott notes that Locke also maintained this (though later also seemed to deny
it). See Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience of Time," The Philosophy of Time, p.304.
67
Broad also maintains, like James, et al, that acts of awareness have duration. But his
claim about the extensiveness of the objects of acts of awareness rather than the acts
deserves independent scrutiny as a potential answer to the problem at hand.
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at any given moment stretches a little way back behind that moment" 68 . To illustrate this
view, J.D. Mabbott uses the analogy of a searchlight illuminating a continuously
changing, extended span of its object (the stream of sense-data) as it moves through
time. 69
There is some reason to think Kant shared this view. Another part of his Analytic
of Principles is his section on the Axioms of Intuition." Like the Analogies, the Axioms
describe for Kant things which we can (in some sense) know to be true of objects
independently of experience, since thinking of them in this way is a condition of
representing things objectively, or as part of an objective order. The 'a priori principle' of
the Axioms is that "all intuitions are extensive magnitudes" (B202). This is to say that
everything which can be an object of perception must be generated out of parts
(A163/B203). According to Kant, in order to think of something as an object of
perception, I must think of it as made up of extended parts; in other words, Kant thinks it
is definitive of objects of perception that they be made of parts which are themselves
extended (in space and/or time, as the case may be).
Kant further claims (this time in the Anticipations of Perception) that
Space and time are quanta continua
,
because no part of them can be given save as
enclosed between limits (points or instants), and therefore only in such fashion
that this part is itself again a space or a time. ...Points and instants are only limits,
that is, mere positions which limit space and time. ..and out of mere positions,
viewed as constituents capable of being given prior to space or time, neither space
nor time can be constructed. (A169/B21 1)
68 C.D. Broad, Scientific Thought (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1923), p.348.
69
Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience," pp.313-4.
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Kant appears to be saying that infinitesimal points in space and time are mathematical or
logical constructs which are parasitical on an a priori notion of, or experience with,
objects extended in space and/or time (see also A25/B39, A31-2/B47-8). So it appears to
be Kant's position that what is basic to perception is objects (or at least sense-data) which
are extended in space and/or time.
If this account were correct, it might solve the problem of how we can have a
direct experience ot alteration, for it implies that we are directly aware at any given
'instant' of perception of a temporally extended span of sense-data. If such a span were to
comprehend a change in data, then we might characterize this as a direct perception of
change, we could then use this to fill in that condition identified by Kant as necessary to
gain awareness of ourselves as temporal beings with successive perceptions in a
determinate order. 70
1 his account, so long as it did not also maintain the necessity of temporally
extended acts of awareness, would be superior to that of Grunbaum, since an account
which says only that the objects of our awareness have duration does not require a
conceptual unification of an act of consciousness itself immersed in temporal succession.
70 The perceptive reader may wonder at this point whether this doctrine might conflict
with the First Analogy, which employs the premise that there is no direct perception of
endurance. Broad's account suggests that there may be a direct perception of the
endurance of sensory states. But what the First Analogy actually requires is that there is
no direct perception of endurance through changes in mental state
,
or sensation; such a
perception would explain the distinction between objective and subjective which the First
Analogy says must otherwise be derived from the postulation of independent substances
enduring through changes in their qualities.
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It would not beg the question, as Grunbaum's does, of how we gain the ability of make
judgments about temporal succession.
Kant does in fact say that
[apprehension by means merely of sensation occupies only an instant, if. that is. I
do not take into account the succession of different sensations. As sensation is that
element in the [field of] appearance the apprehension of which does not involve a
successive synthesis proceeding from parts to the whole representation, it has no
extensive magnitude. (A167/B209)
Kant thus seems to explicitly endorse the view that, while the objects of sensation have
extension in time, sensation itself does not; this he distinguishes from a case in which a
synthesis of parts is required in order to arrive at a representation. Such would be the case
if one were engaged in a act ofjudgment, in which some data were brought under a
concept. Broad’s specious present account is primarily an account of a direct perceptual
awareness of endurance (and change), rather than one of a conceptual awareness thereof;
this is what Kant's argument requires.
Note that, as in Grunbaum’s account, even if the application of the theory of a
Broadian specious present of perception were successful, it would not provide an answer
to the skeptic. All Broad's account requires is that we be directly aware of change in our
sense-data; this says nothing about what the source of that data must be. What the
Broadian specious presents gives us is a direct perception of change--but not a direct
perception of objective alteration. Thus, again, even if this account were correct and
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successfully employed as fulfilling the key necessary condition of making STJs cited by
Kant, proof of independent, temporally extended objects would not follow.
There is also reason to think that Broad's account is just not accurate. Mabbott
cites the arbitrariness of deciding just how long the minimum (or maximum) duration of
the specious present of sense-data must be. 71 Whatever psychological methods of
measurement are used, such as amount of information that can be recalled without error,
the results of those measurements will vary across individuals, levels of fatigue and types
ol sense. Also different methods of measurement have produced widely different results.
A deeper problem is suggested by the psychologist E.G. Boring. 72 Boring asks, "if
a duration is immediately observed, when do you observe it?" His question points out the
difficulty in understanding the connection between the 'moment' of observation and the
enduring input of the sense data which is—allegedly—immediately assimilated by the
observation. If the observation takes place in a moment, then what is the sense in which
the sense-data, which fall under that observation and yet do not occur at the same time as
it, can be contemporaneous objects of observation? This objection does not rest on the
fact that there can be delays between events and our perceptions of them that are owing to
limitations of the speed of sound or light. What Broad's account implies is that I can be
currently and directly aware of sense-data which are not actually present. I think that
Boring's point is that this implication is just hard to accept.
71
Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience," pp.315-7.
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As cited by Mabbott, "Our Direct Experience," p.3 1 8.
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One way to avoid Boring’s objection might be to conceive of acts of awareness as
themselves temporally extended. But if the observation—the mental act of awareness-
comprehending the supposed specious present of perception is conceived of as itself
temporally extended, then the account becomes subject to the same cart-before-the-horse-
type reasoning leveled against the use of Grunbaum's specious present as the explanation
for our original idea of alteration: such an account would presuppose the awareness of
succession in attempting to account for that awareness.
Miller questions one original impetus for the extended present of the real or
phenomenal objects of awareness, namely the fact that we do not reflectively encounter
durationless events. He claims, with Richard Gale, that we can derive the theoretical
existence of instantaneous slices of events from the existence of ostensively identified
enduring events. 73 "It is an overly narrow empiricism," Gale says, "which demands that
every theoretical concept of a physical theory be directly linked with observables through
co-ordinating definitions." 74
So Broad's specious present would provide, in theory, what Kant's account
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13. Vogel's Answer
Jonathan Vogel has a suggestion as to how a single intuition can be temporally
complex without itself being extended (and thus itself requiring temporal synthesis) or
comprehending a temporally extended span of sense-data. His suggestion is that a single
’moment' of sense-data can exhibit or present temporal complexity-and thus present
change directly. Note how a graph of change in population over time can represent such
change without itself changing; thus a glance at the graph can take in the notion of change
over time without a synthesis of temporally diverse pieces of information. Similarly, the
notation 'pp. 1-12’ can describe a sequence of pages without itself being a temporally
extended sequence. Obviously, the perception of a graph or a notation describing a
sequence requires an interpretation involving one's prior understanding of the notion of
succession. Thus these sorts of perceptions cannot be ultimately responsible for our idea
of succession.
Consider, however, the blur you see when a fast-moving fly crosses your field of
vision. Vogel suggests that a sense-data 'moment' 76 of that experience can communicate
the notion of change without requiring either a Grunbaumian or Broadian specious
present. The blurring of the object, in other words, supplies the content needed (according
to Kant's empiricist argument in the Refutation) to conceive of change and thus, in turn,
succession in one's own states. Since no inference is required, the intuition of change in
77
Private conversation.
76 Each such 'moment' will have a manifold of sense-data as its sensory content; thus I
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question can be called immediate. The key difference between this view and those of
Grunbaum and Broad is that no change in content is postulated as being part of the single
intuition of change: rather, the change is supposed to be part of the temporally simple
sense-data presentation.
Vogel s account could also explain how Lipson's 'points of reference' could be
communicated non-inferentially. If Vogel's view is correct, then we could also get the
idea of an independent point of reference by noting the change in perspective regarding
an external object through the same blurring effect; in other words, the idea of an
independent point of reference could be communicated directly by the non-inferentially
perceived motion of one object relative to another, or of the change which takes place
when I move my body relative to some (relatively) fixed object or location.
Note, however, that, as in Grunbaum's and Broad's accounts of the specious
present, this account would do little to respond to the skeptic: even if the skeptic were to
concede that change could be communicated non-inferentially in this way, he could still
claim that the real source of the sense-data moments which communicate changes
remains a mystery. Vogel concedes this: he says that Kant's argument, construed as
employing his explanation for the experience of change,
is ambitious in some ways, in other ways it is not. If successful, it would show
that we have knowledge that some thing external to the mind had undergone some
change at some time. Thus, it would eliminate the possibility that your whole life
has been a dream. I'm not certain how much it would count against the possibility
call them sense-data moments.
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that >ou have been a brain in a vat, whose events are caused by some material
object affecting your sense-organs. 77
Vogel feels he can conclude that the source of the sense-datum in question (the
perception of the blurred fly) comes from 'outside', because, like Kant, he is implicitly
relying on the claim that the idea of change is primitive or simple and that simple ideas
must come from experience. But this argument says nothing to secure the conclusion that
my sense-data come from external objects as I conceive of them; all it shows is that I
must be (or, rather, must at least at one time have been) passive with respect to a single
sense-datum presentation of change.
In addition to objections to the Humean principle (i.e., NOECP) at work in
Vogel's version of Kant's argument, a couple of objections to Vogel's suggestion come to
mind. First of all, can we assume that the temporal complexity presented in simple sense-
data presentations can be detected without an act of inference or interpretation? Vogel's
view of the perception of change is meant to supply something which can play the role of
the intuitive presentation Kant's argument requires as a necessary condition of STJs.
STJs, furthermore, are a necessary condition of making any judgment, since any
judgment requires the synthesis of temporally diverse mental contents. Thus if Vogel's
alleged non-inferential presentation of change itself requires an act ofjudgment or
inference in order for the idea of change to be derived from it, then this sort of perception
cannot be the ultimate explanation for our ability to make STJs.
77
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On Vogel's conception, however, the non-inferential perception of change is a




in the same way that the experience of something blue exhausts the
perceptual content of an idea of that shade of blue. Vogel's claim is precisely that the
perception of change-as essentially similar to a perception of any simple quality-does
not require interpretation; this is the force of claiming that the idea of change is a simple
idea and that we can have a single intuition of it. Vogel's claim, in fact, is consistent with
Hume's claim that all simple ideas come from simple impressions of the senses; all Vogel
is saying is that the idea of change, which he believes is itself simple, is indeed derived
from a simple impression of change. If the Humean accepts the premise, then, that the
idea of change is simple, then he should accept Vogel's conclusion.
But what does this conclusion involve? Consider again Vogel's example of the
momentary impression of the blur of a fly moving past. Is this blur an irreducible,
elementary component of my perception of rapid motion, or is it the appearance ofmy
conscious mind's collection of a series of moments? When you take a photograph of
something moving rapidly, you see a blur. The blur is the impression on the film of the
moving object over a period of time; the film captures a blur because, owing to the film's
insufficient sensitivity, the shutter needed to be open for a period of time so that an image
could register on the film. I would suggest that this reason for the blur appearing on film
78
If we believe the First Analogy, to the sensory content of the idea of change must be
added the a priori concept of substance in order to get an idea of alteration.
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is roughly analogous to the reason for a blurred perception: the blur represents for us the
combination of a series of perceived fly positions. But if Vogel's Kantian argument is that
a single impression of a blur apparently caused by a "moving point in space" is what is
required for our capacity to make STJs, then Vogel’s account of the impression must
involve the notion of a Broadian specious present: if we see a blur because of the
combined effect of a sequence of impressions, then a single impression of a blur must
encompass a temporally extended segment of sensory input.
This leaves Vogel's account of the non-inferential perception of change open to
whatever criticisms pertain to Broad's notion of a specious present. The most troubling of
those criticisms, as we saw above, is that Broad's account implies that we can be currently
observing something which is not present. I also noted that, if we try to answer this
objection by conceiving of mental acts of awareness as themselves temporally extended,
then the reasons why Grunbaum's account of temporal awareness cannot explain the
direct awareness of change required by Kant's argument will also undermine Vogel's
account.
Suppose, however, that Vogel's account about the direct experience of change is
right and that concerns about the Broadian specious present can be alleviated. There
remains a question as to what the Refutation—filled in this way—adds to the Humean
picture of our knowledge of the world. The Refutation, construed in this way, says that
the idea of change is a necessary condition of our making judgments concerning our
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subjective temporal order. Using Hume’s principle that simple ideas come from
impressions and assuming that the idea of change is a simple one, the argument of the
Refutation (as I have been reading it) concludes that the non-inferential experience of
objective change is a necessary condition of STJs. When we apply Vogel's version of
what that non-inferential experience could be, we get the result that, if we are conscious
of our existence as temporal beings, we must have been at some point passive recipients
of a sensory impression of change. As noted above, Vogel agrees that this conclusion
does not refute epistemological skepticism based on brain-in-a-vat (or evil demon)
skepticism, but it does show that the claim that all our allegedly adventitious ideas could
come from ourselves-e.g., from dreams-can't be right.
The question is, what does this argument add that does not already follow from
Hume's premise concerning the origin of simple ideas and the observation that we have
any ideas at all? If we accept Hume's premise, then doesn't the falsity of global dream
skepticism (i.e., the claim that all our ideas might come from dreams) follow from the
fact that we have ideas of shape and color? The argument of the Refutation, as I have
construed it, is an attempt to show that the idea of change can be got inferentially only if
it was already employed in making STJs. This shows that, though the idea of change
could be got inferentially, it cannot originally come to us by this method. So the idea of
change is simple, and by Humean reasoning it must then come from a simple impression.
Thus our idea of change must come from something independent of us. But we already
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knew before all this that the idea, say, of a particular shade of blue is a simple idea that
must come from a simple impression and, therefore, must come from something
independent of us; we knew at the outset (we may suppose) that the ideas of the various
shades of blue cannot all have been derived inferentially from something else (even if
some such particular shades could). So why go to all the trouble of proving this in regard
to the idea of change?
Recall that Hume denied that we have a legitimate idea of substance because there
is not a direct perception of endurance through changes in my perceptions. This might
explain why Kant (and perhaps also Vogel) might be led to think that applying NOECP to
the idea of change would do something that its application to other simple empirical ideas
would not. A direct perception of change, if legitimately attributed to an alteration of
states of a substance, could be described as a direct perception of endurance. Hume
concluded from the alleged fact that there is no direct perception of endurance not only
that we could not know that substances exist, but also that the idea of a substance—i.e., an
independent, relatively abiding external-world object—was without content. One might be
led to think from this that, if one could show that one had a direct perception of
endurance, then Hume’s skepticism would be refuted.
But the argument as Vogel construes it could not accomplish this: at best, all the
argument shows is that one has a direct perception of change in one's states. However
necessary it may be for us to postulate (as the First Analogy claims) the existence of
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substances in order to distinguish conceptually between a subjective and an objective
order of perceptions, this does not show that such things exist.
Alternatively, one could argue that, if Vogel is right that a direct perception of
change in one's states is possible, the direct perception of endurance in those states must
also be possible. But this would not constitute a direct perception of an independent
object’s endurance through a change in mental states; Hume's point about the
meaninglessness of our references to substance rests on the lack of a perception of the
latter sort.
Either way, whether we focus on the idea of a shade of blue or on the idea of
change, the most we can conclude relevant to skepticism by this reasoning is that global
dream skepticism is false. This does not allow us to reject Cartesian skepticism about the
material world: an evil demon could still be responsible for our sense-impressions of
change just as it could be responsible for our other adventitious ideas. At best, all the
Refutation can do is to show that my idea of change is indeed adventitious and thus
comes from 'outer' sense rather than 'inner' sense; it cannot show that it comes from the
experience of a material object in space.
There is, in fact, a footnote to the Refutation which suggests that merely showing
that some of my ideas come from outside me was all Kant really wanted to prove:
The immediate consciousness of the existence of outer things is, in the preceding
thesis, not presupposed, but proved, be the possibility of this consciousness
understood by us or not. The question as to its possibility would be this: whether
we have an inner sense only, and no outer sense, but merely an outer imagination.
It is clear, however, that in order even only to imagine something as outer, that is.
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to present it to sense in intuition, we must already have an outer sense, and must
thereby immediately distinguish the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the
spontaneity which characterizes every act of imagination. For should we merely
be imagining an outer sense, the faculty of intuition, which is to be determined by
the faculty of imagination, would itself be annulled. (B276-7, n.)
Vogel claims that, if we imagine the existence of mental states which can exist
unperceived, then we are thereby imagining mind-independent items whose ontological
independence "would, at least to a certain extent, make them objects in the 'external
world Presumably the same would hold true for faculties which produce mental states.
However, even if we disregard the other problems with this line of reasoning, the
conclusion of this argument understood in this way is weak and dissatisfying as an
answer to the skeptic. Skepticism is not limited to an absolute solipsism which can be
refuted by showing that something other than one's mind exists. Cartesian and Humean
skepticism primarily question whether what I think of as the components of the world
external to my mind-namely, spatially extended enduring objects-exist. What Kant
needs to repair the "scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general" perpetrated by
Descartes and Hume is something altogether stronger: what is needed is the true
"immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me" he lays claim to in
the Refutation. But through what mechanism could such consciousness be achieved?
Kant hints at an answer. In the second edition preface note concerning the
Refutation he suggests a closer connection between my ability to determine my own
existence in time and the existence of an object outside me:
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This latter must therefore be an external thing distinct from all my representations,
and its existence must be included in the determination of my own existence,
constituting with it but a single experience such as would not take place even
inwardly if it were also at the same time, in part, outer. How this should be
possible we are as little capable of explaining further as we are of accounting for
our being able to think the abiding in time, the coexistence of which with the
changing generates the concept of alteration. (Bxli, n.)
There are at least two ways of reading this passage. One is to read it as describing the way
in which the sense-experience of change conditions my ability to determine my existence
in time; the other is to read it more literally, as describing the way in which an actual
experience of an external object is somehow identical to (or a proper part of) the original
determination of my existence in time. The latter would constitute a rejection of the
skeptic's inferential picture, in which we infer facts about the world from sense-
experience. But if there is any way to make such a rejection coherent without degrading
the status of objects to that of mere representations, Kant does not tell us what it is.
14. Concluding Remarks
The mature Kantian approach to the problem of skepticism is a tantalizing attempt
to demonstrate the falsity of the radical skeptical hypothesis by using premises about
general and undeniable facts about one's own experience in conjunction with a
fundamental, widely accepted view of the origin of our mental contents-a view explicitly
embraced at least by the empiricist skeptic. This approach may fall short, however, in
several respects.
79
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First of all, for the skeptic to be refuted, NOECP needs to be established as
certain; as long as NOECP remains dubitable, so does the conclusion of any argument
which depends on it. For Hume’s introspective evidence for NOECP to be sufficient, we
need to show that Descartes is right when he says that I am necessarily aware of the
activity of any faculty in me (my mind). But Descartes’ support for this belief ultimately
rests on his outdated demonstrations of God's existence. In defending Kant's argument,




But when one considers the contemporary acceptance of talk about the
unconscious and subconscious mind, this faith in inner transparency is not very
compelling.
Vogel also suggests that the origin of my idea of succession cannot come from
dreams because my awareness of the alteration in my own states that takes place in
dreams rests on a prior grasp of the idea of succession . 81 But the relevant hypothesis is not
that my idea of succession is inferred from my dreams, but that some unknown mental
faculty in me might be capable of spontaneously and non-inferentially generating the idea
of succession. The feeling that such a faculty cannot exist is based on an empiricist
prejudice which can be questioned by the epistemological skeptic just as readily as the
prejudice that I am clearly in regular contact with an external world by means of my






just a result of the fact that its relevance to external world skepticism is not apparent until
one fully understands Kant’s attempt to refute it.
On the other hand, as I argued earlier, one could argue that it is acceptable to
assume that my reason is functioning properly as I devise an anti-skeptical argument, for
skepticism about my ability to reason is unanswerable by argument and thus could be
said to represent a different level of skepticism altogether. If this is so, then another
assumption about my cognitive capacity—the assumption that I am not capable of
generating original empirical content-doesn’t seem so unreasonable, since that
assumption is only a negative claim about my capacities, rather than a positive one.
If we accept this assumption and thus accept NOECP, and add to that the claim
that the idea of succession is a Humean simple idea, then at least we get the result that I
am passive with respect to the inception of some of my ideas and thus possess not only an
outer imagination but also a genuine 'outer sense'. This would be sufficient to refute a
radical solipsism based on dream or hidden faculty skepticism. However, it is a big step
from passivity with regard to some sense-experiences to the existence of outer objects. In
addition, this result would seem to follow from Hume's empiricism about other simple
ideas without Kant’s help.
Kant's argument gives the result that we have a direct, non-inferential perceptual
contact with change. One way to explain this would be to claim that our consciousness of
our own (outer) sense-data comes in the form of a specious present; in other words, that
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our awareness of our own sense-experiences comes in the form of a sequence of
awarenesses which have duration and thus have temporally extended sensory contents.
As we have seen, however, it is very difficult to understand how we can be
immediately aware of sense-data that are not present. On the other hand, it is also difficult
to see, as Kant and Reid pointed out, how we could be aware of a temporally unextended
piece of data.
In any event, if we construe the conclusion of the argument as implying a direct
consciousness of sense-data, the skeptic can always question the origin of that data. If we
accept the possibility that the direct perception of endurance argued for by the Refutation
could mean just the direct perception of enduring sense-data presentations, then the
Refutation loses what distinguished it from the first edition 'argument from empiricism'.
Recall that the latter argument accepted that our knowledge of the external world is
inferential. This allows the skeptic to question the true source of my ideas, even if he
accepts NOECP and the claim that I myself (or the faculties I know I possess) cannot be
the souce of my ideas of empirical qualities. The Refutation was intended to improve on
this argument by showing that some immediate experience of enduring objects is
necessary. But if we allow the experience of mere sense-data presentations to serve the
purpose of generating the idea of alteration, then we also discard the notion that we must
have immediate contact with external objects. Skeptical hypotheses like the evil demon
hypothesis remain untouched by such a conclusion, and so this argument would fall well
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short of repairing "the scandal to philosophy and to human reason" that Kant set out to
fix.
An alternative and stronger conclusion regarding direct contact with external
objects is hinted at by Kant in his preface note regard the Refutation, but it is not
explained. It is unsatisfying to leave the answer, as he sometimes seems to want to do, as
an unexplainable brute fact about us: a mysterious immediate contact with objects we
simply must have as a condition of empirical self-consciousness and which is as
unexplainable by human reason as the fact that the universe exists, or the fact that the
form of our experience is spatio-temporal.
Still, this argument is much more interesting than a mere application of idealism,
or a trivial application of a problematic verificationist principle. Also, the conclusion
allegedly reached by the argument is the right one for a response to skepticism: actual
knowledge of objects, rather than justified belief in them, or meaningful reference to
them. Contrary to Strawson's protestations, the way to get this result is indeed to attempt
"a priori genetic psychology," in which one argues in favor of certain necessary
conditions of being able even to form certain sorts of belief-regardless of whether those
beliefs are either justified or meaningful.
Also, now that we understand the nature of Kant's argument in the Refutation, we
can clear up Guyer's confusion about it. Recall that Guyer concluded that the goal of the
Refutation is to give a necessary condition of the justification of STJs because he did not
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see "in what sense a principle which is not a psychological factor in the production of a
form of beliefcan serve as a condition of the possibility of a form ofjudgment except by
furnishing the basic framework for the justification of beliefs" 82 In fact, the Refutation is
an argument about a necessary condition of the formation of a kind of belief-a belief
about succession in one's own states. The latter is a condition of the possibility of
judgments about one's own states, which in turn is necessary for judgments about the
external world.
"Clearly," Guyer says, "Kant does not treat claims to the knowledge of the
existence of external objects as a psychological condition in the refutation of idealism." 83
This is right, but we have seen in this essay that there is a coherent line of argument that
genuine (if not necessarily veridical) outer experience is a necessary condition of making
certain kinds ofjudgments; and if outer experience could be shown to be a condition of
making such judgments, then one could then at least make a general claim to have
knowledge that something external to oneself exists. Kant's argument as I have construed
it is a failure, but it comes tantalizingly close to a goal that many of his imitators have
missed by a wide margin.
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